Toward a Cultural History of the Cold War in Turkey

Ideological dynamics, cultural production, media

Edited by Fulvio Bertuccelli

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UNIVERSITÀ EDITRICE

Historica

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In copertina | *Cover image*: Da Rainer Hachfeld: *Freiheit Fur Die Turkei* TÜSTAV Arşivi: https://www.tustav.org/afisler/

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Exploring the ideological and cultural dimensions of the Cold War in Turkey

Fulvio Bertuccelli

Since its appearance, the concept of "Cold War" has been a matter of debate that in the second half of the 20th century engaged scholars in different strands as diplomatic, military and international relations history. Nonetheless, "Cold War" is an intrinsically polysemic term defining both an international system, and a time period, a concept and even a cultural construct[1]. As highlighted by Melvin P. Leffler, what we call "Cold War" was indeed a "complex system" with different geopolitical, economic, ideological and cultural dimensions[2]. Since about the 1990s, we have witnessed a "kaleidoscopic multiplication of perspectives, contextualizations, methodological approaches, and meanings,"[3] thanks to a new scholarly production that resists easy categorization and draws on insights from a range of disciplines, including cultural studies, intellectual history, literary studies, and anthropology, to name a few.

Against this backdrop of academic plurality, the cultural dimension of the Cold War has gained popularity, particularly through the work of Francis Stonor Saunders on the "cultural Cold War", which highlighted the importance of propaganda, cultural diplomacy and psychological warfare[4]. Moreover, studies on "Cold War culture", as "a system of

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[1]   Nehring 2012, pp. 923-925.

[2]   Leffler 2013, pp. 52-53.

[3]   Romero 2014, p. 686. This is one of the most comprehensive accounts of the historiographical debate, which elucidates the potential benefits and limitations of the emerging scholarly perspectives on the Cold War.

[4]   Saunders 1999. See also Robin 2001; Richmond 2003; Osgood 2006; Hammond 2012; Romijn et al. 2012; Jarausch et al. 2017.

meaning and behaviour shaped by the dynamics of the conflict"[5], attempted to investigate how Cold War dynamics affected everyday life.

Not surprisingly, some historians have objected that the increase in number of studies that draw upon a diverse range of disciplinary approaches has the potential to threaten the conceptual clarity of the Cold War[6]. In other words, rather than a global competition between superpowers, the Cold War risks being reduced to pure epoch and a nebula that subsumes all kinds of changes and local actors' agencies as well[7].

In any case, the resurgence of interest in the intertwining of international and local dynamics, as exemplified by considerations such as that "Cold War was many things to many people,"[8] or that there were "many Cold Wars,"[9] resulted in a proliferation of works focusing on case studies outside the traditional Euro-Atlantic terrain. This shift in focus challenged the conventional wisdom that "peripherical" geographies such as the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America were mere passive recipients of superpower politics[10]. In this light, the general idea of this book is based on the assumption that the adoption of a plural and "decentralized" perspective in the analysis of the Cold War is now an inevitable step in order to gain new insights into the complexity of a spatially and chronologically diluted competition[11].

Turkey in the Cold War as an uneasy object of inquiry

It is notable that, while a growing number of studies consider a range of issues related to ideology, culture, and identity in the context of the "Third World" or "Global South," the focus on Turkey remains relatively limited[12]. This is, to some extent, due to the distinctive geopolitical position of the country. Indeed, throughout the period between 1945 and 1989 Turkey was situated at both the core and the margins of the

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[5]   Major, Mitter 2006, p. 241.

[6]   Nehring 2012, p. 931.

[7]   Conelly 2000, p. 769.

[8]   Gaddis as quoted in Sáenz Rotko, Diaz 2022, p. 976.

[9]   Nehring 2012, p. 948.

[10] See for instance Vaughan 2005; Westad 2005; Mooney, Lanza 2013; Lüthi 2015; Bystrom 2021.

[11] Westad 2012.

[12] Among the few exceptions are Sayigh, Shlaim 1997 and Rajak et al. 2017, which however have a regional focus on the Middle East and the Balkans respectively.

Cold War. The country has been the setting for the Straits Crisis, participated in the Korean conflict (1950-1953), became the only Muslim-majority member within NATO (1952), was one of the pivotal partners in the Baghdad Pact (1955) and, notably, it was also deeply involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In other words, during the 1950s and the early 1960s Turkey was a central multi-regional player pursuing pro-western interests in the Balkans, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus. However, the various phases of the Cyprus crisis in the 1960s and 1970s would occasionally sour relations with the USA. As a result, the conditions were in place for a multilateral policy that, in addition to cultivating relations with the Western Bloc, would lead Turkey to intensify relations with the EEC countries, and to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, which improved significantly[13].

Nevertheless, when viewed through the lens of its cultural, social, and economic characteristics, Turkey displayed parallels with Third World countries engaged in disparate modernizing economic development projects that have evolved over time[14]. It can be argued that one of the reasons Turkey is frequently overlooked in international collaborative research is due to its geographical, cultural, and social peculiarities. These factors render it a challenging object of inquiry if the objective is to move beyond the conventional geopolitical perspective.

Historiography addressing Turkey's place in the Cold War has indeed mostly focused on its foreign policy and its strategic, military and diplomatic dimensions[15]. Of course, Turkey is the subject of a plethora of national histories emphasizing the long-term or locally driven political and cultural processes of change[16]. Yet, as observed by Berna Pekesen, a strong chronological divide is particularly evident in the scholarly production that focuses on Turkey as a whole[17]. While the late Ottoman era and the establishment of the Republic, as well as the post-Cold War period up to the most recent developments, continue to attract scholarly attention, the period between 1945 and 1989 remains comparatively under-researched.

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[13] Oran 2010, pp. 440-441.

[14] Keyder 1987, p. 206.

[15] See for instance Kuniholm 1980; McGhee 1990; Bilgin 2007; Oran 2011; Çalış 2017; Gökay 2012.

[16] I will limit my references to Lewis 1961; Berkes 1964; Mardin 1973; Ahmad 1993; Zürcher 1997; 2010.

[17] Pekesen 2020, p. 3.

However, it is worth noting that a new interest in the study of this chronological span is rising. Over the past fifteen years, scholars in a range of humanities and social sciences have been re-evaluating the significance of the Cold War for the analysis of intellectuals, political currents and attitudes that had previously been overlooked. The Turkish right, in particular, is increasingly attracting attention because of the retrospective need to question the origins of today's ruling nationalist-islamist coalition and, in the words of İlker Aytürk, to look back to "the era into which the right-wing elites were born and into which their political socialization took place"[18]. Similarly, there is a growing body of academic literature examining the influence of the Cold War on Turkey's intellectual life, production of knowledge, sciences and popular culture. This includes studies that address specific actors and sub-periods, as well as those that examine the broader impact of the Cold War on these domains[19]. Nevertheless, while this literature has contributed to the advancement of scholarly reflection and has provided the foundation for the idea behind this book, it must be acknowledged that it frequently reproduces the disagreement and confusion that characterize the international debate regarding the meaning of the Cold War. However, I contend that this theoretical chaos provides an opportunity for scholars in the humanities and social sciences to develop a critical mass of scholarship that is currently of the utmost importance. In other words, rather than attempting to construct comprehensive syntheses, it would be more fruitful to focus on developing a body of knowledge that can be used to inform future research. This is the reason why I consider Gordon Johnston's reflections on the "cultural turn" in Cold War studies to be highly thought-provoking. In particular, he notes that culture was

> yoked to power and deployed to exemplify and reinforce a particular hegemony, orthodoxy or regime. But […] also provides sources of opposition, resistance and challenge. It may be objected that this schema overextends the co-ordinates of the "cultural Cold War", but it provides a framework and way of thinking about culture that brings us closer to

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[18]   Aytürk 2022, p. 15.

[19]   To my knowledge, the book edited by Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör (2013) represents the inaugural collaborative effort to investigate the cultural dimension of the Cold War in Turkey, reaching an international audience. Among the recent works, I limit myself to mentioning Aytürk 2017; Begum 2018; Erken 2018; Arzık Erzurumlu 2020; Kaynar 2020; Pekesen 2020; Özkan, Gürakar 2020.

the empirical complexity of the Cold War and one which makes it eas-
ier to resist and renegotiate the seductive embrace of the Cold War's
bipolar narratives[20].

I believe that such a broad perspective can give a better idea of the
phenomena of Turkey's political, cultural and intellectual landscape
that are still relevant for understanding our time, and conversely, of
those phenomena that have been submerged by decades of changes
so profound that they seem distant or even unimaginable today. This
book stems thus from the belief that the field of Turkish Studies has not
yet adequately discussed three key questions:
1. Can the dynamics of the Cold War be understood as a contextual or
   constitutive factor in the political, cultural and social transforma-
   tion of the country?
2. In what ways did these dynamics contribute to the redefinition of
   ideologies, the intellectual landscape and cultural productions, by
   superimposing themselves on the pre-existing dilemmas that char-
   acterized the country's history?
3. How did local actors use Cold War polarization to construct vo-
   cabularies of legitimacy that redefined the terms of dialectics and
   alliances between the different political and cultural segments of
   Turkish society?

The contributors to this volume do not espouse a uniform perspec-
tive on the utilization of the Cold War concept, nor do they proffer
definitive responses to the aforementioned questions. Rather, the col-
lected essays aim to present to an international audience a few tassels
of the complex mosaic of Turkey's Cold War and are the product of
the efforts of researchers from different backgrounds and at different
stages of their academic careers.

Furthermore, it should be noted that by focusing on culture, ideol-
ogy and media, this volume does not seek to overshadow the realm of
"ordinary politics" and its agents, such as state actors, political elites
and parties. Rather, it aims to draw attention to the influence of Cold
War dynamics on the attitudes and assumptions of different sections
of Turkish society and the processes by which these attitudes were ac-
quired, negotiated, maintained and propagated. Similarly, the volume

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[20]   Johnston 2010, p. 295.

is not built up on the divide between high and popular culture but includes essays that analyze case studies from both realms.

Outline of the volume

The volume is structured around three principal sections, each of which addresses a distinct yet interrelated theme.

The first section, "Politics and Culture", gives an idea of the complexity of the Turkish political scenario, which deals with the interplay between external and internal conditions in shaping political discourses and identity-driven projects aimed at responding to Cold War conditions by different political actors. Samuele C.A. Abrami's chapter focuses on civil-military relations. Covering the period between 1945 and the post-Cold War era, the essay examines the cultural dimension of the transformation of the military's role. By exploring the nuances that characterize the different political and ideological positions within the Turkish army itself, the essay examines the evolution of the military's tutelary function in Turkey in the light of Turkish security culture. In doing so, the author problematizes the simplistic binary framework that portrays the military as intrinsically authoritarian and civilian politicians as democratic.

The chapter by Ali Açıkgöz and Carlo Sanna deals with the genesis of the "left of centre" orientation of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP). After outlining the main ideological lines of demarcation between the CHP's centre-left and other ideological orientations in the Turkish political spectrum, the essay assesses their impact on the CHP's overall political strategy in the 1960s and 1970s. By analysing the memoirs and public writings of relevant CHP political actors, as well as CHP-affiliated journals and newspapers, the authors examine the centre-left movement's allies and opponents within and outside the party. It also shows how the CHP's ideological evolution towards a left of centre position was shaped by internal discord, external pressures and the intricacies of Cold War politics.

The place of culture in the ideological elaboration of political movements is the main concern of Halit Serkan Simen's chapter. By analyzing the case study of *Devrimci Yol* (Revolutionary Path, Dev-Yol), one of the most vocal left-wing political movements between 1975 and 1980, the essay explores the concept of "revolutionary culture", a term

that refers not only to artistic, educational or folkloric activities, but to a comprehensive set of behaviours and social mechanisms that should shape the relationship between revolutionary cadres and the masses towards a revolutionary transformation of Turkish society. By examining pamphlets, reports, posters, magazines, memoirs and biographies, the author problematizes and challenges the understanding of the ideological elaborations of leftist movements as a mere consequence of the polarization of the Cold War.

With a different focus, Hilal Yavuz's chapter uncovers the concepts of "bordering", "ordering" and "othering" in relation to the creation of the Turkish-Soviet border. Emphasizing the strong correlation between the making of the border and the making of national identity, and reassessing diplomatic relations between Turkey and the USSR in the early Cold War, the essay provides some critical insights into how border dynamics influenced practices of inclusion and exclusion. In this regard, it examines how the downturn in the Soviet-Turkish diplomatic relations influenced the Turkish government's discriminatory policies towards Armenians, with an explicit focus on the experiences of Zaven Biberyan (1921-1984), an Armenian writer who addressed issues such as the unequal treatment of non-Muslims and discussions of communism and "repatriation" in Soviet Armenia.

Section two, "Intellectuals and Anti-communism", examines the role of intellectuals in shaping the discourse surrounding the perceived threat of communism, illustrating how the "official" anti-communist stance served as a basis for legitimizing right-wing movements calling for a conservative transformation of society. Fatih Çağatay Cengiz's essay investigates the formation of Turkey's anti-communist front between 1945 and 1980 in the light of Gramsci's concept of the integral state. The chapter asserts that the relationship between the state and civil society in the integral state is not one of conflict but rather a dichotomous one. Through a broad overview of the most vocal representatives of anti-communism, the author argues that Turkey's Cold War was marked by the blurring of the boundaries between the state and civil society. In this perspective, the chapter shows how civil society organizations and intellectuals attempted to hegemonize the state's official ideology and struggled to legitimize themselves as the most prominent voices of the anti-communist mobilization.

The section concludes with Gaia Poccetti's chapter on Samiha Ayverdi, one of the most representative conservative female writers and

intellectuals. After a discussion of her literary and intellectual legacy, the author outlines the main features of her anti-communist discourse through the analysis of some of her works. By analyzing Ayverdi's methodical use of historical events dating back to the Ottoman Empire, Poccetti argues that the writer's approach is nostalgic yet vehemently combative, and is primarily aimed at defining images of national enemies and providing a moral and political model of identity to resist communism. In the author's perspective, Islam's role is understood as a pivotal role in Ayverdi's oeuvre: a defining aspect of both Ottoman-Turkish identity and a set of universal values associated with the Ottoman Empire and contemporary Turkey.

Section three, "Education and media", looks at the representations of the Cold War in the media and popular culture, as well as its impact in the production of knowledge. This section opens with Pınar Batur and John M. VanderLippe's chapter which provides a vivid picture of the Cuban Missile Crisis and its perception in the Turkish media, literature, political and intellectual discourse. The authors argue that in the aftermath of the crisis, the Turkish public began to understand the multiplicity of risks in Cold War politics, and the crisis itself served as a focal point for an alternative discourse based on viewing the event as evidence of the erosion of Turkish autonomy and independence. In this light, the essay illustrates the main factors that influenced the conceptualisation of risk, its iconography and the "culture of catastrophe" that emerged during the Cold War. The authors posit that, rather than serving as a vehicle for a global social catharsis, the perception of nuclear risk became a pivotal factor that shaped the divergence between the official and intellectual response.

Zeynep Bursa Millet's essay highlights the transnational dimension of the cultural Cold War in Turkey. By reconstructing the activities of transnational actors, including academics who emigrated from the Soviet-dominated territories and the communist regimes of the Balkans, as well as academic trends in Turkey and abroad, the author illustrates the trajectory of the institutionalisation of Islamic Studies. While seemingly avoiding a determinist approach, Bursa Millet argues that the field was partly shaped and transformed by Western Area Studies and American anti-communist policies, making Turkish Islam the bearer of different scientific, intellectual and political approaches, as well as different spaces and temporalities.

The final contribution in the volume is by Güldeniz Kıbrıs. Her essay analyzes the representation of Turkishness in the action/adventure film genre of the 1960s and 1970s against the backdrop of a Russian-dominated spatial context. Attempting to elucidate the complex relationship between the historical and political milieu and the manifestations in the realm of popular culture, the author argues that the prominence of Russia or the Soviet Union as a subject in the films reflects the prevailing anti-communist discourse and Turkey's western aligned, yet cautious, foreign policy stance during the 1960s and the 1970s. Through the analysis of their recurring themes, Turkey is portrayed as a sanctuary for the "outside Turks," offering refuge from encroaching powers. In light of the historical and cultural context, the essay demonstrates the complex interplay between ideology, culture and geopolitics in shaping representations of Turkish/Turkic identity on screen.

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Politics and culture

1. Tutelary but not unitary. The role of ideology and political culture in Turkey's civil–military relations during the Cold War

Samuele C.A. Abrami

1.1. Turkey's peculiar civil-military relations

Since the beginning of the 20th century, Turkish society has always had a direct relationship with the army (represented as the "state") and maintained a more fragile, secondary relationship with its politicians and politics (defined as the "government")[1]. While in most paradigms of civil-military relations (CMR), the armed forces and the society – with its political representatives – are posited in a confrontational manner[2],

> The Turkish case traditionally has rested firmly on a relatively complementary and symbiotic relationship, despite the Turkish army's periodic expansions of its prerogatives into the societal and political systems[3].

As such, in the CMR literature, one of the most well-known quotations by the first Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is revealing.

> The Turkish nation-state always perceived the officers [...] as the leaders of the movements to achieve lofty national ideals […]. When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country[4].

This demonstrates how, despite their formal separation, military and civilian authorities have forged a partnership based on an imperfect

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[1]   Aydınlı 2009.

[2]   Heper, Güney 1996.

[3]   Ibid., p. 586.

[4]   See Harris 1965, p. 56.

concordance among the army, political elites, and the citizenry[5]. The civil authority needs the armed forces to defend the state and the country's territorial integrity. In return, the armed forces need the civil authority to recognize their legitimacy in accordance with fundamental democratic principles[6]. The real problem is "how to maintain a strong and effective military that poses no threat to the civilian elite"[7].

On this matter, the Turkish military's guardianship, as well as its long record of failed (1962, 1963, 2016) and successful (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997) interventions, is most of the time explained by mainstream theories through power-related dynamics that build on a dichotomy between the secular, patriotic, rational, and modern soldier versus the elected, but inefficient and anti-secularist politician. Therefore, the military's interference with politics is often seen as necessary because "the population is not yet educated and mature enough to elect the "right" politicians and to maintain the constitutional regime in a country like Turkey"[8].

That is why, against this approach, it is key also to include the cultural dimension of Turkey's CMR. This allows us to grasp its highly interactive and transformative character as well as "the possibility of collaboration and institutional-functional interpenetration in a fairly large setting of shared understandings that derive from Turkey's historical and political context"[9]. Hence, the argument is that Turkey's peculiar CMR and its unique ruling style are the products of a specific cultural, social, and institutional milieu featuring a stratified society and a political culture influenced by historical conflicts with neighboring states.

Such conditions significantly shaped the military's role in the nation, for which Atatürk initially separated the army from politics in the name of creating a democratic Republic. However, despite an initial concordance, tension emerged between the military and specific groups, which challenged either "the secular nature of the state (the Islamists), or its unitary character (Kurdish nationalists and separatists)"[10].

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[5]   Narlı 2000, p. 119.

[6]   Bland 2004.

[7]   Burk 2002, p. 15.

[8]   Demirel 2004, p. 145.

[9]   Mardin 2005, p. 146.

[10]   Narlı 2000, p. 120.

Since the military has primarily intervened in times of crisis when governments proved incapable of acting effectively and according to kemalist principle, the dominant view assumes that the Turkish military's tutelage over society automatically stems from an alleged in-group homogeneity[11]. However, in understanding any aspect of the socio-political developments characterizing the country's transition from Empire to Republic, one cannot detach from the historical and cultural context. Therefore, using cultural lenses when looking at Turkey's CMR allows us to appreciate how, in both its interventionist attitude and in its political involvement, the military has maintained its tutelary approach but not a unitary character in front of the domestic and international changes of the 20th century.

Refuting the idea of the Turkish military as a unitary actor helps explain how its tutelary function varied over time but also to disentangle the nuances characterizing the different political and ideological stances within the Turkish army itself. To do so, this chapter looks at the global ideological-power confrontation of the Cold War era, which saw Turkey's socio-political environment revolving around two main issues: the communist threat and the rise of leftist political groups, the emergence of a debate on whether an "Islamic-Democratic synthesis" would be a barrier or an additional threat to the former. Through a multidimensional approach combining historical, culturalist, and comparative cross-time analyses, the objective is also to question earlier claims that the Turkish military's tutelage was limited to restoring public order and preserving the secular regime.

1.2. Back to security culture

The complexities of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process and its impact on civil-military relations actually occurred "under the guidance of cultural patterns," which are "historically created systems of meaning in terms of which we give form, order, point, and direction to our lives"[12]. In the same way,

security culture changes over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded and culturally translated. As culture is not insular, the question,

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[11]   Esen 2021, p. 202.

[12]   Clifford 1973, p. 52.

therefore, is not whether a particular national security culture is changeable or not, but about the direction, quality, and degree of change. Culture changes through inter-subjective processes within communities and between communities.

Thus, one can safely argue that Turkey has a deep-rooted security culture that emerged from the accumulation of historical experiences and interpenetration of diverse kinds of discourses. Hence, the combination of external and internal security challenges with material and structural factors shapes – and is at the same time shaped by – Turkey's peculiar security culture's paradoxical characteristics[13].

First of all, Republican Turkey has inherited a state-centric mindset from the Ottoman Empire, which led all modernizing reforms to primarily focus on strengthening the state in the face of the threats emanating from the international arena. This practice was gradually internalized by the military and other state elites and then cemented on the guiding principle of "the preservation of the state." Another element of the Ottoman-Turkish political culture is the interactive or dialogical dimension, where:

> The history of modern Turkey is not a conflict between Republicanism and Sultanism, nor is it a history of the strife framed by Islam and secularism. It is a complex, many-tiered encounter between "traditional" forces and modernity that have interpenetrated and been transformed over time due to their propinquity. It is a story of the constitution of new spaces where these forces have met and changed[14].

Third, under the impact of the wave of democratization that spread in the Western world after World War II, the military faced a dilemma. While democracy was seen as crucial for modernization, it also brought forth ideological divisions and highlighted social, economic, and political interests. Additionally, the increasing visibility of religion as a social force raised concerns. In response, the officers adopted an ambivalent stance towards democracy as, despite the civilian primacy implied by democracy, the military refrained from acting like agents of the civilian government, believing that it would compromise their role as guardians[15].

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[13]   Karaosmanoğlu 2011, p. 259.

[14]   Mardin 2013, p. 160.

[15]   Karaosmanoğlu 1993.

All of this is explicable by the fact that the idea of the military representing the highest virtues of the state and of the state as synonymous with the society and its cultural-religious identity reinforced the elite position of the military. This perception continued into the Republican period, as the military took a significant role in establishing the Turkish state and defending it against external threats. Furthermore, the failures of civilian governments in areas such as the economy and public order, along with civilian calls for military intervention in politics, indirectly made the officer corps internalize their role as superior in matters of development and national security.

These factors collectively served as catalysts for the military's involvement in politics. This was somehow even codified in Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Law of 1935 stating that "the duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey"[16].

However, ambivalent points emerged in the early 1930s. On the one end, it is true that by the end of the 19th century, the military, along with the civil bureaucracy, became first the object and then the subject of modernization and that, following the transition from the Empire to the Republic, Atatürk rendered the military subservient to the civil government[17]. On the other hand, after Atatürk's death, Turkey was already moving from a "civilian control and military partnership" to "civilian rule and military influence"[18]. This is because, within Turkish society, the military is not seen as a separate institution. Rather, it is seen as a home, a "Prophet's hearth" *(Peygamber ocağı)* or soldiers' hearth *(asker ocağı)*. Military service, despite being compulsory for all Turkish men, is felt as "a national duty and heroic mission because citizens have been socialized with values promoting the army's role as protector of the state"[19]. Conscription has become a significant rite of passage for young males and a source of identity construction, and the army promoted its national security concept to raise citizens' consciousness about internal and external threats[20].

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[16]   Hale 2011, p. 200.

[17]   Then stated in Art. 148 of the Military Penal Code (1930), forbidding military personnel to "assemble together for political objectives, join political parties, participate in political demonstrations, meetings, or elections, or in some other manner make statements with these objections in mind". Ibid., p. 195.

[18]   Narlı 2000, p. 105.

[19]   Ibid., p. 107.

[20]   Altınay 2004.

That is why the pre-2002 civil-military relations in Turkey can be explained by Finer's theory, suggesting that professionalism may actually encourage political activism and render civilian control problematic. This happens because the military may start perceiving itself close to the state rather than to political governments, and, at the same time, the military would be able to act more decisively[21]. Consequently, in Turkey, the military was inclined to oversee the actions of civilian governments, and "when the latter came to the conclusion that the former was not handling the problems the military considered critical in a proper manner, the military got into the picture in one way or another"[22].

1.3. The multiparty era and its discontents

The initial strategy of subordinating the army to the new Republican regime explains the lack of conflict between the political leaders and soldiers in the single-party period from 1925 to 1945. Congruence between the kemalist Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the state, as well as the absence of political alternatives, apparently succeeded in making the army a bureaucratic and neutral organization fully committed to the kemalist principles of the Republic.

However, with the beginning of the bipolar period, many aspects of the top-down Turkish state nationalism altered slightly due to developments in both domestic and foreign politics. Caught between the two hegemonic power-ideological blocs, Turkey sided with the Western camp. Although behind this choice, there was undoubtedly a security component – mainly towards the Soviet threat – a comprehensive assessment of Turkey's foreign policy of that time cannot overlook how its cultural dimension interlinked with the domestic realm. As summarized by Soysal,

> Turkey's participation in the Council of Europe in 1949 and in NATO in 1952 are concrete steps in the […] direction [of establishing Turkey in the Western civilization and democratic order]. With these treaties, Turkey has undertaken a number of moral commitments which have to be fulfilled in domestic policies as well as in foreign policy[23].

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[21]   Finer 1962.

[22]   Heper 2011, p. 248.

[23]   Soysal 1977, p. 6.

However, majorly due to a suspicion that was raised by Ankara's decision to remain outside the Second World War, joining NATO and proving its commitment to Western security in the early Cold War era was difficult for Turkey. It is in this sense that Turkish state officials were also influenced by those "intellectuals of statecraft" who believed that representing Turkey as a "junior partner" of the United States in the fight against communism would help to produce and reproduce its Western identity, which was still perceived to be very precarious at the time. Therefore, NATO was represented "not only as a military but also as a cultural organization manifesting a Western identity"[24].

As Bilgin and Yılmaz note, it might even be argued that "without reference to the threat from the East, locating Turkey in the West would have been more difficult, notwithstanding the commitment of the kemalist elite to Turkey's Westernisation"[25].

This last point explains why, at the same time, this process impacted the domestic side, too. That is, to prove its credentials to its Western allies, Turkey "practically had to embrace multi-party democracy and liberalism in both the political and economic senses of the term"[26]. This favoured a transformation, including the gradual empowerment of conservative groups in politics, the normalization of Islam in society, and the relaxation of strict secularism. This meant that the constructivist approach used in shaping Turkish nationalism along the lines of secularism started to lose ground in its battle with the more culturally and religiously oriented grassroots movements[27].

Being a member of the international system also demanded an organizational restructuring of the military. Although the military leadership was satisfied with its access to power, it lost this autonomy over time. Moreover, despite the armed forces remained loyal to the regime throughout the single-party era, they needed to be equipped and equipped, and the lower stratum of the officer corps had major grievances about their material conditions[28]. As a consequence, while its professionalism continued during the 1950s, the military started to

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[24] Yılmaz, Bilgin 2006, p. 42.

[25] Ibid. p. 51.

[26] Kuzu 2019, p. 74.

[27] Ibid., p. 25.

[28] Cizre Sakallıoğlu 1997.

disengage from its politically neutral position and to involve itself in Turkey's political life[29].

This also clarifies why, although the formula "CHP + army = power" was very popular, some members of the armed forces were keen to end the mono-party regime, thereby aligning with the Democrat Party (DP) when it was founded in 1945[30]. Factions appeared and started to compete against each other in a visible manner. On the one hand, there were those officers advocating the multiparty system and expressing concerns about electoral integrity. On the other hand, there was the high brass of generals who were concerned about a scenario of electoral competition. Furthermore, upon the subsequent loss of CHP at the ballots, four army generals made an offer to Ismet Inönü – President and leader of the party before the elections –in order to reverse the election results and suspend democracy.

However, the DP government took strength also from the support of Western liberal countries, as moderate Islam was much preferable to communism in the Cold War[31].

During DP's rule (1950-60), the government took the form of civilian rule-military partnership[32]. These changes came against the backdrop of Turkey's entry into NATO, which made the military's structural problems more apparent but also created new career opportunities for well-educated junior and field officers[33].

Accordingly, the DP government sought to maintain the status quo and directed the military via civilian defence ministers in a manner that favoured partisanship over competence[34], while trying to co-opt the military leadership with promises of material and political benefits. At the same time, those officers excluded from these privileges were concerned about their social status and the democratic backsliding and partisan tendencies of DP policies.

It is within this context, that plotting in the armed forces began as early as 1955, when several junior officers in Ankara and Istanbul had formed a clandestine organization that would later become the nucle-

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[29]   Heper 2011, p. 175.

[30]   Hale 2011, p. 197.

[31]   Kalaycıoğlu 1999.

[32]   Narlı 2000, p. 112.

[33]   Bağcı, Kurç 2017.

[34]   Hale 1994, pp. 88-118.

us of the junta. In 1959, they finally reached out to the former commander of the Army Cemal Gürsel, who gave tacit support for such activities without joining the conspiracy personally[35].

Confirming how "large-scale public protests serve as a signal for the declining power of the government and growing popular support for the coup"[36], the plotters were understandably emboldened by anti-government protests in April/May 1960 and were enraged by the military leadership's consent to have the armed forces used to put down these demonstrations. Hence, this explains why, despite being practically executed outside the chain of command, the 1960 coup met with little resistance from the military and the public at large. While Colonel Alparslan Türkeş was among the officers who led the coup on the morning of 27 May, it was Gürsel declaring that the military's intervention aimed to "bring the country with all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy"[37].

1.4. Domestic and international challenges in the 1960s

In order to legitimate their intervention further, the plotters brought a former general of the army to the head of their junta. In reality, though, a small group of junior officers, who would later form the National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*, MBK), was in charge. Given their young age and inexperience, most MBK members lacked the skills to run a modern state, so the junta soon split into factions as a result of ideological disputes and personal rivalries.

The main source of tension revolved around the question of how long the plotters should stay in power. One faction close to Türkeş supported the idea that a steadfast military leadership should have stayed in power long enough to enact structural reforms. Meanwhile, the CHP leadership's stance oscillated between support for the coup and opposition to the junta's efforts to prolong its rule. Ultimately, as İnönü was worried about this scenario and wanted the armed forces to return to the barracks as soon as possible, the CHP lobbied moderate factions to turn them against the radical ones.

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[35]   Pelt 2014.

[36]   Esen 2021, p. 7. On the matter, see Casper, Tyson 2014.

[37]   Dilipak 1991, p. 70.

However, the junta still did not enjoy the support of the rest of the military because it had acted against the military's most "sacred norm of hierarchy" and because it took power in a way "that contradicted the Ataturk's legacy of not intervening in politics, even for the sake of protecting the kemalist principles"[38]. As a consequence, the moderates purged Türkeş and 13 other members from the MBK, while a new junta was subsequently formed with the remaining members.

Finally, the junta oversaw the formation of new parties that would replace the vacuum left by the now closed DP. Among them, the most important was the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP) led by General Ragıp Gümüşpala, who was retired by the MBK after the 1960 coup, and the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*) founded by Ekrem Alican, the junta's former Minister of Finance[39].

Following the AP's demands for amnesty for the DP politicians arrested after the coup, İnönü resigned and formed a new coalition government with the YTP and minor parties. However, certain MBK policies, such as the forced early retirement of 5,000 officers and the ensuing political instability, created a discontent that created fertile ground for praetorianism and interventionist sentiments in the military as well as the formation of a clandestine group, the Armed Forces Union (*Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği*, SKB)[40].

As such, despite the violent response of Turkish nationalist movements, ironically, during the post-coup period of military rule, Turkey drafted its most liberal constitution that expanded civil liberties, freedom of speech, and assembly. Amid this power struggle, with the approval of 61.7% of voters after a referendum on 9th July 1961, a new constitution was drawn up to replace the one from 1924. The constituent assembly envisioned anti-majoritarian institutions such as the Senate and Constitutional Court to prevent governments from abusing power. Regarding the CMR, the new constitution allowed the army to play a significant role in security policies. Accordingly, the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, MGK), composed of officers and politicians, was established as an advisory body dealing with internal and external security threats. This not only meant that the army gained a

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[38]   Hale 2011, p. 200.

[39]   Demirel 2004.

[40]   Urhan, Çelik 2010.

constitutional role for the first time since the inception of Republic[41] but also that the MGK could act like a "shadow government" and restrict the policy-making space of elected governments.

As a matter of fact, Turkish politics of the mid and late 1960s lived upon a "silent partnership" in which the military enjoyed full autonomy from the government while keeping a watchful eye over the parameters of civilian political life to defend parliamentary democracy against attempted coups by various radical military officers[42]. In reality, in the MGK, the politicians had to comply with the views of the military on security-related issues, leaving a great deal of room for intervention to the generals, who "had made constitutional changes not only to dilute the power of the civilian government but also to allow the commanders to maintain an influential role in political life"[43].

Indeed, the results of the election in 1961 seemed to support these assumptions. One month after the execution of Menderes and other members of the Turkish government, the 15 October 1961 general elections saw the CHP winning only a plurality of parliamentary seats with 36.74% of votes against the AP's 34.79%. In contrast, the right-wing parties that claimed to be DP's successors attained a majority in both the parliament and the Senate. This outcome panicked the military, which saw the CHP's victory as vital to safeguard the new regime.

However, an element that is frequently overlooked in the literature is the fact that, during this period, the Turkish government also faced two other attempts of coup d'état led by Colonel Talat Aydemir in February 1962 and May 1963. Although they failed, these putsches not only demonstrated that the conspiratorial mindset was still alive within the military but also that, exploiting those significant internal divisions, the hardliner faction was able to mobilize and play an influential role on young cadets in the military academy.

Hence, an interesting fact is also that there were rifts even among the plotters themselves. Challenged by the government's ability to boost the loyalty of most of the army and left without any support from the air forces, some initial promoters of the coups turned their back on Aydemir's faction. Therefore, this gave the green light to İnönü's government to restore military discipline by purging the interventionist

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[41] Zürcher 2017, p. 357.

[42] Nye 1977.

[43] Harris 2011, p. 205.

officers and expelling all cadets from the Military Academy. Moreover, coup organizers were prosecuted in public trials that resulted in jail sentences for plotters and capital punishment for Aydemir.

Nonetheless, some retired officers decided to join civilian politics and run for parliamentary seats in the 1965 general elections. For those like former MBK members, the logical destination was the CHP. On the other hand, right-wing officers chose the AP, whereas Türkeş and his associates joined the Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*, CKMP) after their return from exile. Party elites saw these figures as valuable political assets to monitor developments in the military due to their contacts. Civil-military literature has neglected this intricate link between retired officers and political parties. These ties allowed retired military figures to wield political influence even under democratic rule. The subsequent political vacuum created fertile soil for the AP's ensuing victory in the first free elections after the coup in 1965. Hailed from the party's moderate faction, once in office, its chairman Süleyman Demirel sought common ground with senior military commanders such as Cevdet Sunay and Cemal Tural, on the basis of their mutual hatred of communism and support for a pragmatic approach centered on state-led industrialization against the CHP's "left of centre" agenda[44]. Further signaling how soldiers had openly become actors with political influence, Demirel also supported Sunay's election as president in 1966 to retain the military leadership's support[45].

In sum, this revolution made it clear that the traditional power elites could no longer maintain their political dominance in a nation with diverse social groups without embracing a new philosophy and aligning themselves with the causes of these groups. It also highlighted the importance of economic activity for material well-being, as well as the significance of social progress, balance, and stability. These changes were not part of a formal plan but rather emerged through the mutual pressures and interactions among different social groups[46].

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[44]   Hale 1994, pp. 168, 180.

[45]   Hale 2011.

[46]   Karpat 1970, p. 1683.

1.5. A memorandum against the 1970s crisis

Despite its initial attempt to cohort the military, Demirel's government had to face one of the most turmoiled periods of the Republican era. Rapid industrialization enabled workers to organize under militant unions, which increased the number of labor strikes and anti-government demonstrations. Similarly, ultra-leftist groups recruited university students to engage in subversive activities that destabilized Turkish politics[47]. All of this led to a radicalization of right- and left-wing political groups towards massive protests and fights. At the same time, this phenomenon was a product of the AP's efforts to eliminate the socialist Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP) from the parliament. However, this just contributed to radicalizing its ideology. Moreover, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, a group of leftist intellectuals inspired by the journalist Dogan Avcıoğlu's thoughts tried to invoke the army to initiate a socialist revolution in order to establish a Baathist-like regime based on the principles of kemalism[48].

The weakened AP also faced competition from other right-wing parties such as Türkeş's Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) and Necmettin Erbakan's Islamist National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*, MNP) founded by several independent MPs elected in the 1969 general elections[49]. Against this backdrop, the country was plunged into a worrying economic crisis[50].

Therefore, senior commanders had become disillusioned by Demirel's failure to maintain order within his party and the country and started thinking about possible solutions. This is in line with studies that found strikes, riots, and protests to be strong indicators of coup attempts[51].

In the Turkish context, however, the military could not take immediate action against Demirel's government due to strong internal disagreements within the senior leadership. Unlike their counterparts in the early 1960s, many members of the military – from officers of various levels to young cadets – were more politically engaged and mainly acquired a leftist doctrine to direct their actions after the coup.

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[47]   Ulus 2011, p. 33.

[48]   Karpat 1970, p. 1683.

[49]   Aytürk 2014. On MHP, see Arikan 2002 and on MNP, see Sezgin 2012.

[50]   For a political economy of coups, see Yağcı 2018, p. 85.

[51]   Esen 2021.

Moreover, senior commanders calculated that continued inaction on their part would further polarize the military and encourage junior officers to stage another coup from below. Yet, they also had severe doubts about joining the coup planned by the radical faction for fear of fueling tensions between leftist and rightist factions within the military. For instance, internal symptoms of discontent prone to fuel plots and conspiracies were already growing within the military itself[52].

However, the necessity for the military to prevent further escalation prevailed when senior generals delivered an ultimatum to the government in March 1971. Due to this compromise, the 12 March memorandum did not amount to a full military takeover but was "intended to become a constitutional amendment that would take measures against the threats to national unity, public order, and national security; and consolidate the autonomy of the army"[53]. Although it purged members of the radical factions, the military refrained from assuming power outright, permitted a succession of non-partisan leadership, and selected Nihat Erim, an MP from the CHP's centrist faction, to head the next government[54]. However, the government's reform agenda was soon overshadowed by its draconian measures that imposed martial law, suppressed the press, outlawed strikes, arrested hundreds of leftist activists, and dissolved the TİP and MNP.

> Hence, with the 1971 intervention, Turkey moved towards a "military control/civilian partnership" situation[55]. Martial law ended in September 1973, and in October 1973, elections brought victory to the CHP led by Bülent Ecevit, who had moved the party to the left to attract supporters of the outlawed ones.

The 1973-80 period was perplexing for Turkish politics as factors promoting instability were manifold. Instability in the form of clashes between ultra-nationalist militants and radical leftists, urban guerrilla terrorism, sectarian antagonism, union strikes, and a deteriorating economy in the midst of global and domestic economic crises increased

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[52]   In particular, the core cadre of the *Yön–Devrim* circle was apparently involved in a military conspiracy, later known as the "Madanoğlu junta." For further details, see Ulus 2011, p. 54-55, 60.

[53]   Harris 2011, p. 206.

[54]   Nye 1977, p. 209.

[55]   Narlı 2000, p. 113.

political tensions. Turkish politics were also polarized by foreign policy issues like the Cyprus question and European Community membership. During this period, Turkey was ruled by internally divided coalition governments, including ultra-nationalist and Islamist parties. Throughout the mid-1970s, the military was highly critical of successive civilian governments due to their inability to cope with economic problems and advance stability. According to Narlı, in the late 1970s, civil-military relations appeared to tend to an "uneasy coexistence in which both camps were divided along at least three competing ideological lines: Islamism, pan-Turkism, and socialism"[56]. However, the situation appeared more blurred as "a dichotomous perspective is all the more difficult since the 1970s witnessed the appearance of new political sensibilities that were diverse, specific, diffuse, and therefore hard to grasp"[57].

That is because as the party spectrum broadened during the 1960s, relations between "military parties" and civilian political organizations increasingly gained in complexity. It resulted in an alliance between the "moderates" associated with conservative parties and the "radicals" from the right. As a result, although the desired "revolution" advocated by many intellectuals on the left did not materialize, a significant purge occurred between 1971 and 1973. This purge primarily affected the lower ranks of the military institution, particularly the Air Force, which had been a breeding ground for individuals supportive of socialist or national-democratic revolution and connected to the guerrilla movement. On the other hand, the radicalism of the Right, with its proto-fascist characteristics, including MHP, seemed to enjoy a certain level of impunity. Despite a few summonses, the strongly militarized party's rallying calls to the army found support within a notable faction of the military institution[58].

In this sense, the atmosphere of the Cold War played a significant role in shaping a new type of relations between the civilian, military, and political spheres. As the fear of Soviet expansionism and especially the widespread communist ideas within Turkey were seen as major threats in the 1970s, ultranationalists organized themselves as a counterforce. In the process, there was an essential change towards Islam that also in-

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[56] Narlı 2000. On the same line see also Dekmejian 1982.

[57] Vaner 1987, p. 242.

[58] Ağaoğulları 1987.

volved many members of the military, who started to emphasize Islam as a cultural component of the Turkish national heritage to attract conservative-religious votes for their sympathetic parties. At the same time, this was prompted by the formulation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk İslam Sentezi*) by some intellectuals and with tacit support from the Western camp. In brief, the idea was to combine elements of Turkish nationalism and Sunni Islam to make Turkey a safeguard against the communist menace[59]. Therefore, the combination of these factors favoured a strong return of Islamists to politics. Despite being under a new label, the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP) emerged as a continuation of Erbakan's political mindset. This time, however, the fact that communism represented the prior threat left room for a coalition government with the CHP for the 1973 elections. When, in 1975, Demirel was replaced as Prime Minister by Bülent Ecevit – the new CHP leader – MSP emerged as a substantial player in the formation of a heterogenous coalition formed with the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*) and the far-right MHP led by Türkeş. The latter took advantage of this to infiltrate state security services, worsening the ongoing conflict between the factions. The 1977 elections did not produce a clear winner. Initially, Demirel maintained the coalition with the Nationalist Front. Still, in 1978, Ecevit regained power with the support of some deputies who had switched parties until Demirel became Prime Minister in 1979. However, regardless of the political affiliation of the rulers, this political instability undermined the government's capacity to stop the violent escalation in the country, and following a series of huge massacres, martial law was announced in several provinces in December 1978[60].

1.6. The 1980s as a watershed

In the early 1980s, the military became even more anxious about the volatility of Turkish politics, which was exacerbated by two main elements: the government's failure to effectively deal with the long-ongoing Kurdish separatist agitation and violence in the Southeast and the MSP's impact on shaping an Islamist-conservative narrative in the fields of educational and foreign policies that seemed to undermine the Republic's funding principles.

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[59]   See Alkan 2014.

[60]   On political violence in Turkey, see Sayarı 2010.

This time, due to the preceding purges and the perception of higher dividends at stake, the military appeared more united than before. Indeed, the preparation for the 1980 military takeover was carefully planned in advance and followed the chain of command. On 11 September 1979, the chief of the general staff, Kenan Evren, had already ordered a hand-written report from full general Haydar Saltık on the necessity and eventual feasibility of a coup. Moreover, it is argued that, in order to prevent backlash from political organizations following the coup, Evren had already strategically involved both Saltık, who was close to the left, and General Nurettin Ersin from the right side of the spectrum.

On 7 September 1980, after one year of careful planning and a vote of no confidence in the government, Evren and four service commanders decided to announce a coup d'état on national television. When the military seized control of executive power, the MGK led by Evren implemented martial law nationwide, dissolved the Parliament and government, suspended the Constitution, and – as the leaders of the left and right refused to cooperate with their objectives – banned all political parties and trade unions[61]. The military justified its actions by citing the kemalist tradition of state secularism and national unity, opposing communism, fascism, separatism, and religious sectarianism. The main aim of the generals was to reshape Turkey's political dynamics by making a brand-new constitution and new election and political party laws. Consequently, the 1982 Constitution restricted formerly granted civil liberties and enhanced the military's influence[62]. However, the constitution was backed by an overwhelming majority in a referendum, as was the election of Evren as president, which epitomized Turkey's move to a "military rule/civilian influence" phase.

Nonetheless, all of this revealed that, compared with the previous ones, the 1980 coup was a relatively successful one. The Turkish General Staff initiated the REMO (Reorganization-Modernization) project to help the army recover from the impact of the 1975 U.S. arms embargo imposed in the wake of the Cyprus intervention the previous year[63]. The project, coupled with the impact of internal security concerns, elevated the professional skills of the military, which in turn enlarged the military's influence

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[61]   Harris 2011, p. 209.
[62]   Heper, Evin 2011.
[63]   Narlı 2000, p. 120.

on political matters[64]. Indeed, the military regime folded in 1983, but the army limited elections to three parties. In other words, the military opted to handle both the Kurdish question and the rise of political Islam through security measures rather than political projects. That is to say, the military drew a red line and did not allow political parties to develop alternative solutions to those problems. However, its designed candidate, the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, NDP), led by a retired general, lost to the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). At the same time, a more powerful MGK allowed the then single-party government led by Turgut Özal to stop violence and terror in the streets, improve economic indicators, and overcome the problem of political instability[65].

In addition, previously banned politicians, such as Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan, and Türkeş, returned to politics after another referendum held in 1987, making the Turkish political space more diverse and highly competitive. In terms of the civil-military continuum, the post-coup period was a hybrid between "civilian rule/military influence" and "civilian rule/military partnership"[66]. During his term in office (1983-89), Özal managed to exert civilian control, manifesting itself mainly in two areas: the expansion of civil rights concerning the Kurdish population and the civilian intervention in the promotion processes of the military. In addition, Özal broke the long-lasting tradition that the President should originate in the military when he won the presidential elections. However, following his death in 1993, the political influence of the military progressively increased as a response to separatist Kurdish nationalism and to the electoral gains made by the Islamists in the local and general elections between 1994 and 1995.

Demirel's succession to the presidency shook the grand coalition between its True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP), when Tansu Çiller was elected as the leader of the DYP and became the first female Prime Minister of Turkey. Yet, despite the end of the Cold War opened new spaces of opportunities for Turkey, it also unleashed several domestic and external challenges that all the fragile coalitions led by Çiller – with right and Islamism parties far from DYP's political

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[64]   Cizre Sakallıoğlu 1997, p. 152.

[65]   On CMR of the period, see Fadden 1985.

[66]   Narlı 2000, p. 105. See also Kuzu 2019.

spectrum – were not able to solve. Among all the factors, it was the rising Kurdish Workers Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, PKK) terror throughout the 1990s that led the Turkish military to "take centre stage once again." In practical terms, the MGK decisions limited the policy-making space of the executive body and prevented parliament from exercising its checks-and-balances function. Lastly, in the absence of the communist threat, Turkey had to prove its credentials to keep aligned with its Western camp in a new fashion, namely embarking on a process of democratization that would overcome the military-civilian cleavage. This contradicted the military's traditional stance that arose again when it issued an ultimatum in the form of eighteen recommendations against the strong pro-Islamist stance of the government led by Erbakan's Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP)[67]. As a matter of fact, the army was still able to play an influential role as, although Erbakan signed the directives, he was forced to resign in June 1997 and its party was shut down by the Constitutional Court in January 1998.

However, despite its success, this last top-down intervention also had a "boomerang effect" in times when the Europeanization process was reaching its peak and the US was promoting a "Turkish Islamic-democratic model" against the religious terrorism expansion beyond the Middle Eastern region[68]. Overall, these contradictions paved the way and the basis for the political legitimization of a new moderate Islamist force that would have reverted the balance of Turkey's CMR forever from 2002 on: the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP)[69].

1.7. In lieu of a conclusion

In general, assessing Turkey's CMR from a culturalist perspective helps to think "out of the box" of the common straightforward dichotomies. Thus, by analyzing the ideological, political, and power-related rifts of the Cold War era, the chapter has showed three main trends that also contribute to clarify the evolution of the shifts in civilian-military balance occurred in Turkey in more recent times.

On the one hand, it argues that the military's guardian status was not clearly defined, and the officer corps differed strongly on many

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[67]   Ünlü Bilgiç 2009.

[68]   For its linkage to CMR, see Varol 2013.

[69]   Bardakçı 2013.

political issues because of opposite ideological factions, new right-wing/Islamist parties' political agendas, and varying levels of influence due to frequent purges and conjectural changes[70]. On the other, contesting the argument that the Turkish military always left power voluntarily to institute democratic rule, it also problematizes the notion of its ranks as a unitary kemalist actor to demonstrate also that Turkey's most tutelary force lived – and is still living nowadays – its own internal "cultural turn" that is deeply rooted in the Cold War.

First, the politicization of the military was unavoidable, given that in the late 1940s, Turkey shared with the West a serious Soviet threat, which had an impact on both domestic and international politics. Second, the professionalized military's propensity to participate in the public decision-making process came as a response to the various governments' mismanagement in solving the economic and political instability of the time. Last, the Turkish case exemplifies the effects of the military's professionalization, which may result in self-imposed professional standards, law, tradition, and the military's greater familiarity and respect for civilian institutions and values[71].

That is why the ideological splits into civil-military relations, as well as within the military itself, resembled Turkey's socio-political milieu in its broad sense and were not limited to two distinct social groups. For instance, many orthodox Muslim Turks supported the military's political involvement because of concern for communists and Kurdish nationalists. However, the entrenched elite adopted strong secularist, Turkish nationalist, and anti-communist attitudes, which caused them to be anxious about dangers from the Islamic reactionary, Kurdish separatist, and communist movements as well as to have mistrust for democratically elected governments. Consequently, the Turkish military received the necessary political power and encouragement from ideological allies, particularly in the judiciary, political parties, and media, as well as some facets of society.

This also helped the military legitimize its position in politics as a guardian of the state and its unity, as well as of the regime grounded on kemalist ideology and secularism. This does not imply that the Turkish military reluctantly intervened in politics as a result of civilian

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[70] Esen 2021, p. 202.

[71] Janowitz 1960, p. 420.

pressure; on the contrary, the "military used many threats to keep its allies constantly alert and its political role justified"[72].

Accordingly, this role can be defined as the long-term capacity of the military to define and redefine the ideology of the regime, identify its corporate existence with it, submerge itself beneath the surface and yet be able to support long-term political order, and to define and re-define threats to the regime and formulate responses more substantially than in liberal democracies[73]. This validates the idea that the Turkish military returned to its barracks after the coups not out of respect for democracy but according to a strategy based on "ruling but not governing, controlling politics without taking political responsibility"[74].

On the question of how the military can be rendered subordinate to civilians, Huntington advised keeping the military away from civilians and rendering them professionals preoccupied with military issues, while Janowitz has placed emphasis on the military's internalization of civilian cultural norms and values. In regard to the history of CMR in Turkey, some scholars may have reached a new paradigm: "Less Huntington, more Janowitz"[75].

However, not every sector of society supports the military's interventionist role in Turkish politics. Whereas there is broad political and social agreement on the military's involvement when the nation is threatened by foreign forces or domestic radicals, a sizeable minority, including Islamist and pro-Kurdish groups, as well as liberals and leftists, have become increasingly vocal in challenging the armed forces[76]. Thus, "concordance among the military, the government, and society is fragile and fluctuating"[77]. This was also demonstrated by the 1997 "post-modern coup" and the failed one in 2016 that, despite their different characteristics and outcomes, showed how co-opting the army through benefits and/or creating ideological symmetries between the government and the soldiers is still fundamental for the rulers to guarantee their time in office. In fact, ideology is neither a superstructure nor a mere instrument of power. Ideology and material conditions are separate but interrelated and may transform

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[72]   Kuru 2012, p. 2.

[73]   Cizre 2007, p. 5.

[74]   Kuru 2012, p. 41.

[75]   Gurcan, Gisclon 2016, pp. 6-9.

[76]   Narlı 2000, p. 126.

[77]   Sakallıoğlu 2004, p. 151.

the boundaries between state actors and societal actors. Therefore, "in an ideological struggle, members of the same state institution, social class, or even family can struggle with each other given the opposing ideologies they personally embrace"[78]. That is also why an accurate examination of Turkish democratization necessitates moving beyond a simplistic binary framework depicting an authoritarian military against democratically oriented civilian politicians and vice versa[79].

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[78]   Kuru 2012, p. 145.

[79]   Karabekir 2007, p. 36.

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2. Between the two poles: the anti-communist centre-left discourse in the Republican People's Party in the Cold War period (1950s-1970s)

Ali Açıkgöz, Carlo Sanna

2. 1. Introduction: the Cold War environment in Turkey

The Cold War period and its study are a matter of methodological challenge and conflicting views, significantly since the fall of the USSR in the early 1990s, and at least several strains of interpretation regarding the conflict between the communist "East" and the capitalist "West" appeared in the literature. Thus, calls were made to expand the ways of looking at the foreign policy angle and expanding the field to include inquiries regarding "gender, race and social history"[1]. The key development to overcome traditional "bipolarity" in new topical and methodological pursuits was the immense influx of the archival material. Over the last two decades the research has expanded to include geographies such as Europe[2] and Latin America[3].

In terms of study of the Cold War in Turkey, albeit the emphasis on the international affairs persists, scholarly efforts have also expanded to the cultural and ideological angles[4]. Recent calls were also made to place special emphasis on the ideology and activities of the (both islamist and nationalist) far-right[5]. However, most of the existing literature dealing with the left in Turkish political history and party politics during the Cold War period focused mainly on the cultural and political

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[1] Westad 2000; Pineo 2003.

[2] Autio Sarasmo 2011.

[3] Joseph 2019.

[4] Örnek, Üngör 2013.

[5] Aytürk 2015.

movements located at the far or extreme ends of the spectrum[6]. Even when dealing with the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), which after the turn to multi-party politics embarked in a slow but steady path towards the "left of centre" and social democracy, important research has been carried on about its relations with the movements of the far left[7]. Particular attention has been dedicated to the cultural and political relevance of intellectual circles such as those around "Yön" (Direction), "Ant" (Oath), "Türk Solu" (Turkish Left) and "Devrim" (Revolution) journals or parties such as the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP) and movements such as the National Democratic Revolution (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*, MDD), and the Revolutionary Youth Federation (Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu, *Dev-Genç*). Moreover, focus has been placed on their role in shaping the discourse of the (far) left in Turkey and in reflecting the topics that characterized the international debate of the bi-polar environment. In that light, a discussion on the developments in the centre-left during the 1960s and 1970s is needed to further place the left in Turkey in a global context, refraining from falling to a trap of essentialism regarding bipolarity of the Cold War ideological situation[8] or the trap of essentialism with regards to the left[9] as it connotes a larger family of different radical, moderate and doctrinal movements, groups and parties, not just Kremlin, Beijing or their satellites[10].

The centre-left in Turkey organized out of a synthesis of early-republican kemalist and European democratic socialist traditions. Above all, anti-imperialism (oftentimes meant as anti-Americanism, with the US perceived as supporters of the far-right in Turkey), refusal of the extra-parliamentarian means of achieving power, and anti-communism (meaning a refusal of complete state ownership in economy apart from certain strategic sectors such as oil industry, and an embrace of small propriety and market competition) appear to be intellectual inclinations that reflect aspects of such a change for the CHP. Far less attention has been dedicated to the development, within the CHP, of a debate around these topics in the light of its rising internal

[6]   Landau 1974; Aydınoğlu 2007, Ulus 2011; Bertuccelli 2023.

[7]   Erdoğan 1998; Emre 2014a; Yaşlı 2020.

[8]   Ugur Cinar, Acikgoz 2023; Manwaring, Kennedy 2017; Sandbrook et al. 2007.

[9]   Gencoglu Onbasi 2016.

[10]   Eley 2002.

movement of the "left of centre". This chapter aims to explore the evolution of the discourse within the CHP during the Cold War, answering the questions: What are the main ideological demarcation lines of the CHP's left of centre from other political movements on the Turkish political spectrum at that time? How were these discussions reflected in the overall political strategy of the CHP in the 1960s and 1970s? Who were the intra- and extra-party allies and opponents for the centre-left movement in this era? In this article we provide a revisionist descriptive account of major ideological, and cadre shifts in the CHP as a political party. The aim is to capture the effects of the Cold War ideological clashes over the centre-left politics while trying to get away from the bipolar approaches in the literature. The main sources are memoirs and public writings of relevant political actors of the CHP, journals/newspapers close to the CHP such as "Ulus" (Nation), "Akis" (Echo), and "Kim" (Who).

2.2. The CHP in the opening of the Cold War (1945-1960)

2.2.1. CHP and post-WWII reconstruction: Marshall Fund and NATO

The years that followed the end of the Second World War were years of profound change in Turkey, which laid the foundations of its future positioning in the Cold War. In this period, Turkey engaged in a process of internal institutional and economic reform, and in a foreign policy approach that oriented its first decisive steps in the direction of the Western system of alliances and organizations. As US-Soviet relations progressively deteriorated after the end of WWII, a "special role" started to be envisioned for Turkey and Greece by US State Department officials to improve both the military capabilities of the two countries to contrast the Soviet Union and to enhance the strategic interests of the US in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean regions[11]. This interest most notably evolved into framing Turkey as one pillar of the Truman Doctrine since 1947, and having it included in the Marshall Aid plan, which further promoted the mechanization of agriculture and industrialization started in the 1930s, and the first economic boom of the early 1950s that significatively contributed to the electoral for-

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[11]   Leffler 1985, pp. 810-814.

tunes of the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) in that period[12]. The strategic integration of Turkey in the nascent Western system of alliances, of which its active participation in the Korean War (1950-1953) is a notable example, led it to be included since the earliest phases in the formation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, to the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1949, to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. The first measures of liberalization in the political and economic fields went together with – and were made necessary by – these developments, leading to the creation of some space of private economic enterprise in a system overall still characterized by statism, and especially to the transformation of Turkey into a multi-party system between 1946 and 1950. While the 1950s were entirely characterized by the DP's uninterrupted rule, these changes had been initiated and promoted between the terminal phase of the CHP single-party rule and the early multi-party phase under the leadership of İsmet İnönü.

Many of these developments were a result of the internal dynamics within the CHP itself: until the end of the 1940s, the debates in the (single) party administrative bodies' meetings and conventions directly influenced the policies output. In this sense, the formation of other opposition parties can be read as the outcome not only of the pressures of a faction pushing for political and economic liberalization – as shown with the "*Dörtlü Takrir*" (Declaration of the Four)[13] but also the liberal and pro-democratic concessions promoted by İnönü's leadership itself and formalized in the CHP's 2nd Extraordinary Congress (*Olağanüstü Kurultay*) that opened the way for multi-party politics and for a less restricted debate to happen in the public sphere. In this period, neither the conflict between the CHP and this newly born DP opposition, nor that between the CHP ruling élite and its intra-party opposition were fought along the classical left-right spectrum. First, because as Karpat argues, "on the question of leftism both the opposition and the government parties were in agreement"[14] to the point that, for example, despite the harsh criticism of the DP towards the illiberal measures of

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[12]   Çarkoğlu 1997.

[13]   Presented on 7 June 1945, to the parliament by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan who soon left the CHP or expelled and established the DP.

[14]   Karpat 1959, p. 179.

Recep Peker's government, there were no reactions against the government's December 1946 decision to close various trade unions, political parties, and newspapers on charge of promotion of class struggle. Second, a slightly structured internal opposition was emerging inside the CHP. The most relevant intra-party debates revolved around the issue of the rapidity and extent of the democratic transition, and the space and freedoms to accord to the opposition: while the group led by Peker consisting of mainly veteran party members advocated for a stricter control and for the procrastination of the transition to a multi-party system, a second group of younger and more liberal Republicans, was in favour of the democratic transition. The above described international environment of the early Cold War was certainly influential in making this second group's (and İnönü's) pro-democracy line pass, as İnönü's stated commitment and efforts towards a multi-party and more democratic system (of which the 12 July Declaration [*12 Temmuz Beyannamesi*] is the biggest example) were instrumental in convincing an otherwise skeptical US Congress in turning a blind-eye on the actual democratic credentials of Turkey and include it in the program of US-funded aids for the sake of anti-Soviet strategic goals[15].

In the political arena, both WW2 and the post-war transition to multi-party politics presented an opportunity for both what has been deemed as the "extreme" left and right. On the right, as the Nazi war machine started to lose ground in the war zones of Europe, the ringleaders of the urban ultra-nationalist movement were tried in what was called the "Trial of Racism-Turanism" affair. On the left, the suppression was much more serious. The murder of the famous leftist author and poet Sabahattin Ali, the self-exile of poet Nazım Hikmet and the closure of "Tan" (Dawn) newspaper, as well as obstruction of the dissemination of "Görüşler" (Views) which was supposed to bring together the authors of the "*Dörtlü Takrir*" and prominent leftist thinkers of the day, and finally the raid of "Tan"'s publishing house in early December 1945 aimed to curb any connections between the newly rising democratic opposition and the left-wing intelligentsia of the day[16].

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[15]   Karpat 1959, pp.188-193; Leffler 1985.

[16]   See Çelik 2021, 343-371.

2.2.2. The CHP's change for survival

The electoral defeat against the DP, in 1950, served as a crucial turning point for CHP. During the 1950s the party had to choose to either fall into obscurity or re-adapt itself to the new political context and to its new role as an opposition party. One of its first decisions was to detach itself from the policies of the state for the first time since the founding of the Republic. The debates in the CHP over ideology started to take place very slowly in this decade. Also, in response to the need of taking a position against the DP government, the CHP leader İnönü engaged in alliance building and organizational expansion towards other parties, which paved the way for new ideas and actors to join the CHP[17]. During the 1950s, there were few experienced politicians associating themselves with the left[18]. Apart from older members, a younger generation of politicians such as Bülent Ecevit and Altan Öymen, who started their cursus in the party from within the ranks of the CHP Youth Branch[19] and others from professional backgrounds such as Kamil Kırıkoğlu, Ferda Güley, and Murat Öner, joined the CHP. Another significant external input in new personnel came from the breakaway group of the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*, HP)[20]: the newcomers were mostly young, technocratic-minded, and well-educated politicians[21] such as Coşkun Kırca and Turan Güneş. Some of those young guard soon gave a significant contribution to the intellectual works of the nascent Bureau of Research and Documentation (*CHP Araştırma ve Dokumantasyon Merkezi*, established by Turhan Feyzioğlu, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Bülent Ecevit, and Osman Okyar in 1958) and entered the governing bodies of the CHP in its 1959 Congress[22]. This body and the group of newcomers were significant not only for their policy prescriptions, but also for the setting up of a control over the correspondence between the CHP and the foreign ministries. Emre[23] reported that this Bureau also worked as a shadow foreign affairs department, having direct lines of communication with the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.

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[17]   Kili 1976.

[18]   As, for example, Cemil Sait Barlas.

[19]   Kaya 2021, p. 44.

[20]   Karaömerlioğlu,Kirişçioğlu 2022.

[21]   Keyder 1987, p. 142.

[22]   Emre 2013, pp. 85-86.

[23]   Ibid., pp. 70-71.

The main drive for the change had been two-fold. First was the internal opposition to the chairperson İnönü, by some of the provincial party elites and their representative Kasım Gülek. However, Gülek's effort for taking the control of the party was short-lived. He failed to bring in any ideational or institutional change[24], rather relying on instrumentalizing the demands of the local branches towards the party centrum. A reform commission work after the 1954 electoral defeat was brushed aside not only by İnönü but also by Gülek himself[25]. Instead, the CHP programme adopted an *étatist*, pro-labour attitude for the 1957 elections with the push from the newer generation of policy entrepreneurs joining the CHP[26]. Gülek was finally removed from his office in 1959.

Overall, the party change in the CHP was shaped first by its need to stay relevant in the new multi-party environment. The CHP's voter base stayed mainly around central and eastern Anatolian cities with traditional elite connections: only in 1957 elections this trend started to reverse in major urban areas[27]. Secondly, the rising authoritarianism of the DP and the worsening economy allowed for the CHP to be a harbour for opposition[28]. Therefore, it opened to newcomers, who started to rebrand its party identity, ideas, and policy preferences. In the 1950s, on one hand, the party establishment was able to fully designate the outlook of the party in terms of its ideas; on the other hand, the newer generation used internal competition to bring about new ideas on redistribution, state involvement in economy, social and democratic institutions, and of course the left.

2.2.3. A left-leaning anticommunism

In the 1950s, the CHP élites were forced by the political circumstances to accept that the electoral defeats were due to the party's deficiencies on the supply side. Simultaneously, the intra-party competition between the ruling coalition led by İnönü and supported by most of the above-mentioned young intellectuals and professionals, and the

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[24]   Güneş Ayata 2010, p. 79

[25]   Kılıç 2020, p. 1391.

[26]   Kili 1976, pp. 129-130.

[27]   Cinar, Ugur Cinar and Acikgoz 2022, p. 214.

[28]   Kili 1976, p. 124.

faction grouped around Gülek (among them was Kırıkoğlu) sparked[29]. Despite this, the élites of the party remained cautious in reaffirming anti-communism. Already in this period some of the Six Arrows (especially "étatism" and "populism") were revised, while some principles of labour rights, redistribution, freedom to unionize, and social state were introduced[30]. The "Declaration of Primary Aims" (*İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi*) was an emblematical product of both ideational change (as it included all these new principles), and of the contribution of the newly entered élites (as the Research Bureau team gave a great contribution in its preparation, and as it was presented to the 14th Congress of the party by Turan Güneş). This document and other policy prescriptions became a basis for the main ideas that were pushed in the constitution-writing and policy making efforts of the CHP in the 1960s.

The ideational discussion for the new-coming generation took place over the 1950s in the "Forum" magazine. Both the CHP youth and the ex-HP members were among the discussants. The main aim of the magazine was to bring about a discussion between the kemalist and liberal wings of the intelligentsia[31]. Its authors and editors were also positioning Turkey in the Western alliance against communism even though some writings defended that position in the name of the left[32]. In an article, Bülent Ecevit – at that time a simple CHP member and journalist – wrote about many communist members of the intelligentsia switching to a more democratic alternative in their leftist positions after WWII. He claimed that the policing environment created by the state in Turkey made such an anti-Soviet turn in the Turkish intelligentsia harder[33]. Ecevit had in fact been selected by US institutions twice to visit the USA, first as part of journalism internship in 1954, and then in 1957 as a holder of the Rockefeller scholarship which landed him in the classroom of Henry Kissinger in Harvard[34]. However, an exhaustive reading of Ecevit's works during the 1950s showed that his anti-communism was mostly based in human rights concerns. He blamed the DP for having created a communist threat

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[29]   Emre 2013, p. 85; Kili 1976; Güneş Ayata 2010.

[30]   Emre 2014b; Kili 1976.

[31]   Örnek 2015, pp. 278, 283; Çakmak 2010.

[32]   Örnek 2015, pp. 282, 296.

[33]   Ibid., pp. 286-287.

[34]   Akar and Dündar 2006, pp. 51-52, 55-56.

in Turkey, curbing social justice, freedom to unionize, and right to strike[35]. He also favoured a left-wing solution against the spread of communism, bringing in the non-doctrinal stance of the Labour Party in Britain, and Israel, or the Swedish Socialist Party. Ecevit's position and insistence on defending labour demarcated him from the Turkish right of the next decade. Whereas the right saw modernization and the shift towards the western world as the source of communism, Ecevit embraced western democracy as the solution. The future demarcation lines of the CHP from the rest of the party system in the 1960's was being put in place[36].

A much less nuanced but still meaningful ideological development was taking place in the higher echelons of the CHP. İnönü started to argue after the 1954 elections that the liberal market paradigm had been rendered outmoded and the world started to move towards socialist economies. According to İnönü the CHP's own tradition of national developmentalism (namely etatism) prevented the CHP from using the term. A planned and interventionist economy was the innovative pillar of the new etatism[37]. There were two possible motivations for this shift of İnönü: First, was the tradition of pragmatic economic policies of the CHP, culminated in its etatism. Second, a response to the opponents' (especially the DP) instrumental use of anti-communism, to distance CHP from communism. Still, the CHP remained the main target of the DP's anti-communism, perhaps in a similar – but starker – way than what CHP had instigated in the second half of the 1940s against the newly forming political opposition. In the last days of its government, the DP created a parliamentary "Commission for Investigation" (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) that claimed the CHP was directly in connection with the radio operations of the Communist Party of Turkey operating from Moscow[38]. The CHP's defence against the DP's authoritarian pressures was to organize among the university professors and students. On the eve of the investigation, these allies numbered to 25,000 people[39], managing to arrange large protests against the DP government in Ankara

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[35]   Sanlı 2021, p. 147.

[36]   Ibid., p. 145.

[37]   bilâ 2008, p. 138.

[38]   Kirişçioğlu 1973, p. 202.

[39]   Karpat 1966, p. 180.

and Istanbul. The CHP's efforts to organize among the university circles was known and closely watched by the CIA[40].

2.3. CHP and the "left of centre" (1960-1974)

2.3.1. The context after 1960 *coup d'etat*

Opened with the coup of May 27, 1960, the decade of the Sixties is topical for the dynamics hereby analysed. The international system was becoming more and more polarized as the Cold War entered one of its most heated phases before the détente: from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the war in Vietnam, to the announcement of the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" by Leonid Brezhnev. Turkey was the protagonist of one of the biggest episodes of tension within NATO, with the Cyprus issue escalating in inter-communal violence in 1963-1964, resulting in the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force and the political pressure of US President Lyndon Johnson.

Most importantly, the polarisation of the Cold War and intra-alliance disputes were directly reflected in Turkey's internal dynamics, also within the CHP. On the one hand, the new 1961 Constitution which greatly expanded civil liberties and granted extensive social rights[41] created new spaces for political expression for the political left. Labour organizations and trade unions proliferated because of this and of the 1963 Labour Law pushed by Ecevit as the Minister of Labour of the three İnönü cabinets (1961-1965), that significantly expanded labour and union rights. Many other left-wing political subjects were established in this decade in Turkey[42] in the form of parties (e.g. the Workers' Party of Turkey, TİP, 1961-71), of student and youth movements (e.g. the Federation of Idea Clubs, *Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu*, 1965-69), and of left-wing intellectual circles. The rise of the left was met with a parallel surge in right-wing and anti-communist forces. Any reference to communism was prohibited by the 1965 Law on Political Parties[43], and the association with communism and socialism

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[40] The CIA document regarding the student protests in Turkey of April 1960 was published by the Turkish historian and writer Tolga Gerger on his X/Twitter profile on 05/09/2023: https://x.com/tolgagerger/status/1699102649587577289?s=20.

[41] Özbudun 1997, p. 232.

[42] Bertuccelli 2023.

[43] Dodd 1969, p. 131.

was used as a political weapon by the right to discredit and threaten its adversaries. These stances found home in various political parties, especially in the Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*, CKMP) since the former Colonel Alparslan Türkeş took over its control in 1965 and re-branded it as Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi,* MHP) in 1969. But parties were not the sole expression of the anti-communist sentiment: many organizations, intellectual circles, newspapers were established around it, as exemplified by the Association for the Fight of Communism in Turkey (*Türkiye Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*, TKMD, established in 1963) that somehow institutionalized the fight against communism in Turkey[44] as even Turkish President Cemal Gürsel was its honorary chairman[45], and the Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları*) – better known as the Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*) – who will play a pivotal role in the outburst of political violence of the 1970s.

It is in this growing anti-communist environment that the CHP, until 1965 committed to the governing experience, started to talk of itself as a party at the "left of centre" (*ortanın solu*). It did so initially as a discourse to position itself away from extreme poles on the political spectrum, aiming to shield against right-wing accusations of communism while embracing the new environment supportive of left-wing politics[46], where the party had already made significative (albeit limited) openings. Examples of these openings are the liberal safeguards, democratic freedoms, and labour-friendly social and economic provisions that found place in the 1961 Constitution[47] wanted by the CHP members of the founding assembly, and which were largely drawn from the CHP's 1959 "Declaration of Primary Aims"[48]; or the Labour Law of 1963 as a success of the intra-CHP élite of the R&D Bureau[49]. However, fully embracing left-wing politics was hindered by the intense intra-party factionalism. The internal constraints regarded even the principles of the "Declaration", which had been previously accepted by the right-wing of the CHP that now started to consider it too much leaning

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[44]   Güldal 2018.

[45]   Ahmad, Ahmad 1976, p. 293.

[46]   Akis 1960, p. 26; Emre 2014a, p. 92.

[47]   Isiksel 2013, p. 714

[48]   Emre 2014a, p. 65.

[49]   Ibid., p. 99.

on the left. For the rest of the 1960s the shift of the CHP towards the left of centre was at point a problematic and at best a conflictual one.

Significant internal and external developments in the first half of the 1960s should be mentioned as examples. The first was a failed alliance with the labour movement in 1961 by Ecevit. During the 15th Congress of the CHP in August 1961, Ecevit proposed that a maximum of 15% labour representative quota should be put in effect in localities with significant labour population to enable them to raise their voice in the legislative bodies of Turkey[50]. Although the motion was accepted in the Congress its application was postponed due to intra-party right-wing opposition. This fed into TİP's rise, as a lack of effort of CHP pushed the main left-wing labour union of the day (*Türk-İş*) towards the former. This development exposed another fault-line at the intelligentsia. CHP's connection to the "Yön" movement, Muammer Aksoy, offered Ecevit to start a new party called "Labourers' Party" (*Çalışanlar Partisi*) after the breaking out of the unionists and the CHP. The "Yön" group's effort was aimed at stopping the rise of TİP. Ecevit refused and pursued his pro-labour policies in the CHP[51]. During his ministry, he focused on expanding social security to all workplaces and securing the right for workers to participate in workplace administration and profit sharing[52]. Ecevit rationalized his pro-labour attitudes as an effort to curb the radical left, but still faced hostility from the right-wing members of İnönü cabinets and the CHP party assembly[53]. A second internal push came when Ecevit, Güneş and İbrahim Öktem offered during a Party Assembly meeting to give the CHP a new way to stop losing the youth to TİP. Some members attacked the proposal as communist leaning, and it was brushed aside by the meeting chair and General Secretary İsmail Rüştü Aksal[54]. The resistance to left-wing ideas in the CHP was due to a general tendency of anti-communism fed by the presence of DP successors in the İnönü cabinets. During coalition governments the CHP lost connections and competitive advantages over the university youth and the left-wing intelligentsia. Another external development widened the cleavage between the latter

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[50]   Bilâ 1987, pp. 257-278.

[51]   Öner 1976, p. 48; Atılgan 2008, p. 266.

[52]   Kili 1976, p. 190.

[53]   Uyar 2017, p. 120.

[54]   Güneş 2009, p. 67.

and the CHP: the disgruntlement in the army regarding the victory of the DP successors in the 1961 elections. Soon after the elections the military forced the CHP and the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP), to form the First İnönü coalition cabinet. The lack of commitment of the coalition to policy prescriptions such as the land reform bill, petroleum bill, and the role of foreign investment in economy, as stated in the CHP programme, created an outcry in the left-wing journals and among left-leaning youth branch members of the CHP, the most prominent being Kemal Anadol[55].

The last İnönü government came to an end after the Cyprus crisis in 1964. The sentiment of the close circle around İnönü, as written by his son-in-law Metin Toker, was that there was American involvement in the collapse of the coalition[56]. The CHP went to the 1965 Elections in such a mood and the anti-American sentiment rose especially after the experience of the elections among the left-leaning members of the CHP such as Ecevit[57]. The sentiment was so strong that even after two years, Öner claimed that İnönü told during a Party Assembly meeting regarding NATO in 1967, "I work so much, yet the U.S. will not let me become prime minister"[58].

It is widely accepted in the literature[59] that İnönü and the CHP declared their position on the "left of centre" during the 1965 elections campaign, as a direct effect of the energetic entrance of the TİP into the Turkish party system. According to this argument the CHP, as an anti-communist party, wanted to actively stop the TİP from gaining more ground, thus emulating its ideas and slogans[60]. This argument has some value as it is evident from previous discussion of the CHP elite around the meaning of the left presented above. Moreover, a close reading of party sources and memoirs of the CHP MPs and local cadres showed that the TİP had an allure over the voter base of the CHP[61].

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[55]   Kili 1976, pp. 199-206; Bilâ 1987, pp. 274-275; Kaya 2021, pp. 38-40.

[56]   Kili 1976, pp. 207-208.

[57]   Uyar 2017, p. 209; Öner 1976, pp. 135-137.

[58]   Öner 1976, pp. 279-281.

[59]   Kili 1976; Yaşlı 2020; Emre 2014a; Uyar 2017.

[60]   CHP acquired some of its slogans from the cultural left of the day. However, programmatic tendencies and policy prescriptions of the CHP and the TİP had significant differences. See: Erdem 2012.

[61]   Neftçi 1997, pp. 70-1; Bakşık 2009, p. 225. Also see: Emre 2014a, p. 90.

The AP started the 1965 campaign with an all-out offensive accusing both the CHP and TİP of being communist, using the TKMD, and brought such accusations to the core of its electoral campaign. According to Kili, the third İnönü coalition moving away from a pro-US foreign affairs focus and a cultural ties agreement with the USSR during its last days were the grounds of the AP's offensive[62]. The CHP's response was to first counter the accusations. From June to July 1965 CHP's newspaper "Ulus" carried the issue to headlines via messages of Kemal Satır, Turan Feyzioğlu and İnönü, and defended the party[63]. On 15 July, İnönü visited prime minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, delivered his concerns for electoral security, declared the TKMD akin to Nazi SS, and demanded Gürsel's resignation from the honorary membership[64]. CHP's defence continued until 25 July when İnönü made his famous statement that CHP was a party on the "left of centre" and reiterated it over several other interviews[65]. This defence however was not effective as little ideological discussion took place for in the public and the CHP members were unable to make convincing arguments regarding this sudden turn to centre-left politics. The AP pushed forward with its new slogan "*Ortanın solu, Moskova yolu*" (Left of centre, way to Moscow). The TİP kept a watchful eye and lowered the tone of its general critiques of the CHP for the election period[66]. The data suggest that the reason for CHP's turn to left was not due to competition from the TİP. No open references or polemics could be seen regarding TİP's "non-capitalist path to development" in CHP sources. Rather it was anti-communist right-wing activism which pushed the CHP to rearticulate its identity. Narrative evidence supported this point as Nihat Erim wrote in his diary "İnönü had told it in June against the propaganda that RPP was taking it to communism"[67].

The open turn to the left for the CHP was a problematic one both in terms of its electoral chances and internal cohesion. Soon after the elections internal discussions started and quickly got heated, as those who supported the "left of centre" stance and those opposing formed

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[62]   Kili 1976, p. 208; Emre 2014a, p. 128.

[63]   See Açıkgöz 2022, pp. 185-186.

[64]   Emre 2014a, p. 90.

[65]   Bilâ 1999, p. 214.

[66]   Emre 2014a, p. 128.

[67]   Erim 2021, p. 818.

factions. Overall CHP elite's inability or indifference to include labour movement due to rigid anti-communism and context of military intervention to politics curbed the party's shift to the left. Only after being forced by anti-communist actions of the right, the CHP had to declare that it was a party on the left. Even after that, there were many in CHP who wanted "left of centre" to be a mere unfortunate episode.

2.3.2. An internal dispute over ideology, voter-base and policy-making

After the electoral defeat of 1965, the CHP was torn between its conservative, centrist, and progressive wings, with İnönü engaged in a difficult balancing effort. The former wing – represented by cadres like Ferit Melen, Coşkun Kırca, Orhan Öztrak and led by Turan Feyzioğlu, who would launch various oppositional initiatives within the party administrative bodies and the parliamentary group[68] – contested the discourse of the left of centre as electorally detrimental and contrary to the ideology of the CHP, and its promoters as too much leaning towards socialism and communism[69]. Centrists such as Satır and Erim kept a low profile and followed İnönü with occasional calls for removal of extreme-wings from the CHP[70]. The last group, consisting of younger party elites and intellectuals who possessed more progressive, centre-left or socialist inclinations (Ecevit, Orhan Birgit, Mustafa Ok, Selahattin Hakkı Esatoğlu, Nermin Neftçi and Aksoy among others)[71], pushed for ideational change, in the sense of a review of CHP's founding principles and programs more towards vote-seeking, moving away from elitism, and more attention to the needs of workers and peasants who were the majority of Turkish population. İnönü, who throughout the first half of the decade was mostly concerned with protecting the democratic regime and its values[72], started to worry

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[68] Most notably, he organized and led intra-party opposition initiatives in the 18th Congress (1966), leading a group called "76'ers" (*Yetmişaltılar*), and in the 4th Extraordinary Congress (1967), leading the "63'ers" (*Altmışüçler*) in the parliamentary group and "the Eights" (*Sekizler*) in the Party Assembly.

[69] Kili 1976, pp. 222-225; Uyar 2017, pp. 205-217.

[70] Uyar 2017, p. 218.

[71] Güneş kept a position of observer according to Öner (1976, pp. 50-1) in the initial period, and became active in this faction after the 18th Congress in 1966.

[72] Ugur Cinar, Acikgoz, Esen 2023, pp. 6-7; Kili 1976; 227-229.

more about the competition against the AP. While reiterating the firm non-communist stance of the CHP in all the intra-party discussions and factional clashes, İnönü started to support the group of party cadres and intellectuals who promoted the left of centre discourse that seemed capable of bringing the much-needed ideological refreshment. It is in this context, those supported left of centre started to consolidate from a group of people sparsely put together around a discourse to an actual intra-party movement. Supported by İnönü himself, the LoC movement obtained a decisive victory over Feyzioğlu's conservative faction (which accused the CHP of having cut its ties with kemalism, and Ecevit's group with communism) and started to threaten İnönü's position as the chairperson. In the 18th Congress in 1966[73], left of centre group won the majority in the party assembly, and Ecevit became the new Secretary General of the CHP.

The fact that Feyzioğlu's wing left the CHP after the congressional defeats of 1966-67 to establish the Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi*, GP) did not curb the debates in the CHP over its ideology and the meaning of "left of centre", because the stronger left-wing overtones of its new electoral platform brought by the LoC Movement did not result in electoral victories. On the contrary, as the elections in 1969 saw the CHP's vote share shrink by 1%, new discussions were ignited by the centrist faction. The main demarcation line regarded the ideological shift of the CHP. First, such an issue occurred when some of the left-leaning members of the LoC Faction started questioning the NATO membership of Turkey during a parliamentary group debate. Güneş had signed a petition for Turkey to leave NATO and Toker wrote in his column that there were communists in the CHP. İnönü himself intervened and stated that Turkey should indeed stay in the NATO with amendments to its agreement with the organization[74]. The second issue was the reinstatement of the labour movement to the CHP and the labour quotas. When the LoC Faction pushed union representatives as mayoral and parliamentary candidates in Ankara and İstanbul in 1968 Local Elections, the centrists voiced their concerns[75]. The final point regarded kemalism, and a heated debate occurred over Ecevit's speech on

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[73]   Uyar 2017, pp. 256-263.

[74]   Öner 1976, pp. 279-281; Neftçi 1997, pp. 123-132; Mülayim 2019, pp. 227-229; Erim 2021, pp. 865-867.

[75]   Ulus 1968; Erim 2021, p. 874.

Atatürk's Memorial Day in November 1969[76]. This issue also strained the relationship between the "Yön" movement and the CHP.

The revival of the ideological debates within the CHP paralleled the growing left-right tensions of the end of the decade that flared up throughout Turkey. After the defeat of 1969 elections for the CHP, the leftist intelligentsia lost all its hopes for a change in power via parliamentarism. Ecevit and the LoC started to come under attacks from the extreme left both polemically and literally. During the Congress of the Teachers Union of Turkey in 1969, Ecevit and socialist LoC Faction member Esatoğlu were beaten by a group of leftist students who accused them with being collaborators of the US[77]. Some of the most prominent leftist protagonists of these tensions were also directly in contact with CHP groups: for example, it was the case with Deniz Gezmiş, who led the appearance of a group of the far-left organization *Dev-Genç*[78] to confront Ecevit[78], in the congress of the CHP's Istanbul local branch in June 1970, in support of the candidate backed by Satır[79]. İnönü claimed that the instigator of the event was the former military putschist and CHP MP Orhan Kabibay[80] who worked as one of the connections between the revolutionary left and the radicals in the CHP.

Once again, the left-right tensions in the country – that from the universities (especially after the global '68 movement) overflowed in street violence and claimed prestigious victims[81] – and especially the coup by memorandum of 12 March 1971, worked as a watershed for the CHP. The LoC Movement was once again standing on the one side

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[76]   In his speech Ecevit refused non-parliamentary politics and reformulated a well-known Marxist motto "Base will determine the superstructure" as a call for "revolutions at the base level". See, Ugur Cinar Acikgoz, Esen 2023, p. 9.

[77]   Uyar 2017, pp. 322-3.

[78]   Dev-Genç was an organization directly evolved from the university organization called the Federation of Idea Clubs which was close to the TİP. The organization broke away its ties with the TİP due to the party's parliamentarianism and renamed itself as such in 1969.

[79]   Milliyet 1971, p. 144.

[80]   İnönü 2020, p. 865.

[81]   The far-left revolutionary groups organized various clamorous actions between 1971 and 1972, including the abduction of US and NATO military personnel and the assassination of the Israeli consul Efraim Elrom, in retaliation against the repression of the left and its militants, some of whom – most notably Deniz Gezmiş – were sentenced to death. Against this decision also İnönü and Ecevit protested and gave their vote in parliament, in a debate that exemplifies the extreme left-right polarization of those years, as the MHP and AP leaders Türkeş and Demirel expressed their favour to the capital punishment.

of a debate with the centrist faction of the CHP over the support to the military coup, the stance towards the leftist revolutionary movements, and the accusations of leaning towards socialism and communism. İnönü, after receiving threats of abolishment of the parliament from the military, put his (and CHP's) priorities behind regime guardianship and the protection of the Republic, opting for the dialogue and appeasement with the armed forces to prevent them from closing the parliament down and establishing a complete military rule[82]. Ecevit and his faction strongly opposed this decision. Ecevit's resignation from his post of General Secretary of the CHP on 21 March was the biggest symptom of the rupture between the chairman İnönü, and his group that still held the majority in the party organs. This meant for İnönü placing tacit support for Erim's prime ministry and openly siding with Satır's centrist faction to curb the hold of Ecevit and the LoC Movement in the ruling bodies of the CHP. Ecevit in return managed to get the support of Kırıkoğlu's left-wing, his own group, and a new group of academicians from the University of Ankara (most notably Deniz Baykal, Besim Üstünel and Ahmet Yücekök, and Güneş acting as an elder), the so-called "Mülkiye Junta"[83]. After a bitter rivalry the control of the CHP was eventually won by the LoC Movement. İnönü resigned from chairmanship after failing to push a vote of no confidence for Ecevit's group in the 5th Extraordinary Congress on 8 May 1972, and Ecevit's faction continued its hold over the party. He became the third chairman of the CHP on 14 May and led the party to the electoral victory of 1973.

As discussed above, the 1960s presented two-pronged pressures of the Cold War binary over the CHP, which was slowly but surely moving towards the centre-left. On one hand, as a modernist and increasingly pro-labour unit of Turkish politics, the CHP became the target of the Turkish right, which used anti-communist sentiments as a staple tool against the CHP. On the other hand, far and extreme-left saw the CHP as either a threat to itself or as an enemy. The radical left student movement did not refrain from physical attacks or interfering in the factional competition of the CHP. The 1960s showed that the centre-left position was under crossfire in Turkey and when the CHP came at odds with the US interests in the region it became easier to use

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[82]   Kili 1976, p. 282.

[83]   Emre 2014b.

the anti-communism card for the Turkish right. Any potential chal-
lenges to establishment in a NATO country which was bordering the
USSR, even if it came from a more tame and moderate-left wing party
which was also openly anti-communist, were being kept in check.

2.4. Conclusion: yet another leftist "victim" in the Cold War?

This chapter highlighted how the CHP's ideological journey to-
wards its left-of-centre stance was marked by internal strife, external
pressures, and the intricacies of Cold War politics. The party's ability
to navigate these challenges defined its role in Turkish politics during
a transformative era, illustrating the complex interplay between ideol-
ogy, internal dynamics, and the international context. The case-study
hereby presented demonstrated how the more classical ideological de-
bates of the international environment of the Cold War intertwined
with those specific to the Turkish context, ultimately shaping a dis-
tinctive ideological solution within the CHP. Furthermore, it shows
how left elsewhere than Europe struggled with the binary ideological
alliance conditions.

The centre-left in Turkey sprung out of a strict anti-communist po-
litical and ideological lineage, kemalism. After WWII, the CHP openly
kept the course of Turkey towards the West. It acted as anti-commu-
nist agent and suppressed the fledgling left which sought friendly re-
lations with the USSR. This had the added effect of putting pressure
on the newly rising DP. However, during the 1950s, the DP as the gov-
erning party turned the weapon of anti-communism towards the CHP
which resisted its rising authoritarianism. Doing so the CHP opened
itself up to issues of social equality, social security and labour rights,
and appealed to a new generation of politicians. In the post-coup en-
vironment of the 1960s, left-wing political track appeared as a political
alternative for the rapid need for development, and a group from the
younger generation of CHP pushed in that direction. Their ideas were
under development since the 1950s and called for an anti-communist
centre-left. This brand of left brought together socialism/social democ-
racy of European left and kemalist experience of the CHP to avoid
the taint of communism in the eyes of the political community. This
idea and its carriers received flak from its ideological rivals since its

inception. Moreover, differences over class-based politics, tactical preferences (namely military involvement in politics), as well as generational and left-leaning policy and cadre implementations pushed away left-kemalist intelligentsia and divided the CHP itself. First breakouts in 1967 openly tried to link the LoC with socialism, and communism. The factional exodus of 1973 was significant as it marked cadre renewal and revolved primarily around diverging understandings of the kemalist tradition and class-interests. The LoC insisted on reaching the popular classes and shifting its position over cleavage axes to stop being a party of "the elites" and relying on "democratic forces"[84], thus pushing away a significant portion of the old CHP elites and voter base significantly in 1969 elections. Between 1965 and 1977 the CHP managed to capture urban and agricultural labour-intensive provinces and its votes dramatically increased[85].

CHP's tenures in power between 1973-4 and in 1979 saw increased US disgruntlement and involvement in Turkish politics due to the Poppy-seed and Cyprus crises. Such decisions, while feeding into Ecevit's political appeal[86], debilitated the Turkish economy along in the aftermath of the 1973 petroleum crisis in the long run. With rising violence in the streets and under economic pressure, the Ecevit's minority government collapsed in 1979. Ecevit's failure was partly due to loss of state capacity and factionalism in the institutions. However, according to Kakizaki's research, Ecevit had fallen out of favour with the military due to his exposure of NATO-backed counter-guerrilla operations in Turkey[87]. This led to the inability to stop left-right conflict as well as to intervene and persecute those responsible for massacres in Maraş and Malatya. The reasons of failure for Turkey's anti-communist centre-left, in the late 1970s, stemmed from internal ideological and class conflicts, as well as a detrimental political environment that led to an external coup. General lack of culture of democratic engagement[88] and intense factionalism, when combined with the rigid anti-communist stances of the Turkish right and centrist parties, created a harsh environment for the democratic left in Turkey like elsewhere in Latin

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[84]   Ugur Cinar, Acikgoz and Esen 2023, p. 14.

[85]   Cinar, Ugur Cinar, Acikgoz 2022, pp. 2013-218.

[86]   Ugur Cinar, Acikgoz, Esen 2023, pp. 12-3.

[87]   Kakizaki 2013.

[88]   Samim 1987, p. 84.

America[89]. When this environment was influenced by the US in favour of the right and controlled by the security apparatus in a NATO country, it became extremely difficult for the centre-left to survive, even if it was genuinely anti-communist.

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3. "The people's power will be established with its own strong arms": creating a revolutionary culture in the 1970s Turkey through the case of Revolutionary Path *(Devrimci Yol)*

Halit Serkan Simen

3.1. Introduction: questions and perspectives

The polarization of international politics during Cold War resulted in various conflicts across multiple domains, including the military, political, cultural, economic, technological, and diplomatic spheres. Official institutions and civil initiatives in the US influenced countries consistently employed anti-communist and counter-revolutionary discourse in response to the growing threat of socialist movements. In turn, political parties and movements advocating for leftist agendas championed democratic demands, while motivating the masses toward either a reformist or forceful transition. The increase in revolutionary politics, particularly since the late 1970s, has made it imperative to address a variety of topics not only theoretically or terminologically, but also regarding their practical functioning. Culture and cultural hegemony were certainly the factors at play. During Cold War, the left revolutionary politics viewed culture not just as a cumulative historical legacy of societies but also as a means to establish new behaviors and lifestyles serving their revolutionary aims.

Turkey's strategic position during the period was closely intertwined with these global trends. Due to the ever-increasing dissent of the people, the left-wing movements started to gain momentum and exert a significant influence on society that was difficult to impede. As a result, right-wing organizations and state institutions attempted to undermine the cultural ascendancy of the left and the increasing popular support

they were garnering. To achieve this goal, they utilized forceful methods, including the funding of militant groups such as the *Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği* (Association for the Fight of Communism) or the "Idealist Hearths" (*Ülkü Ocakları*) – better known as "Grey Wolves"[1]. Prior to 1980, Turkey witnessed a period characterized by political and ideological rivalry, alongside a resolute struggle to achieve cultural and social dominance.

Focusing on the period between 1975 and 1980, this study examines Revolutionary Path (*Devrimci Yol,* also known as *Dev-Yol* or DY), one of the most widespread and influential political movements in Turkey, in terms of how it defined and how it instrumentalized culture, naming "revolutionary culture" (*devrimci kültür*), within its own revolutionary strategy and tactics. The concept, as reinterpreted and conceptualized by Revolutionary Path with a distinct political agenda, played a significant role in the development of revolutionary strategies and perspectives. Instead of equating the term culture with only artistic, educational, or folkloric activities, revolutionary culture referred to a set of behaviours and social mechanisms. Therefore, this study will examine this perspective from two different viewpoints: the cadre (*kadro*), the masses/people (*kitle/halk*).

Besides the brochures, articles, reports, posters, and special issues of the "Devrimci Yol" (Revolutionary Path) and "Devrimci Gençlik" (Revolutionary Youth)[2] journals, this study will benefit from the memoirs and biographies that were written by the members of the

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[1]   Following the counterinsurgency methods of the CIA and the Gladio, the Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi) played a major role in organizing militant sectors of the right. For a detailed study on right-wing militant movements in Turkey, see Yaşlı 2009; Bora 2020.

[2]   In addition to the published collections of selected articles from the journal, many other articles and special issues of the magazine can also be found on the internet. In recent years, the Devrimci Yol Archive initiative, established within the RIT – Institute for Turkish Studies (*Türkiye Araştırmaları Enstitüsü*), has digitized and made available various editions of magazines such as "Devrimci Yol", "Devrimci İşçi", "Türkei Information", "İşçilerin Sesi", "Turkei Depesche", "TÖB-DER" as well as brochures and leaflets. In addition, the TÜSTAV (Social History Research Foundation of Turkey) archive has recently made Revolutionary Path documents and magazines accessible on its website. As for printed collections, see Müftüoğlu 1989; Devrimci Yol'da Sosyalizm Yazıları 1996; Aslan 1996; Aslan 1997; Anonymous 1997; Anonymous 2006; Ocak 2006; Erdoğan 2013; İşleyen 2017; Ağırbaş et al 2018. In a recent contribution, Bilir presented an exhaustive bibliography on Revolutionary Path, encompassing a diverse array of published documents and analyses, selected readings from journals, court records, academic works, biographical and autobiographical literature, and fictional novels. Bilir 2024b.

Movement. Besides the written sources, the slogans and general rhetoric used by the organization constitute another type of sources. After a brief introduction to the development of Revolutionary Path, it will focus on the Movement's definition of culture and its methods for disseminating it. The main section of the paper will examine the concept of revolutionary culture within the two main elements by focusing on specific themes, characters, narratives, and incidents.

Methodologically, this study analyzes the sources from a historical perspective rather than utilizing a grand narrative or theoretical framework to comprehend and elucidate the political environment and organizational responses. The '78 generation (*78'liler*)[3] in Turkey represents a radical extension of the global '68 movement (*68'liler*). As a result, the left movements in Turkey between 1975 and 1980 feature distinctive approaches, tactics, political advancements, and experiences when compared to their western counterparts or people's movements in Africa, Middle East[4], and Latin America, despite sharing certain similarities with the latter[5]. As most of the political and sociological frameworks are inclined to view the entire process as part of Cold War polarization, this approach bears the risk of undermining the significant role of left movements in domestic politics. Given the biased nature of some recent studies adopting an outsider perspective, this study tends to avoid rigid schemes or models[6].

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[3] On the Generation of '78's self-definition and differentiation from their predecessor and successor generations, focusing on memories and nostalgia, see, Durmaz 2024.

[4] The ongoing political and social unrest in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine, has also led to the formation of more organic relations between the Turkish left and other Palestinian political actors. In particular, those who participated in the revolutionary struggle alongside the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and who undertook military service in the camps, perceived themselves as direct subjects of the Palestinian struggle. Similarly, Syria and Lebanon, particularly in the latter half of the 1970s and following the coup d'état, served as a training ground, arms smuggle and a place of refuge/recovery for Revolutionary Path as well as the other organizations, see Duman 2017a; Duman 2017b; Bilir 2024a, pp. 58-99.

[5] This influence can be attributed to the fact that national liberation movements seeking "liberation from colonialism" had become integrated into a revolutionary paradigm on a global scale. The rise of translated literature and publications on global anti-colonial uprisings in this era is essential in demonstrating how the left in Turkey emulated these popular movements.

[6] Jenny White's recent graphic novel, which is of academic importance, is one of the works that carries this risk. For a detailed review and the author's response, see Simen, Alemdaroğlu, White 2024.

Another goal is to enlighten a little-studied period and topic. Scholarly works on the political and cultural environment of Cold War Turkey after 1960 concentrated on a variety of areas, including youth, memory studies, cultural transformation, intellectual and ideological debates, immigration, women's rights activism, military memorandum and coups, and identity movements[7]. However, most studies have either focused on the period up to the 1971 military memorandum or after the coup d'état of September 12, 1980. Therefore, the latter half of the 1970s has been little examined by studies for various reasons, notably when compared to the preceding decade.

One significant reason is that the organizations established during the 1970s maintain a direct political continuity to the present day, which makes it particularly harder to study. For the left, including social-democrats, it is simpler to embrace the revolutionary figures and organizations of the '68 Movement along with its anti-imperialist spirit and advocacy for freedom. However, the increasing anti-fascist rhetoric of the left in the 1970s and the classification of these organizations as "terroristic"[8] impairs the perception of the era. Additionally, in mainstream political discourse the relatively less severe violence of the 1960s is more easily accepted compared to the subsequent decade.

Accordingly, the '68 Movement became more convenient and accessible for integration with the global academic and political environments. The '78 Movement, on the other hand, remained more Turkey-centric that makes it challenging for the non-Turkish speaking academic community to follow its historical and political developments. While there are numerous publications on Revolutionary Path, including essays, books, polemics, debates, court records, memoirs of its members, and select pieces from journals[9], few are academic

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[7]   For detailed studies on Cold War Turkey with specific focus on the cultural, ideological, political, and social changes, see Ulus 2011; Örnek, Üngör 2013; Örnek 2015; Pekesen 2020; Ünlü Ertan 2020; Bertuccelli 2021. In recent years, there has been growing interest in memory studies of the period spanning from the 1960s to the 1980s. Among these studies, see Karacan 2015; Başçı 2017; Drechselová 2021; Tuncer, Özdemir Taştan 2021; Erbil 2023.

[8]   Whilst it is true that the organizations of the late 1960s were viewed as illegal by the state, it is important to note that the higher incidence of "terrorization" was a result of the political situation and discourse prevalent in the 1980s.

[9]   Numerous academic and non-academic studies have analyzed the structure of Revolutionary Path, the reasons for its success, the circumstances following 1980, and its decline. Some of which are self-critical assessments and often written by movement members. Karakurt's works are the ones that can be considered semi-

works[10]. Therefore, this study attempts to examine the political and cultural structure of a pivotal era in Turkey from the perspective of a revolutionary organization by also providing complimentary information on the general political conditions of the 1970s Turkey and Revolutionary Path.

3.2. A brief overview on Revolutionary Path

During the mid-1970s, social dynamics were undergoing significant changes due to revived conflicts and a polarizing political climate. In these times of heightened social mobilization, political violence emerged as a crucial phenomenon impacting daily life. However, other factors, including rising inflation and illicit market practices, unemployment, human rights violations, sectarianism, and mounting popular opposition, were also affecting this situation[11]. The emergence of Revolutionary Path coincided with these political and economic circumstances. After the General Amnesty of 1974, the remaining members and supporters of the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*, commonly abbreviated as THKP-C), experienced several fractures. In November 1975, a faction with significant influence in universities and technical schools began publishing "Devrimci Gençlik" (Revolutionary Youth) magazine. Over time, the organization expanded its influence beyond student communities and gained a notable presence in multiple regions throughout Turkey. On 1 May 1977, the group released the Manifesto (*Bildirge*) and chose the name Revolutionary Path (*Devrimci Yol*), also utilizing it as

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academic in nature and perspective. See Karakurt 2017; 2019; 2023. Other critical evaluations were composed after the Movement's split and are presently being published in magazines, newspaper columns, or internet blogs. A few examples of these evaluations have been published, see Müftüoğlu 1989, 2001; Alpat 1995; Uyan 2005; Arslan 2005; Pekdemir 2014 pp. 291-341, Yol Dergi 2020, Canlı 2022.

[10] On Revolutionary Path, there are several academic studies mostly focusing on the Movement's discourse and its correlation with populism by using the theoretical framework of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Paul Taggart. See Erdoğan 1998; Bozkurt 2008; Özdemir Taştan 2011; Özdemir Taştan 2012; Kara 2012; Uysal 2013; Çınar 2018; Morgül 2019; Karakurt 2019.

[11] Zürcher 2004, pp. 248-277.

the title of their publication which was circulating around 100,000 to 250,000 copies[12].

From 1977 to 1980, Revolutionary Path experienced significant growth in number and influence due to its distinctive terminology and revolutionary strategy centred around Resistance Committees (*Direniş Komiteleri*)[13]. The Movement, which had an active presence all over Turkey with tens of thousands of supporters[14], suffered a "physical[15] but not ideological" defeat according to the leading members of the organization after the military coup on September 12, 1980[16]. Meaning that while the ideological stance and the assessment that Turkey was in a "low-intensity civil war"[17] were sound, the organization lacked the political and military capacity to withstand a military coup. In other words, the organizational structure lagged behind the immediate growth and influence of Revolutionary Path. Consequently, the hastily prepared resistance planning was not long-lasting, resulting in the arrest or defection of thousands of members abroad, except for the several successor groupings that maintained their activities throughout the 80s[18].

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[12] Although the magazine had legal status, it lacked official records in state archives. The figures cited above are often reiterated in news reports, interviews, memoirs, or during conferences and speeches of the members of the Movement. While the special issues reached circulation of 250,000 to 300,000 copies, the regular ones were distributed around 100,000 to 150,000 copies see Bostancıoğlu 2011, p. 172. In the October 1977 special issue, it was stated that 150,000 copies of that issue had been printed and therefore a charity campaign was launched. See Devrimci Yol Özel Sayı 1977.

[13] The purpose and functioning of the Committees will be discussed in detail.

[14] Based on the number of participants in the demonstrations cited in journals and circulation figures, the Movement estimated its capacity to reach one million prior to the military coup.

[15] Revolutionary Path lost around 400 militants, of which around 120 were killed after the coup. See Anonymous 1993.

[16] Anonymous 1992.

[17] In contrast to other groups, Revolutionary Path characterized the pre-coup era as a period of "low-intensity civil war" (*düşük yoğunluklu iç savaş*) due to the persistent rise in political violence and the profound polarization of society. Thus, it proposed to establish Resistance Committees to provide "active defence" (*aktif savunma*) of the population to stop the threat of civil war fueled by fascist terror. For certain organizations, such as Revolutionary Left (*Devrimci Sol*), the acceptance of an ongoing civil war was perceived as a negation of the Çayanist concept of Vanguard War, and thus came under criticism. see Anonymous 1990, Anonymous 1997.

[18] According to a recent evaluation by Karakurt, Revolutionary Path failed since it tried to combine the concepts of *Dev-Genç* (Revolutionary Youth), based on mass organization, and THKP-C, based on the armed action of revolutionary cadres. However, Bilir argues that these concepts were arbitrary definitions and that after

Subsequently, the resistance movement manifested itself as mountain fighters in the "Main Guerrilla Units" (*Ana Gerilla Birliği*, AGB) until 1984, after which splits emerged resulting in the groups known as "Autonomists"[19] (*Otonomcular*), and later "Revolutionaries" (*Devrimciler*). The Movement regained strength with the establishment of student associations across various groups, particularly in the late 1980s, the bolstering of civil servants' unions, and the growth of organizational efforts in the social sphere. Nowadays, apart from the Left Party (*Sol Parti*) – which was formerly known as Freedom and Solidarity Party (*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma* Partisi, ÖDP) – and the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*), the Revolutionary Movement (*Devrimci Hareket*), the Labor Movement Party (*Emekçi Hareket* Partisi, EHP), and partly the Union of Hope (*Umut-Sen*) are the main organizations that follow the Revolutionary Path tradition[20].

3.3. "Undoubtedly, the people's revolutionary culture will not fall from the sky": the definition of the new revolutionary culture

The second chapter of the Manifesto, titled *Ülkemizde durum* (The situation in our country), commences with an analysis arguing Turkey's complete dependence on imperialism in economic, political, cultural,

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1975 the organization consciously reinterpreted and updated Çayan's theses and did not make a sharp distinction between these concepts or traditions. see Karakurt 2023; Bilir 2024c.

[19] Autonomous groups should not be confused with their western anarchist counterparts. These organizations lack a clear organizational structure and were formed by Revolutionary Path militants who evaded capture after the coup who took initiatives in different parts of the country with new recruits. Differences between these groups often arise from disputes and factionalism among militants abroad in Europe. Between 1984 and 1989, autonomous movements gained strength throughout the country. Some of the most significant movements were the Ankara-based "Revolutionary Path Supporters" (*Devrimci Yol Taraftarları*), "Research, Discussion, Intervention Groups" (*Araştırma, Tartışma, Müdahale Grupları*, ATM), and "30th of March Followers" (*30 Martçılar*) , the Istanbul-based, "Supporters" (*Taraftarlar*) and "United Revolutionary Attitude on the Revolutionary Path" (*Devrimci Yolda Devrimci Birleşik Tavır*), and the İzmir-based "Revolutionaries" (*Devrimciler*). For a recent detailed study, see Bilir 2024a.

[20] For detailed information see Müftoğlu 1988, 2001, Arslan 2005, pp. 15-29; Pekdemir 2014 pp. 291-341; Ersan 2014, pp. 269-322; Aykol 2022, pp. 115-116; Taştan 2012, pp. 318-333.

and military terms[21]. This view was the direct continuation of Mahir Çayan's theories[22] on "colonial type of fascism" (*sömürge tipi faşizm*) and the recognition of Turkey as both a semi-feudal and semi-colonized state[23]. Revolutionary Path sought to establish a distinct ideological and political identity within the context of Cold War, developing its own terminology and language while avoiding alignment with any socialist blocs – a notable divergence from the approach of numerous other parties and movements[24]. Thus, this approach prioritized understanding the dynamics and demands of the socio-economic and cultural conditions of the people and localities to offer a distinctive model of revolutionary organization. In essence, the Movement sought to organize and cultivate a rhetoric that is "by the people and for the people."

The Movement then conducted an analysis revealing a close link between culture and imperialist hegemony. In the 1979 brochure *Devrimciler ne için savaşıyorlar?* (What do the revolutionaries fight for?), Revolutionary Path described the prevailing culture as a blend of decadent bourgeoisie imperialist culture and corrupt feudal culture. The order of exploitation and corrupt bourgeois culture poses the greatest hindrance to the people's consciousness and the promotion of a new revolutionary culture. The creation of a dominant culture enabled imperialist and exploitative powers to maintain social dominance over working-class people. As a result, an effective culture and education system is unattainable. Therefore, a primary responsibility of the revo-

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[21]   Devrimci Yol 1977.

[22]   Çayan relied on Paul Baran's analyses on dependency, and then his views adopted by Revolutionary Path.

[23]   Çayan 2013.

[24]   In numerous issues and Manifesto, Revolutionary Path described the Soviets as "modern revisionist" and "revisionist dictatorships," while the PRC was labelled as "social-imperialist." However, the magazine refers to Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong regarding them as important teachers of Marxism and Leninism. The ideological centre of the Movement considered Trotskyism a deviation but held the writings of Antonio Gramsci, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Che Guevara in high regard. Andre Gunder Frank's dependency theory provided an important perspective to explain the dynamics of imperialism. The "Monthly Review" magazine, an independent socialist magazine published in the USA, was the primary source for Western Marxism and international news. The most popular publication among experiments of actually existing socialism was the Cuban Communist Party's "Granma". For the historical and current analysis of Turkey, Mustafa Akdağ and Doğan Avcıoğlu served as inspirations for Revolutionary Path. see Devrimci Gençlik 1975, 1976a, 1976b, 1976c; Devrimci Yol 1977c, 1977d, 1977e, 1978; Pekdemir 2014, p. 298.

lutionary movement is to establish cultural independence which could only be achieved through the adoption of the revolutionary culture:

> In an exploited and oppressed society where the struggle for liberation is waged, revolutionary culture must inevitably be part of the struggle (against today's dominant bourgeois culture) to establish the revolutionary power of the people and to create a new way of life that is not based on exploitative relations (in a word, the understanding of revolution)[25].

Accordingly, the formulation of revolutionary culture aimed to create "a culture of people striving to form their own independent-revolutionary rule"[26]. This endeavour had to be an essential component of both the evolution and revolution processes; otherwise, it merely constitutes a reformist proposal. In the first sentence of the section discussing the culture in the brochure, there is a firm critique of the ideas claiming the main problem of society is lack of education[27] and revolution is not essential to solve the problem[28]. To challenge these stances, Revolutionary Path asserts that the revolutionary struggle and the creation of new cultural fragments, which are meant to embody the will of the people's self-rule, ought to be conducted jointly. Thus, the Movement was ready to take the initiative to achieve this as it was formulated in the brochure *Elbette ki halkın devrimci kültürü gökten zembille inmeyecek* (Undoubtedly, the people's revolutionary culture will not fall from the sky)[29].

The studies focusing on the discourse and methods of Revolutionary Path concluded that the Movement employed a form of populist rhetoric[30]. The first academic research on this topic, by Erdoğan, ar-

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[25] Devrimci Yol 1979, p. 23.

[26] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[27] Lack of education is undoubtedly one of the key factors contributing to cultural problems, and to address this, the Movement included the establishment of a revolutionary culture and education system together as one of its top eight priorities. See Devrimci Yol 1977b.

[28] Revolutionary Path advocated for an education system that promoted solidarity and equality. For this reason, it attached great importance to the organization of teachers and actively participated in *Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği* (All Teachers' Unification and Solidarity Association, TÖB-DER) with a majority, which was founded in 1971 and boasted over 200,000 members. For a detailed study on TÖB-DER, see Babuş 2020; Ünlü 2020, pp. 243-308.

[29] Devrimci Yol 1979, p. 24.

[30] Özdemir Taştan's doctoral dissertation [2012] deserves recognition due to its

gued that the Movement's populist discourse differed from that of Bülent Ecevit, the social-democrat leader of the Republican People's Party and prime minister at the time[31]. The populism is defined here as a difference in political language from other leftist structures and is self-defined as "populist-democratic," rather than carrying a negative connotation associated with bourgeois politics[32]. A crucial distinction of this discourse is its creation of antagonism and paradigm to organize the people using the language of "us, the people" and "fascists, enemies of the people".

Recent studies suggest that the cornerstone of Revolutionary Path's organizing method and language was, as Morgül put it, "revolutionary-populist"[33]. As another example, Kara highlights that acknowledging the existence of a compelling enemy, "fascists" and "oligarchy" in this context, is a crucial element of the rhetoric which serves to reinforce the idea that united and strong people are much stronger[34]. The concept of strength and power predominantly shapes political language and serves to motivate members of the organization. A key priority in this domain was to establish a steady revolutionary culture, characterized by committed cadres, an effective network of masses and people.

Revolutionary culture is defined as an alternative and counter-hegemonic stance against imperialism and the bourgeoisie's corruption of the cultural values that the people have accumulated throughout history. In other words, what is meant by revolutionary culture is the effort to create an exemplary revolutionary prototype and corresponding merits with behaviours. However, it is strongly emphasized that the "new revolutionary culture" does not reject all cultural values historically produced by society. On the contrary, it aims to embrace and carry them forward. Since Revolutionary Path defined itself as the reality of the people and the natural result of the political climate in 1970s Turkey[35], the source of these values was the working-class people. It was therefore expected that the revolutionary cadres who were

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comprehensive and thorough analysis of the organization's rhetoric, including paradigms and dilemmas.

[31]   Erdoğan 1998.

[32]   For detailed discussion on the using of the term in Turkish politics, see Baykan 2017; Bora 2019; Şirin 2023.

[33]   Morgül 2019, pp. 274-275.

[34]   Kara 2012, pp. 45-46.

[35]   From the court defence documents, see Mater 1989.

brought up within the struggle would adopt a culture moulded by the people and, in turn, raise people's consciousness with revolutionary culture while guiding it towards the revolutionary war. As a result, Revolutionary Path developed a unique style, incorporating language, behaviour, organizational structure, stance against fascism – or "fascist terror" – as they called it – and even physical appearance.

3.4. "We are friends of the people, enemies of fascism": making of a revolutionary cadre

From the Çayanist perspective of "Vanguard War" (*Öncü Savaşı*), the Revolutionary Path Movement acknowledged the importance of a revolutionary pioneer and a well-trained competent cadre. Even prior to the official establishment in May 1977, the Revolutionary Youth magazine highlighted the characteristics of the vanguard cadre. Manuals were subsequently created, possibly because of self-criticism, to assist in organizing and effectively engaging with the masses. Undoubtedly, as Kara points out, there is a dilemma in this situation. The Movement, which claims to be part of the people, is unwittingly expressing confusion with its 'return to the people': either it has distanced itself from the people, or it has failed to be the people, or the images of the "labourer people" (*emekçi halk*) and the "brave sons of the people" (*halkın yiğit evlatları*) who try to be worthy of the people do not match[36].

This need to regain sympathy among the people can be attributed to various factors. For instance, many of the prominent leaders of the '68 period emerged from the student movements and thus had middle-class backgrounds that were incompatible with the working-class nature of the revolutionary organizations[37]. Thus, in order to reestablish the connection with the people, the revolutionary organizations began to embrace certain values, rhetoric, behaviors, and even folkloric elements such as the long bushy mustache that epitomized the resilient and unyielding character of Anatolia. In fact, Revolutionary Path followers did not address their peers as "comrade" (*yoldaş*),

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[36] Kara 2012, p. 51; Erdoğan 1998, p. 264.

[37] Although the movements of the late 60s had strong anti-imperialist and patriotic/nationalistic nuances, they were more internationalist in terms of fashion as it was demonstrated in they were dressing up as a fighter or guerrilla by wearing military boots and a parka reminiscent of Che Guevara, which was later associated with Deniz Gezmiş. See Kürkçü 2002, p. 4.

as opposed to a significant portion of the left. Rather, they employed terms like "friend" (*arkadaş*) and "brother/sister" (*kardeş*) as a stance against the alienation and marginalization of the left from the people.

The fact that the organization's place of origin was Ankara, in contrast to many other organizations which were centred in Istanbul, had a significant impact on the cultural perception and character of Revolutionary Path. The bureaucratic atmosphere and republican enthusiasm that emerged as a consequence of the city's status as the capital and the considerable wave of immigration from the peripheral areas in recent years introduced a distinctive form of diversity to the city. In particular, the slum areas (*gecekondu*) where the working class resided in last decades served as the primary organisational base for the Revolutionary Path and a source of cultural inspiration. Thus, this "Ankaraness", which was a cosmopolite form of "Anatolianness", was a phenomenon that was felt throughout the Movement and resulted in competition with Istanbul, which occasionally claimed to be the centre[38].

Consequently, as the political objective of Revolutionary Path shifted from universities to neighbourhoods, rural producers, and factory workers, it necessitated the reorganization of behaviour, dressing style, speech, daily habits, and intimate relationships. The Movement has prepared several writings for this purpose. However, it is noteworthy that these writings, which were aimed directly at cadres, drew attention to different themes in different periods. For instance, the essays titled *Saflarımızdaki hatalı eğilimleri düzeltelim* (Let's correct the erroneous tendencies in our ranks) and *Kadrolar* (Cadres), published in Revolutionary Youth magazine in 1976, and *Kitle eğitiminde dikkat edilmesi gereken noktalar* (Important issues in mass education) in the inaugural issue of Revolutionary Path in 1977 give the impression of a guidebook for cadres or cadre candidates[39].

The Revolutionary Youth's writings advise cadres to avoid exhibiting indiscipline, irresponsibility, lack of initiative, loose friendships, excessive chatter, carrying unnecessary information, pedantry, timidity, making criticisms with negative intentions, indecision, laziness, and discrimination based on school or city of origin. These

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[38] In 1978, the majority of the Istanbul-based members of the Revolutionary Path departed from the organization, citing a range of concerns, including socio-cultural issues, and proceeded to establish the Revolutionary Left (*Devrimci Sol*).

[39] Devrimci Gençlik 1976d; 1976e; Devrimci Yol 1977a.

writings emphasize the significance of the cadre for the revolution and point out that they act as representatives of the Movement and their attitude should be given special consideration. Those who lack this discipline but want to participate in the struggle, which is seen as a "liberal" deviation, however, should not be sharply excluded from the anti-fascist ranks:

> Even if these friends are not really revolutionaries, they can be considered consistent democrats. In this respect they are useful for the revolutionary movement. However, "militant" friends who are "candidates" for becoming proletarian revolutionaries and who therefore do not fulfil their responsibilities even though they have been assigned to them should be subjected to our criticism below[40].

The article in Revolutionary Path magazine of May 1977 served as a manual, addressing not only style and language but also physical appearance and mannerisms. This guide was specifically tailored to cadres involved in mass education, ensuring the suggestions align with this audience. For example, to dress cleanly and neatly, to go without a beard or with short hair depending on the region, not to wear tight clothes and make-up, to stay calm, to be patient, not to act like a teacher, to use plenty of examples, to be respectful, to involve the people in the discussion and make them ask questions, to learn from the people, to add agitation to education, to act democratically, never to lie, to respect traditional and religious beliefs, and to advocate the class struggle in every aspect of the daily life. One of the "prohibitions" was smoking filtered cigarettes. The Movement viewed filtered cigarettes as indicative of a petty bourgeois and luxury lifestyle and advised everyone to smoke brands such as Bafra and Birinci, even coming up with the rhyming slogans "Most revolutionary, Birinci" (*En devrimci, Birinci*) or "Smoke Birinci, be revolutionary" (*İç Birinci, ol devrimci*). However, this regulation was not strictly followed and was even considered amusing in later years[41].

With the growth of the struggle, such articles were replaced by discussions on organizational relations within the Resistance Committees. Especially from 1978 onwards, cadres were increasingly called upon to actively participate in the anti-fascist struggle as it was exem-

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[40] Devrimci Gençlik 1976d.

[41] Pekdemir 2014, pp. 101-102.

plified in the brochure *Örgütsel Sorunlar ve Çalışma Tarzımızdaki Bazı Hatalı Eğilimler Üzerine* (On Organizational Problems and Some Erroneous Tendencies in Our Methods) also known as "Pink Brochure" (*Pembe Broşür*), from May 1978[42]. The possibility of becoming an alternative option for power was getting more realistic, but political violence had also become an everyday occurrence. According to the official state rhetoric, the conflicts were between right-left or Alevi-Sunnis. Yet, Revolutionary Path explained political violence with the following slogan: "There is no Right-Left Conflict, Individual Terror, Anarchy; but Fascist Massacres!" (*Sağ-Sol çatışması, bireysel terör, anarşi yok; faşist katliamlar var!*). Accordingly, it was legitimate and necessary for the people to take measures for self-protection. Thus, the cadres responsible for safeguarding, directing, instructing, and consolidating the masses under the revolutionary culture framework had to exhibit enhanced discipline and professionalism compared to their previous conduct. In a documentary, Zeki Kırdemir[43] – also known as "Zeki the Guerilla"-, a militant of the organization, outlined the process of professionalization, dedication, and the transition to the role of revolutionary cadre during that period as follows: "We did not have much to do with school. Because for us at that time, "Revolution is the only way!" was the only motto. That was our path, that was everything. In other words, life for us was shaped according to the revolution and it was going for it."[44].

Local dynamics were significant in shaping attitudes and rhetoric. The interaction of local cadres with the people had a significant impact on central politics, and so these new ideas were processed and redistributed throughout the Movement. Likewise, themes such as solidarity, friendship, heroism, responsibility, sacrifice, self-confidence, and revenge were introduced to ensure the political and cultural consolidation of cadres. The memories about Veli Eskiili[45] recall that he communicated easily and empathetically with residents of any place he visited. According to the narratives of those living in these neighborhoods, although the clashes with right-wing groups became very intense, when

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[42]   Devrimci Yol 1978c. See also Erdoğan 2013, pp. 105-115.

[43]   Kırdemir provided one of the earliest memoir on Revolutionary Path, see Kırdemir 2006.

[44]   Anonymous, 2020.

[45]   Veli was a prominent cadre who oversaw political and military organizations in Ankara, Çorum, Antalya, Adana, and Malatya before his killing in 1981.

Veli stayed in the houses of people, he would cook for the family, clean up, play with the children, joke with the elderly, and even demonstrate the tailoring skills he had acquired from his family. It is also rumored that when he was in Adana, he frequently used swearwords to blend in with the locals as well as adopting the local accent[46].

Behçet Dinlerer[47] was also actively involved in neighborhood relations but unlike Veli, he was representing the more 'serious' face of the Movement. One of the suggestions in the pamphlets was to listen carefully to sympathizers without interrupting or making fun of them, and Behçet paid maximum attention to new followers[48]. An instance from the Eastern Black Sea region, in which the Movement held significant influence especially following the "End to exploitation in hazelnut" (*Fındıkta sömürüye son*) campaign, is Ensar Karahan[49]. When the people of Şavşat, a town in Artvin region, faced personal or collective issues, they would frequently turn to Ensar for assistance. According to the testimonies, the gendarmerie commander remarked that "Although a government exists here, the Government of Ensar Karahan is the most effective!"[50].

Since the formation of revolutionary culture was not purely achievable through the training of political and military cadres, the Movement assigned noteworthy significance to artistic initiatives. Artists who were associated with the Movement adopted the bardic *(ozan)* customs of Anatolia and presented the music of the common people as also an opposition to the prominently acclaimed genre of arabesque, which was seen as representing the atomization and degeneration of society. Musicians like Hasan Tatar, Yılmaz İpek, Foto Ali, Cem Usal,

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[46] Canlı, Ulutaş 2021, pp. 110-117.

[47] Behçet Dinlerer established one of the initial nuclei of "Revolutionary War Units" (*Devrimci Savaş Birlikleri*, DSB) in Ankara and later expanded to other cities including Adana and Antep. He was killed through torture in December 1980, in the basement of the main police building in Ankara, known as the "In-depth Research Laboratories" (*Derinlemesine Araştırma Laboratuvarı*, DAL), where thousands of people were tortured, and many lost their lives. see the testimonies in the project of "Memory Museum for Historical Justice" (*Tarihsel Adalet İçin Bellek Müzesi*) and Anonymous 2011.

[48] Canlı, Ulutaş 2021, pp. 115-116.

[49] The most nuanced anecdote about him is that after he was captured, the captain brought the heavily wounded Ensar to the centre of Şavşat and made a propaganda speech. However, a child from the crowd innocently asked "Brother Ensar, how are you doing?" Karahan smiled and kindly responded, "I'm doing well." Angered by this, the captain takes Ensar back to the police station where he lost his life in May 1981.

[50] Kahraman 2013, p. 403.

Ali Asker[51], and Mehmet Gümüş who started performing before 1980, and continue to do so, have interpreted and composed songs with themes of hope, love, lament, and struggle. In addition to the songs and recordings, the public concerts, especially in the provinces, were very important for the development of revolutionary culture and organization. For instance, in Uşak, concerts with very large participation were held in the villages in parallel to the city centre. A noteworthy aspect of these concerts was that, without any prior arrangement, the entire village was informed about the concert solely through the announcement made from the minaret of the mosque, and everyone would attend the concert in the evening[52].

Artists like Sevinç Eratalay, Adalılar, Umuda Ezgi (formerly known as Grup Atmacalar), and Grup Baran, which began their careers primarily after the 1980s, created albums with comparable themes and styles bearing the same tradition. Another example is Aydın Erol[53], a conservatory-trained ballet dancer who had to go abroad after the military coup. Aydın, who embraced a modern and Western perspective on art, was seen by his acquaintances as the most open to promoting and practicing a communal way of life. He devoted considerable effort to instructing in dance, ballet, and modern music and integrating them into revolutionary culture. In August 1980, he even inaugurated a short-term course on dancing[54].

The organic and spontaneous development of Revolutionary Path resulted in the dichotomy of the cadre-mass in specific regions and circumstances. For example, an article titled "Tobacco producers' organizing efforts and lessons learned from" in the February 1978 issue on the resistance of the ETÜS (*Ege Tütün Üreticileri Sendikası*) trade union in tobacco factories argues that it is inaccurate to rigidly separate the components of the organization into cadre and mass. The article acknowledges that the cadre instruction was solely theoretical training,

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[51] Duran's recent work effectively demonstrates Ali Asker's artistic and political expression in protest music. See Duran 2015.

[52] Arslan 2023, pp. 193-194.

[53] Following the coup, Aydın utilized a radio system from Germany to interrupt the speech of military junta leader Kenan Evren on Istanbul Radio. He then delivered a 10-minute speech, starting with the line "This is the voice of Free Turkey, the Revolutionary Path Resistance Fighters are calling out." (*Burası Özgür Türkiye'nin Sesi, Devrimci Yol Direnişçileri Sesleniyor*) see Devrimci İşçi 1982.

[54] Canlı 2018, pp., 36, 83.

and that the absence of professional trade unionists made communication with the masses quite hard. Nonetheless, it is stated that 10,000 special issues had been distributed to workers, and that the progress in the resistance is positive[55]. Similarly, Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, one of the leading figures of the Movement, reported in his memoir-interview book that in 1979, during his visit to Kars, he observed that the Revolutionary Path leaders in Ardahan were two middle school-aged children. As he put it, "However, the (central) organized structure was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the struggle in those days"[56], meaning that the Movement experienced an uncontrollable acceleration, resulting in a process of spontaneous leadership among local elements without being able to effectively supervise the newly flourishing nuclei.

3.5. "Whatever I did, I did for the people, together with the people": consolidating the people's revolutionary culture

Among the cultural norms that Anatolian culture has influenced conservative and left ideologies in common are the notions of warriorism, heroism and martyrdom. For Revolutionary Path, writing obituaries, creating posters, organizing memorial events, and taking retaliatory actions for those who lost their lives in the confrontations became a daily practice, particularly as 1980 approached[57]. As the Movement viewed itself as "friends of the people, enemies of fascism" (*halkın dostu, faşizmin düşmanı*), the attacks were seen as a direct assault on the people, necessitating revolutionary participation in active resistance. In other words, revolutionaries, who were already part of the people, had the obligation to oppose fascism, the enemy against whom the people had to unite.

The slogans used after such events not only revealed the relationship between revolutionaries and the people, but also provided models to follow for cadres and sympathizers. After the murder of Necdet Erdoğan Bozkurt in 1979, the president of the student association

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[55] Devrimci Yol 1978a.

[56] Bostancıoğlu 2011, p. 215.

[57] Taştan's article on this subject provides a detailed analysis of the slogans, obituaries, and posters. See Taştan 2011.

TEK-DER (Association of Graduates and Students of the Higher Technical Teacher Training School) and Dev-Genç (Revolutionary Youth Federation), the Movement urged the public to establish Resistance Committees via the "Your gun will not stay in the ground" (*Silahın yerde kalmayacak*) campaign. Bozkurt's political influence fashioned a legendary figure for the members, and the masses were made participants in this cause. This is evident in the catchphrases found on various posters: "Fascist hands raised against the people will be broken" (*Halka kalkan faşist eller kırılır*), "The People lost another revolutionary hero" (*Halk devrimci bir yiğidini daha kaybetti*), "His memory will serve as an example for our struggle" (*Anısı mücadelemize örnek olacak*), and "His blood will not go unpunished" (*Kanı yerde kalmayacak*). They promoted both a desire for vengeance and loyalty to the revolutionary movement and the people. Similarly, commemorative oaths or poems like Cahit Akçam's "My Mahir" (*Mahirim*), referring to Çayan, attempt to increase the sense of revenge, while maintaining a devotion to the cause. In this context, the poems written by the revolutionaries themselves and by others posthumously also depicted the order they sought to establish and their outlook on life as well as aiming to immortalize their memories[58].

Revolutionary Path attempted to fully involve all possible layers of society in the struggle. In this context, aged mothers, and elders in the neighbourhood, who were at risk of losing their children in the clashes, became key players in the anti-fascist discourse. "We are mothers, we are sisters, we are against fascism" (*Anayız, bacıyız, faşizme karşıyız*) or "Mothers give a birth, fascists kill" (*Analar doğurur, faşistler öldürür*) were among the slogans that the mother/sister columns were chanting and writing on their posters[59]. However, the women's struggle was not limited to these categories but also young women that were mostly high school or university students, or teachers. The presence of young female militants indeed assisted in organizing and visiting homes, as they were able to provide a greater sense of reassurance to people[60]. The Revolutionary Path members attempted to construct a revolutionary

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[58] Alpat 2022.

[59] The struggle of mothers, similar to that in Argentina, had a significant impact on domestic politics. For example, in 1989, parents of inmates who had been sentenced to death and were in severe health condition due to hunger strikes wore shrouds to draw public attention in Eskişehir and Aydın. see Uygun et al. 2015.

[60] Yılmazer 2018, pp. 293-296.

culture by creating a child-parent-like connection with elderly people in the surrounding areas. In this type of interaction, which is sustained by traditional relationships, people would, for instance, donate animal skins to the revolutionaries following the Feast of Sacrifice for them to sell the skins and use the proceeds to support the Movement[61]. This form of interconnectedness and intimacy proved beneficial for numerous militants in locating shelters following the coup and endured in their memories for years to come.

Defining the people based on their class character and being the target of "fascist terror", Revolutionary Path tried to keep distance with a sectarian rhetoric. In its brochures and in the special issue (*özel sayı*)[62], published during the Çorum Incidents, a massacre attempt on Alevis in May 1980, the organization restated to its members and the people the importance of refraining from following sectarian motivations with a slogan of "Long live the unity of Alevi-Sunni people, damn to fascism" (*Yaşasın Alevi-Sünni halkın birliği, kahrolsun faşizm*)[63]. Although the organization gained attraction among Alevis in Central Anatolia, most of its areas of operation were in Sunni regions. Therefore, the Revolutionary Path followers were particularly careful in this regard and, in line with the wishes of the people in the regions, they occasionally participated in constructing or renovating mosques and fountains, and even organizing mass circumcision events, particularly in the Aegean and Black Sea areas. In fact, there were "revolutionary imams" who were propagating the Movement's leaflets during the Friday prayers[64].

The Movement called on the public and other leftist organizations to form Resistance Committees against the threat of right-wing attacks. In addition to providing armed protection, the Committees also encouraged people to live together in peace and solidarity around the idea of revolutionary culture. These committees, which were first mentioned in the fourth special issue of 1977[65], were already the basis of the organization in 1978[66]. Their duties included facilitating educative activities, coordinating solidarity efforts, resolving local disputes as a

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[61] Memişoğlu 2019, pp. 50-51.

[62] Devrimci Yol Özel Sayı 1980, Devrimci Yol 1980.

[63] Ibid, p. 1.

[64] Erdoğan 1998; Kahraman 2013, pp. 162-163.

[65] Devrimci Yol Özel Sayı 1977.

[66] By 1978, the committees were already at work, see Devrimci Yol 1978c.

people's court, overseeing reconstruction projects, forming coopera-
tives, and providing armed defence against attacks.

Since armed struggle played a significant role in the strategy promot-
ing the gradual seizure of power, Resistance Committees were supposed
to establish "Armed Resistance Units" (*Silahlı Direniş Birlikleri*) to car-
ry out anti-fascist endeavours using the tactic of "active defence" *(aktif
savunma*) and the strategy of "united revolutionary war" (*birleşik devrim-
ci savaş*)[67]. Besides their militaristic function, the committees waged an
effective struggle against the black-market problem by raiding ware-
houses and distributing all the products free of charge to the people[68].
The militants successfully combated usury, freeing the people from debt
by revoking usurers' promissory notes. Functioning as the "alternative
nuclei of people's power", the committees aimed to consolidate politics
and unite people through a common language and purpose.

Resistance Committees aimed to politically mobilize the populace
through central campaigns like the "Campaign of resistance against
fascist oppression and poverty" (*Faşist zulme ve pahalılığa karşı direniş
kampanyası*). As part of the campaign, rallies were held in numerous
cities, committees were established, and previously unvisited villages
and neighbourhoods were reached[69]. Without a doubt, one of the Re-
sistance Committees' greatest achievements was the victory of Fikri
Sönmez the "Tailor" (*Terzi Fikri*), the Revolutionary Path candidate, in
the 1979 Fatsa municipality elections. During his 10-month tenure as
a socialist mayor in this medium sized Black Sea town, Sönmez di-
vided Fatsa into 11 districts and established "People's Committees"
(*Halk Komiteleri*) in each. The People's Committees put an end to the
black-market and usury[70], carried out regulations for hazelnut produc-
tion, and quickly repaired the town's roads as a part of the "End the
mud" (*Çamura son*) campaign[71]. In terms of social life, female militants
displayed a notable interest in women and children by adopting a firm

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[67] Subsequently, besides the local forces, the Central Committee established
      "Revolutionary War Units" (*Devrimci Savaş Birlikleri, DSB*) and "Revolutionary
      Intelligence Organization" (*Devrimci İstihbarat Teşkilatı, DİT*) to enhance its military
      and intelligence capacity.

[68] Bostancıoğlu 2011, p. 195.

[69] For a detailed analysis, see Taştan 2012, pp. 249-257.

[70] Kahraman 2013, p. 173-176, 186.

[71] For a discussion of the campaign's hegemonic role in road construction politics, see
      Yıldırım, Polat 2020.

stance against domestic violence, as well as the gambling and alcohol consumption habits of the husbands. As a result, politicized women also engaged in at rallies and other events[72].

The "Fatsa People's Festival" (*Fatsa Halk Şenliği*) was one of the events where the revolutionary culture was most clearly visible[73]. During the festival, concerts, poem recitals, games, bike races, theatre performances, football tournament, athletics events, children's choir performances[74], folk dances, instructive panels, and cinema nights were held with left-leaning intellectuals traveling to the town from Turkey. The high degree of politicization among the people is evidenced by children inquiring the visitors from Germany: "Why are the Red Army Faction members being held in jail? What are they doing there[75]?" As a result, Fatsa gained recognition across Turkey as a "liberated region" (*kurtarılmış bölge*) due to its openly socialist stance and collective governing principles.

However, right-wing politicians heavily targeted Fatsa, and the city was labelled in the media as the "the city ruled by the committees," or "the city where the red sun will rise." In particular, the governor of Ordu, Reşat Akkaya, was engaged in a concerted effort to demonize Fatsa and its local government. He appealed to Kenan Evren, the architect of the military coup, to intercede in the socialist governance by stating, "My commander, when you traverse Fatsa, fly high in a helicopter, Dev-Yol militants in Fatsa might target you[76]" Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel told journalists who asked questions about the Çorum Incidents, "Leave Çorum, look at Fatsa", saying that if nothing was done, "there would be a hundred Fatsas"[77]. Consequently, July 11, 1980, the government carried out the "Operation Dot" (*Nokta Operasyonu*), resulting in the arrest of thousands of individuals, including Fikri Sönmez, and the death of many. Sönmez,

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[72]   Kahraman 2013, pp. 209-211.

[73]   For detailed account on Fatsa, see Uyan 2004; Aksakal 1989; Morgül 2019.

[74]   The Fatsa Children's Choir, founded under the conducting of Ali Asker, gave concerts in many different places. Their performances at the Middle East Technical University Student Representative Council's festival in 1979-80 were published as an album.

[75]   Kahraman 2013, p. 221.

[76]   Aksakal 1989, p. 107.

[77]   Mater 1989, p. 375-379.

who later died in prison in 1985[78], stated during his court defence: "Whatever I did, I did for the people, together with the people. I have never had any behaviour detached from the people"[79]. Even the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP) and Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) members from Fatsa, who were the centre-right parties during the period, argued against the necessity of military intervention by claiming that the community made collective decisions and lived together harmoniously[80]. Evren further explained the state's perception of Fatsa as a threat in his well-known statement: "There is a man there called Fikri the Tailor. He says he is the state. He formed a committee. That committee runs Fatsa. The people decide what to do and what not to do, and that committee decides on behalf of the people. So, the state does not make the decision. The authority of the state is zero. The laws of the state do not work in Fatsa. What should the Turkish Armed Forces do? The army had to do it"[81].

In summary, the Resistance Committees were established in hundreds of locations in a short period of time, beginning in Ankara/Sentepe, with a primary role of facilitating the eventual establishment of the proletariat party. They acted as a miniature representation of the Movement's power perspective, resulting in the writing of numerous articles and notes[82]. This proposal acted as a mechanism for local decision-making and centres of power. Indeed, it was anticipated that as the movement progressed and a certain degree of maturity was achieved, the direct involvement of revolutionaries would gradually diminish. Instead, it was hoped that the people would become increasingly engaged in the fight and continue to oversee the committees on their own initiative[83]. Since the revolutionary struggle itself is a component of revolutionary culture, the Resistance Committees are an essential element to understand this cultural transformation.

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[78]   In 1983, British politician Jeremy Corbyn, a member of parliament, wrote about his observations of the trial in Fatsa after the operation as part of the "Turkey Solidarity Campaign", which aimed to raise international public opinion, in a flyer called "Fatsa: A Town on Trial". Afterwards, he took the lead in organizing many protests abroad to draw attention to Fikri Sönmez's deteriorating health.

[79]   Aksakal 1989, p. 129.

[80]   Akçam 2007.

[81]   Aksakal 1989, p. 14.

[82]   While Bozkurt analyzed the structure of the committees, Erdoğan collected written works and reviews, see Bozkurt 2008; Erdoğan 2013.

[83]   Birdal 2020, pp. 141-157.

3.6. Conclusion: towards a multilayered cultural history of Cold War Turkey

This study started with a brief overview of the cultural formation and leftist organizations during Cold War before delving into one of the most significant political movements of the 1970s Turkey, Revolutionary Path. The focus then shifted to revolutionary culture and its participants as the research question. To summarize the concept of revolutionary culture according to the Movement derives its essence from the people and then filters it through a revolutionary lens before returning it to the people. As a set of values and behaviours, this cultural definition treats the revolutionary cadre and the broader mass/people from similar yet distinct perspectives.

This paper has tried to demonstrate what is understood behind revolutionary culture, how it was formed and how it was disseminated by various means. Revolutionary cadre with a certain ethos and values were expected to undertake a valiant struggle for the people, while the masses were expected to organize themselves for the people's war. Despite the existence of disparate approaches at the central level of the Movement, the Resistance Committees system represents the structural nexus where the cadre and the masses are most intimately linked, and revolutionary culture is most visibly manifested. Thus, the case of Fatsa, and numerous other committee experiences, serve as clear instances of Revolutionary Path's interpretation and implementation of revolutionary culture.

In conclusion, the absence of an academic perspective on this influential and widely supported political movement, along with other left-wing movements and parties, hinders a complete and comprehensible understanding of Turkey in Cold War. The influence of the past revolutionary traditions persists in contemporary politics, culture, and society, particularly in literature, as evidenced by the growing number of memoirs and biographies. These legacies are not only of historical significance but also contribute to our understanding of the past 50 years. Therefore, conducting a multilayered analysis on Revolutionary Path or any other revolutionary movement of the 1970s will yield beneficial outcomes for the study of cultural, social, and political history of contemporary Turkey.

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4. Borders and boundaries: the impact of Soviet-Turkish relations on Armenians during the early Cold War years

Hilal Yavuz

4.1. Introduction

After the breakdown of the ideological dichotomy between the capitalist and socialist blocks in the early 1990s, paralleled by a surge in the trajectory of globalization within the economic sphere and the advancement of communication technologies, it became reasonable to expect a change in mainstream dualistic approaches in politics more than ever. Yet, the observed events did not align with the predicted circumstances. Instead, it remerged in "new clothes"[1] fuelled by the Russian invasion of Ukraine: democracy versus dictatorship, or better to say, the struggles for democracy versus the struggles against dictatorship. Concurrently, while the growth of fascism stigmatizes liberal democracies, autocratic regimes can keep a few democratic aspects. This makes visible that fascism is not a pit into which democracy will slip and fall; on the contrary, there is unity of what appears to be duality or sameness of what is thought to be different, just like in Mobius's surface. As Rimbaud writes in the mid-1800s, *je est un autre*!

Such inside-outside, self-other, or domestic-foreign divisions should be revised. At least regarding their relationship, these divisions should be seen as dialectical rather than oppositional. A borderland perspective that emphasizes the dialectical relations between dominant and oppressed identities is crucial in this context. Today, everyone can observe a shift from the rhetoric of a borderless world, which gradually became popular after the fall of the Iron Curtain and mirrored the rhetoric of a borderless Europe, to a more bordered world,

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[1]   Harootunian 2006.

which was first heightened through security concerns urged by 11 September, and then violently tightened to take preventive measures against increasing numbers of migration. This has made borderland studies more critical than ever.

The trajectory of borderland studies, whose importance for anthropology, geography, and international relations is indisputable[2], offers valuable tools for other social sciences and humanities disciplines. Recent scholarly works primarily reside on three concepts to make the link between identity and space: "bordering", "ordering", and "othering"[3]. The ordering process can be delineated as the mechanism by which sovereignty is exercised over a defined space. As more significant within the framework of this paper, the ordering process emphasizes the role of identities in understanding international borders and the role of borders in shaping national identities. At last, the othering process, on the one hand, enables the definition of friends and foes; on the other, it facilitates keeping the "undesirable elements" away from the national territory[4]. More recently, some scholars reject such a clear division between these two concepts to recognize "othering" as a critical element in "ordering". Accordingly, the othering process redefines geographical, governmental, and legal boundaries between "inside" and "outside" by establishing these boundaries at various levels, including local and global scales[5]. At the local level, the processes involved in creating borders play a formative role in shaping communities, affecting how they perceive themselves, their relationships with the broader society, and their interactions with the state and its institutions. However, it is of utmost importance to acknowledge the inherent disparities in the impacts of borders not only on the inhabitants of bordered regions but also on the experiences of people residing further away. Scholars in identity politics have already embraced metaphors such as borders and borderlands in comprehending the intricate dynamics between people and their territories[6]. Shifting the focus away from the symbolic correlations to a literal analysis of the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union (USSR)

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[2]   Brown, Pratt 2000.

[3]   For more information, see Van Houtum, Van Naerssen 2002; Popescu 2012; Paasi 2021.

[4]   Meier 2016.

[5]   Paasi 2021.

[6]   Wilson, Donnan 2012, p. 34.

in the early Cold War years, this article meticulously uncovers these disparities to understand better the complex dynamics of (b)ordering and othering.

Turkey's relationship with the USSR has not yet been analyzed as much as with the transatlantic world. Just as Britain, Germany, and the USA, respectively, had some political, economic, and cultural influence on republican Turkey, the USSR also needs to be scrutinized in terms of its impacts on domestic politics. My primary objective is to illustrate the sphere of influence, which extends beyond borderlands to economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions at the local, regional, and global scale. Providing a comprehensive overview of the significance of adopting a borderland approach in conjunction with a chronological framework, this paper concentrates on the early Cold War to exemplify the controversial relationship between Turkey and the Soviets. Emphasizing the strong correlation between the making of the border and the making of national identity gives some critical insights into how border dynamics influenced the practices of inclusion and exclusion[7]. In this regard, this paper examines the discriminatory policies implemented by the government towards Armenians, explicitly concentrating on the experiences of Zaven Biberyan (1921-1984), an Armenian author who was previously overlooked but has recently gained recognition in literary and academic circles.

4.2. Local, regional, and global dynamics of the (b) ordering process

The date of 1921 has foremost importance in terms of the border-making process of Turkey. The Treaty of Moscow (a friendship agreement signed by Lenin and the Ankara government) and the Treaty of Kars defined its northeastern border. At the same time, the London Agreement and the Ankara Agreement delineated its southern border[8]. Although the border delineation between Turkey and the USSR was set up on this date, the actual demarcation work was carried out in 1926 due to the region's inaccessibility during the ongoing conflict in Anatolia. In the early 1920s, the border remained largely undivided and was only partially influenced by the respective states, as

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[7]   Balistreri 2022, p. 32.

[8]   Ibid., p. 29.

neither the USSR nor Turkey had fully developed their administrative structures then[9]. Crossing the border for people who owned property on the other side was effortless. When the Soviet authorities developed a centralized distribution system and conducted a fixed price policy for most goods, price differences between the two rose dramatically, which led to increased smuggling activities, especially in towns near the border.

By the end of 1925, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, signed a "Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality" in Paris[10]. They agreed not to join any alliances directed against one another. The treaty, signed in response to Italy's aggressive militarization of the Dodecanese islands, also included a contentious provision for significant financial support to Turkey[11]. This period was marked by interstate cooperation between the two states against cross-border smuggling of material goods and arms trafficking. For this purpose, both parties increased surveillance practices and strengthened border controls – a 10-kilometre perimeter was set up on either side of the frontier. This cooperation hurt local Kurdish tribes who were struggling for autonomy. The government succeeded in consolidating central authority in its eastern provinces and suppressed two Kurdish rebellions, Sheikh Said (1925) and Ararat (1930).

Turkish-Soviet cooperation continued into the 1930s based on substantial financial assistance. In 1932, İsmet İnönü visited Moscow and noted: "Our 12-year-old relationship based on geographical necessities is derived from mutual interests and became beneficial for two parts"[12]. In return, he obtained an $8 million loan to subsidize Turkey's first five-year industrialization plan, and just one and half years later, Soviet Commissar for Defence Kliment Voroshilov visited Ankara in October for the tenth anniversary of the Republic[13]. The Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, is believed to be the underlying cause of the transformation in the relationship between the two. As it was well-documented

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[9]   Pelkmans 2006, p. 25.

[10] The Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was renewed annually until 1929, two years after 1929, and finally for ten years on 7 November 1935.

[11] Hale 2023, p. 50.

[12] Cumhuriyet 1932.

[13] İşçi 2023a.

in numerous telegrams, there was always a lingering suspicion that the Soviets would take advantage of Turkey's problems with other neighbours to pursue their interests. For example, there was a low-intensity conflict across the Syrian border, strengthening the perception that neighbouring countries threatened the Turkish state in the early 1930s[14]. A Kurdology Conference arranged in 1934 in Armenia was perceived in this regard, even though the Soviet authorities assured the Turkish government that it was just a linguistic event. However, the explanation was insufficient to prevent the complaints about the Soviet side's encouraging attitude toward the Kurds from Ardahan to migrate and form a Kurdish state in the Soviet territory[15].

The Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923) had a separate convention relating to the regime of the straits, which resulted in the straits' demilitarisation[16]. Invoking the danger posed by the atmosphere of approaching war, Turkey requested a meeting to renegotiate its terms and conditions. The contracting powers (except Italy) agreed to replace the Lausanne regime with the Montreux Convention, which made it possible for the Turkish government to re-fortify in the Dardanelles, the Bosporus, and the Sea of Marmara[17]. Still, a combination of international political factors and local interests has moulded the regulations on the passage. Despite differing views on the convention, Turkey's partnership with the USSR remained resilient, bolstered by Turkey's strained relations with its neighbours in the Balkans and the Middle East and Britain's isolation of the USSR due to its anti-imperialist stance. However, the international equilibrium surrounding this partnership was about to change more harshly than before at the end of the 1930s since the footsteps of the approaching massive war prompted all the countries to establish new types of cooperation.

Turkey considered Iran and Iraq as potential partners on the one hand and Britain and the USSR as potential sponsors[18]. Accordingly, a nonaggression pact (Saadabad Pact) was signed between Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq in 1937 to promote peace and stability by fostering friendly relations and cooperation among the signatory countries.

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[14]   For more information, see Altuğ 2020.

[15]   1938.01.02 (35357 – 138981 – 3), Turkish Diplomatic Archives (hereafter TDA).

[16]   Oral 2016, p. 27.

[17]   Ibid.

[18]   İşçi 2019, p. 45.

Furthermore, after the annexation of Alexandretta[19], the rapprochement between Turkey and France led to a tripartite treaty, which included Britain and was signed on 18 October 1939. Under this treaty, Britain and France were committed to aiding Turkey if a third party attacked it, while Turkey pledged to support the Allies if a Mediterranean war was sparked by escalating tensions in Europe[20]. Turkey expected to involve the USSR, but its hopes were already dashed by the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact on October 17. On the same date, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was in Moscow, intending to establish a triangular communication channel between Ankara, London, and Moscow. However, he faced a lukewarm reception in the Soviet capital. While both parties affirmed their commitment to friendship and neutrality, the contentious issue of the straits remained unresolved. Before Saraçoğlu's return to Turkey, the Turkish government realized the futility of bridging the divide between Western powers and the Soviets and declared the tripartite treaty with Britain and France. About this declaration, Stalin commented that "the Turkish diplomats radically steered their country towards a Western-oriented policy of sabotaging their friendly relations with the Soviet Union"[21].

Oscillating between favouring the Allies and Germany, the Turkish government mostly succeeded in pursuing neutrality during World War II[22]. This policy eventually bore fruit when a nonaggression pact with Germany was signed on 18 June 1941, four days before Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa to invade the Soviet Union. Such cases eventually contributed to the escalation of tension between Turkey and the USSR in the early years of the Cold War. Both sides blamed the other side for irredentism and expansionist goals[23]. Turanism, which gained some political influence among the intellectual elite, was considered a sign of Turkey's hope for unity with the Turkic peoples of

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[19]   Following its *de facto* transformation as a province, it became an official part of Turkey on July 23, 1939.

[20]   Hale 2021, p. 83.

[21]   İşçi 2019, p. 66.

[22]   Selim Deringil (2004) describes Turkey's foreign policy during the war as an "active neutrality". One of the prominent architects of such active neutrality during the war, Numan Menemencioğlu, aimed to keep all viable options open by having close relationships with various powers. See Gökay 2006, p. 52.

[23]   Ter-Matevosyan 2019, p. 210.

the Caucasus and Central Asia[24]. A pan-Turkist committee was established in July 1941 with support from Germany[25]. However, while the Turkish state's ideology aligned to some extent with the ideas of Turkish intellectuals, they should not be considered fully overlapping[26]. Therefore, it would not be correct to assert that pan-Turkism brought about significant changes in the government's foreign policy, although it did impact political discourse[27]. In 1944, when Hitler's defeat became clearer, pan-Turkish organizations were closed, and their propaganda tools were harshly suppressed as part of a strategic move to preserve diplomatic relationships with the Allied powers.

In many respects, this process has witnessed the very paradoxical character of Turkey's position. Notably, on the one hand, the Turkish government welcomed numerous Jewish scholars who fled from the Hitler regime as refugees[28]; however, on the other, these scholars found themselves working alongside some others who openly espoused support for the Nazi ideology[29]. For the remaining minority population of the country, the situation was more dire. Jews, Greeks, and Armenians faced significantly severe repressive attitudes and discriminatory regulations in this period. Two notable examples of these practices were *Varlık Vergisi* (Wealth Tax), described as "the tangible manifestation of economic nationalism"[30] that was followed by a military service known as *Yirmi Kura Askerlik* (labour battalions) in the form of forced labour which had some similarities with Nazi concentration camps[31]. As part of "the postgenocidal habitus of denial"[32], the government turned this atmosphere into "opportunities" to exacerbate uneven and unequal conditions for the domestic others.

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[24]   Ibid., p. 214.

[25]   Zürcher 2004, p. 205.

[26]   Birkan 2019.

[27]   Ter-Matevosyan 2019, p. 217.

[28]   Gökay 2006, p. 56.

[29]   Genç 2014.

[30]   Aktar 2009, p. 42.

[31]   For more information, see Bali 2006, 2015.

[32]   Talin Suciyan (2016), in *The Armenians in Modern Turkey: Post-Genocide Society, Politics and History*, shows how the policies undertaken against Armenians in 1915-23 continued to be implemented throughout the first decades of the Republic. For further information about the structural and administrative continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, see Akçam 2004, Kevorkian 2011, Üngör 2011.

Approaching the end of the war, in the Yalta Conference held on 4-11 February 1945, where the US, the UK and the USSR were supposed to discuss the post-war world order, Joseph Stalin officially expressed the Soviets' claims on the straits[33]. For Stalin, the Montreux Convention was no longer aligned with the prevailing conditions[34]. The British and American representatives tended to consider some modifications by recognising the importance of the straits for Russian exports. A few days later, Turkey severed its commercial and diplomatic ties with Japan and declared war on the Axis Powers, aligning itself with the Allies[35]. Despite Turkey's decision to enter the war on the side of the Allies, it failed to meet the expectations of the Soviets. The second chain of the conference series was held in San Francisco from April to June 1945. Hasan Saka, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, was the delegation's chairperson and took a relatively active role in creating the United Nations (UN) alongside delegates from fifty other nations.

During the conference, domestic politics was experiencing a profound period of transformation and upheaval. The land reform bill discussed earlier in the assembly had already resulted in polarization within *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party, RPP). This bill aimed to combat landlessness among the rural population by redistributing the properties owned by absentee landlords to the tenants and sharecroppers who were actively cultivating and maintaining those lands. However, some parliament members attacked the government by arguing that such a land reform "would lead to a decline in production which would have all sorts of adverse consequences (and) the principle of private property guaranteed by the constitution was also being violated"[36]. Simultaneously, as a sign of a desire to get closer to the Western camp in a world order on the brink of bipolarity, İsmet İnönü declared a new process of democratization of the regime with

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[33] Behlül Özkan (2020) argues that the discourse of Soviet threat, which is grounded on the USSR's desire for changes on the Soviet-Turkish border and the Straits, is "a foreign policy myth". Instead, he asserts that there were some "proposals" in response to Turkey's offer of an alliance, which enabled the Turkish government to devise them to achieve rapprochement with the West.

[34] Oran 2010, p. 502.

[35] Cumhuriyet 1945a.

[36] Ahmad 2003, p. 103.

his speech in the Turkish National Assembly[37]. In between this speech and the legislation of land reform, Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan gave a proposal known as *Dörtlü Takrir* (Memorandum of the Four) demanded the broader application of democratic procedures in the country to highlight their oppositional position to the land reform alongside their support to İnönü's speech[38].

In the meantime, tensions between the Soviets and Turkey continued to escalate. The turning point in the mutual relationship between the two was the meetings on 7 and 18 June[39]. It was the first time Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, openly expressed differences in a bilateral meeting[40]. Molotov notified the Turkish ambassador Selim Sarper that there would be no revision to the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality[41] unless the Montreux was modified in favour of the USSR by permitting unrestricted passage of Russian warships through the stairs, the prohibition of access to non-Black Sea nations, and the establishment of Russian bases on the straits[42]. In addressing the issue of Soviet-Poland borders[43], he also emphasized the lack of legitimacy of the transfer of Armenian territories to Turkey during a Soviet vulnerability. Finally, he demanded that the northeastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan be returned to the USSR. The prospect of such a territorial claim was deeply unsettling as it implied the USSR's willingness to disregard the provisions of the Brest-Litovsk agreement[44]. According to multiple diplomatic cables preserved in the diplomatic archives, the Soviet side demanded to relinquish three provinces in the eastern part of the country and at least one military base in the

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[37] Cumhuriyet 1945b.

[38] Zürcher 2004, p. 210.

[39] Özkan 2020, p. 165.

[40] İşçi 2023b, p. 631.

[41] Oran 2010, p. 472.

[42] Hale 2023, p. 53.

[43] The demarcation of Soviet-Polish borders was initially established in 1921. However, in 1939, the USSR occupied the eastern part of Poland within the framework of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

[44] Following the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russia War, the provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batum were transferred to Russia. After the Bolshevik revolution, the eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire returned to the line before the war in the scope of Brest-Litovsk signed in 1918.

straits during wartime[45]. Ankara issued the following directive in response: "Arrange a meeting with Molotov and firmly convey Ankara's unequivocal rejection of these demands. Furthermore, if such matters are raised again, discontinue all forms of negotiation"[46].

From 17 July to 2 August of the same year, Turkish diplomats expressed their concerns to the Allies in the Potsdam negotiations. Still, they needed more hope that their pleas would be recked due to the incompatible positions of the USSR. Stalin argued that "the Convention granted the same rights to the Japanese as it did to the Soviets regarding passage through the straits and stressed the Convention's failure to reflect the changing dynamics of the international situation"[47]. They all agreed to the necessity of revision but could not reach an agreement due to their diverging interests. They likely did not have time to discuss it in depth during these meetings when Truman shared with Stalin the news (the discovery of the atomic bomb) that would lead to a reshuffling of the cards in the power struggle between the two great powers.

A few days after the Potsdam conference, Ankara sent a note to London and Washington about the government's concerns regarding Stalin's proposal. However, there was no clue that it was being considered yet. In the days when no satisfactory answer was received from direct contacts, many speculated news about the USSR was quickly circulated not only in the media channels but also in official letters. For example, it was noted in a telegram that the Soviet side sent a report to British newspapers for publication. Attributed to the Armenian pope, it appealed to Attlee, Truman, and Molotov to help Armenians take over their lands seized by Turkey[48]. Since a search of British newspapers did not yield any news regarding this report, it was speculated that the absence of such news could indicate a tacit agreement between the British and American states against the Soviets. After all, in November, Washington and London sent official notes to Turkey proposing an international conference (except Japan) to address the needed modifications to the Montreux. The Soviet side sent the first official note on 8 August and the second on 24 September[49]. Washington replied to the first note,

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[45]   1946.04.09 (68112 – 297758 – 15), TDA.

[46]   Ibid.

[47]   Yılmaz 2020, p. 716.

[48]   1945.12.13 (35357 – 138982 – 3), TDA.

[49]   Oran 2010, pp. 504-506.

indicating their support for Turkey's rejection of the idea of a regime administered exclusively by Black Sea powers. In the autumn of 1946, the USSR gradually reduced pressure on Turkey, and Moscow unofficially notified London that any conference on the future of the straits was not considered necessary at this point[50].

While these developments occurred in international relations, domestic politics was also in turmoil. *Demokrat Parti* (Democrat Party, DP), known as the beginning of organized political opposition in the history of Turkey, was officially founded by *Dörtlü Takrir* members at the beginning of 1946[51]. The RPP also held an extraordinary congress in May, during which the members agreed on the liberalization of the party. Since the DP refused to participate in an election if the rules were not reformed, the RPP immediately amended specific laws, such as permitting direct elections instead of two-tier ones through electoral colleges, granting the universities some administrative autonomy, and liberalizing the press law[52]. In the parliamentary elections held in July, RPP won 397 seats, DP 61, and independents 7[53]. It went down in history as a shady one for several reasons due to the attitude of the administrative officials in favour of the RPP, the transparent voting processes, the pressure exerted at the polling stations, the ill-treatment and threats against DP voters, the undisclosed calculation of votes, and the interference of the administrative officials in the results by throwing away the votes after the election and the burning of the ballot papers[54]. However, even if there had been no intervention in the results, the DP would not have reached the number of deputies that could carry them to power since it could not nominate candidates everywhere.

The Soviet-Iran border was also restless, particularly in the last month of 1945. Following the Azerbaijan People's Government's declaration of its autonomy in northwestern Iran, the Soviets began pouring

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[50]   Gökay 2006, p. 62.

[51]   In a meeting with the government bureaucrats at Dolmabahçe Palace, İnönü declared his concerns about a possible opposition party. He believed the party needed to be founded under his sponsorship to mitigate the risks of adopting communist ideologies or USSR influence. See Özkan 2020, p. 172.

[52]   The authority to censor the press was delegated to the martial law commanders from 1940 to 1947. However, the banning authority was taken away from them with a new press law. See Ahmad 2003, p. 106.

[53]   Cumhuriyet 1946.

[54]   Zürcher 2004, p. 212.

into central Iran and deployed along the border with Turkey and Iraq[55]. Another Soviet army moved southwards from eastern Bulgaria and deployed along the Turkish border. It is possible to come across numerous telegrams about the rumours of the detection of Soviet military presence and heavy weapons ammunition on the Turkish-Bulgaria borders from early 1945 to late 1946[56].

Accompanied by this news from the region, the government faced a significant challenge in determining how Turkey would fit into the new post-war world. They believed that the only solution was to define zones of power clearly. This uncertainty haunted the Turkish cabinet and quieted down when the flagship of the US Navy arrived in the Bosporus on the 5th of April 1946. By docking their flagship in the region and confronting the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea, the United States consolidated US-Turkey relations. Although several records mentioned that the USSR increased its activities in the borderland following American support[57], the number of telegrams implying a Soviet threat from the Iranian or the Bulgarian border would dramatically decrease.

The tension between the government and the opposition started with irregular parliamentary elections and culminated in İnönü's speech, which would go down in history as the 12 July Declaration. In this speech, İnönü portrayed himself as an arbiter above the parties, resulting in freedom of movement in politics. As opposed to this change, Recep Peker resigned as prime minister, and former foreign minister Hasan Saka took charge of the government. The significant role played by a former foreign minister in the initial phase of the democratisation process underscores the crucial role of international relations within the political context of that time. This period was also marked by the acceleration of modernisation through the expansion of education[58], the widespread adoption of mass media[59], and the construction of highways[60]. Aids following the Truman Doctrine with the Marshall

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[55]   Rossow 1956, p. 17.

[56]   1945.01.19 (68141 – 298448 – 13), TDA; 1945.07.23 (68141 – 298448 – 336), TDA; 1945.10.07 (68141 – 298448 – 65), TDA; 1946.11.08 (35680 – 140941 – 50), TDA.

[57]   1947.08.06 (68141 – 298448 – 298), TDA.

[58]   For more information about, see Village Institutes Stone 1974, Karaömerlioğlu 1998.

[59]   For a detailed overview of radio broadcasting, see Ahıska 2010.

[60]   For an insightful contribution on this topic, see Adalet 2018.

Plan made all these developments financially feasible, which sparked curiosity among the rural population and led them to be part of the "revolution of rising expectations" for the first time[61].

4.3. The condition of the press and the dynamics of othering

The deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations significantly affected Turkey's perception of socialism and communism, resulting in widespread anti-Soviet sentiments within society. The hostility towards the Soviets manifested in acts of violence against left-wing publishers. One such incident occurred in 1945 when the *Tan* (Dawn) publishing house was destroyed in a raid organized by around 20,000 students[62]. It occurred just after a group of leftist intellectuals published a journal titled *Görüşler* (Opinions), where it was announced on the cover of the first issue that "[…] Celal Bayar, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Fuat Köprülü, and Adnan Menderes were on the initial list of contributors along with leftist intellectuals such as Sabiha and M. Zekeriya Sertel, Behice Boran, Niyazi Berkes, Sabahattin Ali, and Aziz Nesin"[63]. Some scholars, who pointed out the timing, claim that this attack should be a product of the government's attempt to curb possible left-wing tendencies of the oppositional party[64]. Ten days after this raid, two Georgian academics drafted an article entitled "Our Legitimate Claims from Turkey," published first in the Georgian newspaper *Kommunisti* (Communist) and then in *Pravda* (Truth) and *Izvestia* (News)[65]. They have demanded the return of the region encompassing Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu, Tortum, İspir, Bayburt, Gümüşhane, Giresun, and Trabzon from Turkey, claiming that it historically belonged to Georgia[66]. Concurring with the Soviets' decision that all diaspora Armenians would be allowed to settle in Soviet Armenia, a fusion of anti-socialism, anti-communism, and hostility toward Armenians gained momentum.

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[61] Harris 1970, p. 440.

[62] Sıvış 2020, p. 204.

[63] Görüşler 1945.

[64] For further information, see Koçak 2009.

[65] Özkan 2020, p. 177.

[66] Oran 2010, p. 503.

Despite the ethnic cleansing of the rest of the country, Istanbul still accommodated Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, at least until the 1950s[67]. It is important to highlight that the Turkish government's discriminatory practices extended beyond non-Muslim minorities, encompassing a widespread normalization of hostility toward Kurds and Alawites in the public sphere, media, and press. However, specific policies, such as the *Yirmi Kura Askerlik* and *Varlık Vergisi*, were explicitly aimed at Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. Within this broader context of the government's troubled relationship with its religious minorities, the situation of Armenians has been particularly severe due to their significant population in neighbouring countries. The fear of territorial loss, which provoked an existential crisis[68], was employed as a pretext for the aggressive policies against them. Thus, examining the Turkish-Soviet border relationship during the early Cold War is crucial for understanding the government's increasing pressure exerted on the Armenian community, which demanded unwavering loyalty to the state.

The Armenian population faced significant challenges due to a lack of institutional representation during this period. The absence of administrative bodies and trustees rendered the press the only public forum for voicing community concerns, compelling authors to assume the role of *de facto* representatives of their community[69]. Concurring with the anti-Soviet atmosphere, these platforms were easily labelled as the fifth column. The articles published in *Nor Lur* (New News) and *Nor Or* (New Day) newspapers were considered tools of communist propaganda[70]. The editors and authors of these newspapers were subjected to close surveillance, many reports were prepared on their publications, and their names were placed on the suspected individuals' list[71]. These newspapers were labelled as against the government be-

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[67] Keyder 2014.

[68] The severity of the fear, which escalated into an existential crisis, can indeed be understood by considering various historical events over the past century, including the Balkan Wars and the Armenian genocide. However, a comprehensive analysis of these factors lies beyond the scope of this article.

[69] Suciyan 2016, p. 112.

[70] *Nor Lur*, published between 1924 and 1954, was a daily newspaper during the 1930s and transitioned to a biweekly format in the late 1940s, with Vahan Toşikyan serving as its editor-in-chief. *Nor Or* began as a weekly publication before becoming a daily newspaper within a year under the editorship of Avedis Aliksanyan, Sarkis Keçyan, and Aram Pehlivanyan (Ibid, pp. 5-7).

[71] Ibid. p. 132.

cause they provided a platform for critical voices discussing various issues, such as unequal treatment of non-Muslims and discussions on communism and immigration to Soviet Armenia[72]. Zaven Biberyan was one of the most active journalists for both newspapers. Reflecting on the attacks of *Tan*, he writes:

> On December 4, 1945, during the event now known as the December 4th Raid, I was in Güven. Three printing houses—three newspapers— and two bookstores were raided, burned, and destroyed. The *Tan* newspaper, owned by the couple Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, along with the *La Turquie* newspaper and a newly established daily newspaper, came under attack by a mob described in the press as "disgruntled students," but it was a group composed of government agents and police officers. (…) There was a consensus that İsmet İnönü, the dictator of that era known as the "National Chief," had ordered his undercover police to carry out this act of vandalism to silence *Tan*. The newspaper had demanded that the government disclose the names of politicians holding bank accounts in Switzerland, threatening to publish them otherwise. It was no coincidence that the attack by the "disgruntled students" occurred immediately after the Sertel couple issued an ultimatum to the government, demanding that it reveal what could have been considered the most sacred state secret within a week[73].

4.4. Portrait of an Armenian Intellectual, Zaven Biberyan

It is no exaggeration to consider Zaven Biberyan one of the most significant authors yet to receive sufficient academic attention. By the time his literary voice emerged, the world had already been shaken by two of the most horrifying events of the twentieth century. While his works do not directly address either event, they are inextricably linked to them; the echoes of the Holocaust reverberate alongside the oppression faced by Armenians who remained in Turkey after Catastrophe[74], enveloped by its lingering memory. Although I contend that further academic inquiry into his literary works is necessary, such an undertaking falls beyond

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[72]   Ibid., p. 136.

[73]   Biberyan 2021, pp. 330-331.

[74]   The word "catastrophe" appeared as a proper name for the first time in Hagop Oshagan's *Mnatsortatz* (The Remnants) in 1931 and is widely today used for naming the annihilation of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 with its capitalisation. For more information, see Nichanian 2011.

the scope of this article. Instead, I will focus primarily on Biberyan's recently published autobiography, *Mahkûmların Şafağı: Özyaşamöyküsü 1921-46* (The Dawn of the Prisoners: Autobiography 1921-1946), and seek to portray him as an Armenian intellectual whose life was marked by the injustices of the Turkish state, imprisonment, and exile.

Zaven Biberyan was born on January 13, 1921, in the Çengelköy district of Istanbul, and around the age of four, his family moved to Kadıköy. He first attended Dibar Gırtaran (Sultanyan) Armenian School and later enrolled at Saint Joseph French High School, which students from Turkish and Greek bourgeois families predominantly attended. In his autobiography, Biberyan reflects on the discomfort he felt during his first year of college, realizing that he was not on equal footing with the Turkish students. This realization led him, at the age of 14, to decide to leave the school, and he followed through with that decision[75]. Two years later, following a series of challenging experiences in the job market, he returned to his studies and enrolled in the School of Economics and Commerce. At first, he found the environment free from discrimination. While there, he was taught by notable figures such as Mehmet Ali Aybar, and it was here that he first encountered the works of Nazım Hikmet[76]. He became acutely aware of the fragility of his Armenian identity after being belittled by his teacher, Maximilian Berlitz, and reading Turkish history books, where Armenians were either omitted or portrayed as "betraying Turkey"[77]. His growing disengagement from school eventually led to failure and withdrawal. Experiencing a profound nationalism in this period that intertwined with what he describes as "defensive racism," which persisted for almost two years[78].

At some point, he vented his anger at journalists who disparaged Armenians by sending anonymous letters, wrote pamphlets aimed at mobilizing the Armenian community, copied them by handwriting, and distributed door to door[79]. He even boldly wrote "Long live Armenia!" on the wall of the Armenian church in Kadıköy[80]. At some point, Biberyan severed ties with his Turkish friends and was overwhelmed

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[75]   Biberyan 2021, p. 54.

[76]   Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[77]   Ibid., pp. 68-71.

[78]   Ibid., p. 72.

[79]   Ibid., pp. 73-75.

[80]   Ibid., p. 76.

by his increasingly radical ideas. His autobiography reveals that this fanaticism was a reaction to the chauvinism of the Turks[81]. As World War II approached, Biberyan fled to Bulgaria to avoid mandatory military service. However, he was compelled to return to Turkey only six months later. Consequently, like many other non-Muslim citizens, he was conscripted into the *Yirmi Kura Askerlik* from 1941 to 1944, which he describes as a new iteration of the *Amele Taburları* (labour battalions)[82]. In his letter addressing his journalist friend Hrant Paluyan in 1962, he expressed this experience:

> Forty-two months in the mountains of Anatolia, from İzmir to the Georgian border, from the Black Sea to Adana and Hatay. Always in tents. Fighting nature, hunger, tropical malaria. I lament these three and a half years. The best three and a half years of my youth, (spent) in wild mountains and forests[83].

This experience also allowed him to acquire knowledge of the Armenian language and meet with the editor-in-chief of *Jamanak* (Time) newspaper, eventually leading to the publication of his initial articles. In that period, he also came across a document labelled "top secret" signed by Fevzi Çakmak, the chief of general staff, who referred to the non-Muslim soldiers in this document as "traitors, ingrates, and scoundrels"[84]. Having continually witnessed the brutal face of the Turkish state, Biberyan contemplated defection and crossing the Syrian border. The cessation of trade between Turkey and Germany, which led to his father's bankruptcy, further intensified the pressure he was experiencing. Biberyan grappled with conflicting emotions about seeking asylum: on one hand, he felt guilt over abandoning his parents, who had supported him for the past three years; on the other hand, he was uncertain about where Armenia's true interests lay—whether in Syria or the Soviet Union. He questioned whether the alliance between the UK and the USSR would endure until the war's end. These uncertainties caused him to delay his decision and

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[81] Ibid., p. 86.

[82] *Amele Taburları* was involved in the forced labour of Ottoman Armenians and Greeks during WWI.

[83] For a brief essay featuring excerpts from Biberyan's letter, see Robert Koptaş's article, "Make room for Biberyan please" on the K24 website.

[84] Biberyan 2021, p. 289.

wait a few more days. His primary concern was the potential impact of the conflict on Armenia and the diaspora. Ultimately, Biberyan decided to remain in Turkey, but after completing his military service, he faced an additional five months of bureaucratic obstacles before finally gaining his freedom[85].

Following the immigration call from the Soviets in 1945, Biberyan authored various articles expressing his enthusiasm for "the secure borders of a socialist state"[86]. For him, this invitation coincided with the borderland conflict experienced by Armenians in Turkey in two ways: the hope of salvation accompanying the idea of going to Armenia and the revenge accompanying the possibility of transferring the promised lands to the Soviets[87]. He encapsulates the Turkish press's verbal assaults and the state's close surveillance of the Armenian community as follows:

> The Turkish press responded with intense vigour, launching a systematic campaign. Daily headlines, articles, and critiques frequently referenced the Armenians' request to be sent to Soviet Armenia, often laced with irony, insults, and threats. Government officials sought to intimidate those queuing outside the Soviet consulate. Rumors spread that individuals leaving the consulate were being followed to their homes and that undercover police had rented the house across the street to photograph everyone entering and exiting. These rumours are significant as they capture the tense atmosphere among Istanbul Armenians during this period[88].

In his memoir, Biberyan states that two threatening letters were received in March 1946. The first was sent to the home of Vahan Toşikyan, the owner of *Nor Lur*, and the second to the newspaper's office, addressed directly to Biberyan. Due to the profane language in the letter addressed to Biberyan, they decided to publish only the one directed to Toşikyan. This letter warned that "Turkish students, along with their Armenian comrades, would not hesitate to destroy the printing house, just as they had on 4 December 1945" if they insisted on publishing

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[85]   Ibid., p. 318.

[86]   Suciyan 2016, p. 160.

[87]   Biberyan 2021, p. 333.

[88]   Ibid.

Biberyan's articles[89]. In response, the following day's headline in *Nor Lur* was "We are waiting for the attack of the Don Quixotes" [90]. Because of this headline and his articles published in *Nor Lur*, Biberyan was detained and taken to the Sansaryan building for interrogation that night. Subsequently, he was transferred to a military prison on the day the Missouri arrived.

In prison, he established contacts with Turkish communists, stating that it was the first time he realized some Turks might have a no-chauvinist, libertarian, and impartial point of view. From then on, he endeavoured to address the Turkish-Armenian issue from "a relatively neutral and objective point of view"[91]. During the imprisonment period, the news of his situation was internationalized by the diaspora, and according to him, the Soviets protected him from torture[92]. After being released from jail toward the end of 1946, he became an editor-in-chief for *Nor Or* newspaper. There, he started positioning himself side by side with the Left-wing movement. Following the ban of *Nor Or* by martial law, he had a short-lived experience in the newspaper *Aysor* (Today)[93]. In 1949, he moved to Beirut, Lebanon. In 1953, he returned to Istanbul, worked at *Tebi Luys* (Toward the Light), and started publishing his literary works towards the end of the 1950s[94]. In the 1960s, he contributed to the daily newspaper *Marmara*, was affiliated with the *Türkiye Komünist Partisi* (Communist Party of Turkey), and served briefly as a municipal representative[95].

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[89] Biberyan 2021, p. 366.

[90] *Nor Lur* 1946, 19 March.

[91] Biberyan 2021, p. 415.

[92] Ibid., p. 422.

[93] *Aysor* was published weekly from July 1947 to May 1948 under the editor-in-chief, Avedis Aliksanyan.

[94] A brief look at Zaven Biberyan's *oeuvre* might be helpful. His first novel was *Lgrdadze* (Slut), published in 1959 and translated to Turkish by the author himself in 1966 with the name of *Yalnızlar* (The Lonely Ones). His other books are in chronological order: *Dzove* (The Sea, 1961), *Angudi Siraherner* (Penniless Lovers, 1962), and *Mrchiwnneru Verchaluyse* (The Sunset of Ants, 1984). The last one was initially serialised in *Jamanak* in 1970 and published into a book version just before the author died in 1984.

[95] Gebenlioğlu, p. 36.

4.5. Conclusion

Truman's 1947 talk in the White Palace was critically important in a global context. He focused on the growing interest in communism in Europe, particularly Greece and Turkey and stigmatized this interest as a threat, which was taken by the Turkish side as psychological support. In this speech, he stressed "the US commitment to assist all free peoples threatened by attack from without or subversion from within"[96]. He additionally guaranteed a 400-million-dollar assistance package, which was supposed to help heal the economy in Greece and Turkey. Three-quarters of this sum was allocated to Greece, while one-quarter was to Turkey. The first tranche of this assistance was very symbolic[97]. In 1948, the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), distributed "$13 billion ($140 billion in 2022) to sixteen European countries over five years to rebuild their nations and economies based on the American capitalist model"[98]. After the Marshall Plan was introduced, Turkey's foreign policy underwent a notable transformation as it aligned itself closely with the US and its containment efforts against the USSR. Financial aid of 300-million-dollar has additionally been announced for Turkey, which has been accepted as a member of the European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

In the early Cold War years, the conduct of the Turkish government, not only considering its foreign politics but also domestic politics, was paradoxical. Implementing the law on associations, which provided a legal framework for establishing class-based parties and associations, would serve as an example for this claim. On the one hand, a few left-wing parties were allowed to be introduced after this law, and on the other, not only did they close in a short period, but their founders also arrested[99]. Some of the hostile attitudes toward Armenians should also be examined within this context. Following the migration invitation from the Soviets' side, Turkish newspapers initiated a campaign against Armenians by using threatening language. They published the lists of those who applied to the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul on their front

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[96]   Yılmaz 2020, p. 720.

[97]   Çalış 2017, p. 76.

[98]   Tunç, Tunç 2022, p. 752.

[99]   Gökay 2006, p. 71.

page[100]. This paved the way for second-wave immigration, including intellectuals, most of whom, contrary to Biberyan, did not ever return to the country. As a result, while the Armenian population in Turkey was estimated to be around 120,000 in 1946, it decreased to approximately 100,000 three years later and was reported to be 60,000 in 1950[101].

The Cold War framework, which intertwined with a narrative of conflict between liberalism and communism, has emerged as the prevailing paradigm globally. This way, the old polarities have been recorded again and served in "new clothes", even if the patterns of international relations have been completely transformed. Within this paradigm, although the creation of national borders is closely tied to the formation of national identity—often highlighted as a key distinction between nation-states and empires—the current ambiguity of national borders, which enables nation-states to seek border expansion, is blurring the lines between the two once again.

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[100]   Özkan 2020, p. 178.

[101]   Suciyan 2016, p. 58.

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INTELLECTUALS AND ANTICOMMUNISM

5. Integral state against communism in the Cold War (1945-1980)[1]

Fatih Çağatay Cengiz

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the formation of an anti-communist front in Turkey between 1945 and 1980 in terms of the "integral state" a concept examined by Antonio Gramsci[2]. Even though a plethora of literature examines the anti-communist battle from the standpoint of the state or civil society separately[3], this chapter argues for the dichotomic unity of state and civil society against communism in Turkey during the Cold War. According to the chapter, the anti-communist front in Turkey established a strong partnership and alliance between the state and civil society, allowing the state to organize and construct anti-communist consent inside the sphere of civil society. In other words, the chapter claims that throughout the Cold War between 1945 and 1980, the Turkish political regime attempted to construct "anti-communist hegemony armoured with force" in political society and civil society in order to achieve intellectual and moral leadership over the masses.

As a result, anti-communism, which had risen to the status of "state policy" since 1947, and particularly since the rule of the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) in 1950, was transformed into a conflicting area in which the state used its repressive apparatus. Moreover, representative institutions of civil society contributed to the formation of hegemony.

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[1]   The Turkish version of this chapter was published in the book titled *Soğuk Savaş Yıllarında Türkiye'de Siyaset ve Bürokrasi* by Çizgi Kitabevi in 2023.

[2]   Humphrys 2018; Gramsci 1977.

[3]   See Aytürk 2014; Koca 2017; Ergüç 2020; Kocaoğlu 2020; Meşe 2016; Öztürk, 2014.

It will be shown in the chapter that through the mediation of anti-communism, the creation of "organic society" bequeathed from Turkey's single-party period was able to continue during the succeeding multi-party period. The difference between the two periods is that the multi-party period was able to convey consent and hegemony in the spheres of political society and civil society due to the obsessive fear of communism. Thus, anti-communism became a basic feature of emergent bourgeois civil society, transcending the implementations of the integral state's repressive apparatus (government, army, police force, courts, prisons, etc.).

The concept of "integral state" with reference to Gramsci will be briefly described in the first section of the chapter. It will be demonstrated in this section that state-civil society relations during the early Republican period prior to the Cold War did not fully correspond to the establishment of the integral state. However, it will be emphasized that the single-party period's allergy to communism was instrumentalized as a feature that the Cold War period acquired. The following part will demonstrate how organic intellectuals and representative institutions of civil society attempted to build hegemony as carriers of anti-communist thought. The last section concludes that until the 1980s, the development of an integral state could legitimize itself and attempted to incorporate civil society into itself through the fear of communism. In other words, the fear of communism, organized in the spheres of the state and civil society, gave a "rose garden free of thorns" to state-civil society relations in the post-1980 period.

5.1. Constitution of integral state in Turkey before the Cold War

Academic studies on the concept of "the state" as such differ methodologically, with different readings of the relationship between the state and civil society. In other words, they disagree on whether the relationship between the state and civil society is "antagonistic" or "dichotomic"[4]. While the liberal view sees the state as repressive, authoritarian, and anti-freedom by nature in contrast to civil society, it also sees the state-civil society relationship as conflictual. As a result, civil society – an existential realm in which individuals can realize

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[4]   For further discussion see Halifeoğlu Yetiş 2013; Yetiş 2009, p. 143; Bank 2015, p. 8.

themselves in contrast to the sphere of the state – gains distinction as a sphere of freedom and democracy[5].

Classical Marxists, on the other hand, consider the state as a tool of the bourgeoisie. According to Lenin's book *The State and Revolution*, the state is conceptualized as a "special organization of the force for the suppression of the oppressed" with its army, police, and bureaucracy[6]. According to this view, the state, as a manifestation of irreconcilable class antagonisms, should not be viewed as a trench to be seized by revolutionaries, but rather as an instrument to be destroyed. However, this classical approach was challenged by the expansion of welfare state policies in the West after the 1930s, workers' enfranchisement, and an increase in social payments. These superstructural changes led to the view that the state cannot be seen only as an instrument of repression, as orthodox Marxism claimed, but must also be understood as an element of hegemony constructed in the superstructure and social institutions. Thus, Antonio Gramsci was among the first who conceptualized the state as an institution that constitutes hegemony equipped with power, rather than a special instrument of force in the hands of the dominant class[7]. Therefore, the approach that sees the state-civil society relation as "dichotomic" rather than "conflicting" sees the state as a realm that constitutes its hegemony in civil society.

Similarly, it is maintained that civil society can only exist within an integral state. According to Gramsci, representative institutions of civil society (political parties, the media, schools, the church, and so on) assure their own development by integrating with the state. For Gramsci, the state, on the other hand, is more than just a technical arrangement based on separation of power, as seen in modern bourgeois states. It is rather a more comprehensive approach that covers civil society as well[8]. This viewpoint clearly should be viewed as a challenge to the 18th century French thinker Montesquieu's principle of separation of powers. On the other hand, the concept of integral state refers to a special relationship between political society, instruments of the state, and civil society. This relationship, however, cannot be defined as either uniformity between two instances (political society/state and

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[5] Ozan 2012; Halifeoğlu, Yetiş 2013.

[6] Lenin 2015, p. 32.

[7] Humphrys 2018, p. 37; Gramsci 1977, p. 263.

[8] Gramsci 1977, p. 267.

civil society) or fusion/merge. The term "integral state" refers to the dialectical unity (dichotomy) between the state and civil society[9]. As Gramsci emphasizes, the dichotomy between the state and civil society is merely a methodological separation. In a nutshell, Gramsci defines the state as a practical and theoretical ensemble of activities through which the ruling class protects its sovereignty by establishing its legitimacy, as well as a practical and theoretical ensemble of activities through which the active consent of the dominated classes under control can be maintained[10].

Taking this theoretical background into account, it can be stated that throughout the Cold War period, Turkey attempted to establish an integral state through the mediation of anti-communism. However, it should be noted that the early Republican period's state-society relations left a distinctive legacy for the subsequent period's formation of a broader anti-communist front. According to Cangül Örnek, anti-communist ideology was an important component for Turkish nationalists who were organized in racist periodicals in the pre-Cold War period, even if it was later echeloned to the status of state policy during the Cold War period[11]. The organizational framework of racism in civil society provided Turkish nationalists with an opportunity to turn the ideological organization of the nation-state in their favour. The triple fusion of anti-Soviet sentiment, antipathy to class politics, and the populist principle (*halkçılk*) that followed the organic society model articulated by French sociologist Émile Durkheim underpinned fierce anti-communist thought throughout the Cold War period[12]. In summary, anti-Soviet sentiment in Turkey in the 1930s demonstrated parallelism and continuity with the Republic's goal of creating an "unprivileged, classless, and cohesive nation". As a natural result of this approach, communist thought was viewed not just as an alien ideology to the national body, but also as a pathological illness separated from reality. Furthermore, some intelligentsia backed the populist principle envisioned by Turkey's single-party rule.

The Cadre (*Kadro*) Movement, for example, attempted to unite marxism, nationalism, and corporatism under the banner of kemalism by claiming that statism (*devletçilik*), which was necessary and indispensable

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[9]   Humphrys 2018, p. 36.

[10]   In Yetiş 2009, p. 143.

[11]   Örnek 2015.

[12]   Ibid., p. 60.

for Turkey's development, could only be realized by an unprivileged and classless society project based on solidarity[13]. However, the Cadre Movement, which emerged in the early Republican period when the separation of the state and civil society had not been clearly crystallized, rendered organic intellectuals of the nation-state ineffective in establishing hegemony over the masses. As a result, the state failed to achieve the dichotomous unity required to sustain hegemony protected with force. This being said, it should be noted that anti-communist sentiments in the early Republic led to a violent anti-communist preoccupation in racist newspapers.

For instance, according to Reha Oğuz Türkkan, one of the founders of the racist "Ergenekon" newspaper, communism was not "an equality (*müsavat*) in wealth and welfare," but "an equality in poverty and agony". For Türkkan, it would easily establish its control over pure and innocent Turkish villagers[14]. Moreover, communists who noticed the absence of the working class (*amele sınıfı*) in Turkey would like to instil a "pitch-dark grudge to the pure hearths" of villagers who made up eighty percent of the population by "singing nocturne for destitution"[15]. Thus, Türkkan asked for a challenge to all of foreign ideologies by arguing that communism was a "communal gutter and enemy buskin in the country" that was alien to the national body, similar to fascism and national socialism[16]. But it is important to note that the country's battle should be fought in a way that is analogous to "fighting germs and injecting tincture of iodine into a wound in the body"[17]. Indeed, according to him, these foreign ideologies, like maladies such as "lockjaw, typhoid, tuberculosis, and pox", are alien to the body[18]. However, communism is more harmful than others since "... people can get rid of these maladies if they know how to do it technically." For instance, the deceased never lose their dignity or humanity. However, according to Türkkan, because we are Turks, communism germ poisons us as well as our spirituality[19].

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[13] Demirci 2006, pp. 45-46.

[14] Türkkan 1939.

[15] Türkkan 1943, p. 49.

[16] Türkkan 1939.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Meşe as quoted from Diper 2016, p. 254.

Indeed, there are more examples of racist intelligentsia in the sphere of civil society. Reha Oğuz Türkkan's pseudo-biological rhetoric presents itself in a more obnoxious form in Nihal Atsız, who did not wish to conceal his racial thoughts. In a 1934 publication, a communist person was cursed of being a "vagabond who sold his conscience to the Jewish Marx," a "foolish, … a judas… that fancies that he reached heaven in a place where working-class dictatorship was established," and a "rascal who thinks to find a woman in a communist community"[20]. This fictitious communist and morally inferior person is a monster: a "critter who could not ascend to the level of humanity," a "morally bastard if not physically," and a being infected with rabies[21].

The crucial issue here is that, while anti-communist nationalists benefited from the nation-state's aim to create an organic society, they regarded the early Republican period with suspicion. In other words, prior to the Cold War, the relation between the nation-state and anti-communist nationalists was strained. Besides, racist nationalists in the 1930s claimed that the nation-state erroneously served communism and the Comintern through its educational projects. As a result, anti-communist nationalists portrayed Hasan Âli Yücel's Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*) as a "safe sanctuary for enemies known for their communism"[22]. It was interestingly criticized that the *Communist Manifesto* was translated, Sophocles plays were produced, and Mexican hats were worn in these institutions, demonstrating that colonial sentiments run rampant here[23].

The anti-communist fervour centred on the Village Institutes captivates not only racist Turkish nationalists but also Islamic writers. In his book *Türkiye'de Komünizma ve Köy Enstitüleri* (Communism in Turkey and Village Institutes), Necip Fazl Kısakürek of the *Büyük Doğu* movement stated that these institutions were "thoughtful and planned attempts to construct Godless, nationless, materialist communist structure by devastating, flattening, sweeping over spiritual topography of Anatolian children", "slaughterhouse of spirits", and "centres for blasphemy"[24].

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[20] Atsız 1934.

[21] Meşe as quoted from Çaka 2016, p. 258.

[22] Arık 1951, pp. 3-4

[23] Ibid., p. 4.

[24] In Kocaoğlu 2020, p. 41.

On the other hand, the gradual closure of these "centres for blasphemy" during the the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) rule in the late 1940s demonstrates the growing power of Islamists and nationalist anti-communists during the Cold War. Because of the single-party regime's ideological and political turn, the distance between racist nationalists and the state began to narrow throughout the Cold War period, which aided the state in establishing its control over civil society[25]. As a result, it can be seen that the single-party regime's goal of constructing an integral state was ineffective before the Cold War period.

5.2. Integral state and organic intellectuals in Turkey during the Cold War

In a 1951 confidential meeting of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Judge Advocate Şevki Mutlugil stated that a total war against the scourge of communism was required. According to Mutlugil, an effective struggle against traitors (Nazım Hikmet, Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, Doktor Kıvılcımlı, Şefik Hüsnü, etc.) who could organize everywhere, establish political organizations, and impose their ideas forcefully couldn't be met by simply using repressive apparatuses of the state in Althusserian manner or reducing the number of red communists (*kızıl tevkifat*)[26]. Hence, for him, ideological apparatuses of the state should be utilized. Similarly, the goal of red communists in Turkey was not only to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms, but also to clear the way for imperialism (Russian imperialism) to seize Turkey. Indeed,

> Communism is in the act of invading the world. Rights and freedoms of humanity in legal and logical sense are under threat. The freedoms of individuals as citizens, and even the freedoms and independence of nations are under a threat that has never been seen before in the history

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[25] Arık 1951, p. 4.

[26] These writers, poets, novelists, theoreists, and party officials worked to further communism in Turkey. Nazım Hikmet, a communist poet, was imprisoned in Turkey in the 1940s for inciting cadets to revolt and spreading communism, and his Turkish nationality was removed from him in 1951. While Doktor Kıvılcımlı established the legal Vatan (Homeland) Party in 1954, Şefik Hüsnü served as general secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey from 1925 to 1936, and again from 1946 until 1959.

of the world. The free nations of the whole world (…) feel the threat most severely. Communism resorts to unseen and unusual tricks, fraud, and destructive manoeuvres in order to realize this threat. All this takes place in accordance with the ordinary methods of struggle and encroachment of communism. Communism is far from being considered as a political, economic, social creed or a matter of doctrine. Today, communism is trying to infiltrate, unite and dominate all the free regions of the world as the vanguard, fifth column, spy network and organization of a contemporary new imperialism[27].

Correspondingly, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes claimed that communist thought was not a "freedom of thought" issue, but rather an imperialist "survival problem"[28]. This was such a malady that communism gained a foothold not only in civil society but also in the state's bureaucratic hierarchy. Menderes, like Remzi Oğuz Arık, challenged communist involvement in cinema, theatrical plays, daily news, journals, as well as the Ministry of National Education, Faculty of Language and History, and Village Institutes[29].

Interestingly, the war against the red communist threat in Turkey was highlighted not only by the state and/or the Turkish right. Bülent Ecevit, who led the "Left of the Centre" (*Ortanın Solu*) movement in the 1960s, had notable ideas for combating communism, as the proposal to set up a security organization comprised of ex-communist intellectuals[30]. As a result, the war against communism, which was so extensive and ubiquitous in the state and civil society, could become more fervent, and the relationship could develop into one in which the state continually kept communism in mind. That is, anti-communism was embedded in the thoughts of the Turkish right as well as the CHP elites.

According to Fatih Yaşlı, the Democrat Party and its successors' engagement with the CHP in the communist obsession originates from the ruling classes' interest for an unrestricted articulation to imperialism in foreign policy domain[31]. Thus, while communism was considered by Ecevit as a threat to democracy and Westernization project[32],

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[27]　TBMM 1951, p. 7.

[28]　Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[29]　Ibid., p. 30.

[30]　Sanlı 2011, p. 145.

[31]　Yaşlı 2019.

[32]　Sanlı 2011, p. 145.

Alparslan Türkeş intended to confront it with a social justice-based economic strategy, or even "crush" it[33]. As a result of this broad anti-communist front, political society, which in a narrow sense is a governmental organization, became a site of the integral state.

Under communist threat, the "genuine and true" Turkish nation was perpetually asked to unconditionally participate in anti-communist hegemonic project in political and civil society. According to Yüksel Taşkın, the conflict between the Republic's founding elites, who represent the "centre" and nationalist conservative progeny of provinces, who represent the "periphery" was primarily resolved through anti-communist mediation[34]. Importantly, this intrinsic relationship within the state was strengthened by an ideological shift from racist elitist Turkism to populist nationalism by articulating Islam to anti-communist thought. In other words, according to Tanıl Bora, nationalism at this period was "graced with Islam"[35]. As a result, not just racist civil society elements, but also Islamic civil society organizations, used anti-communism to establish hegemony.

Consequently, anti-communism whose organizational might had risen sought enemies not only from within the country but also from abroad. Furthermore, the Turkish Right's consolidative power was unquestionably directed against "non-nationals" (*gayri milli*) and "nonbeliever Muscovites" (*Moskof*)[36]. Even more, according to Güven Gürkan Öztan, this new alliance considered "eternal" communism as continuation of tzarist Russia and thus carried memory of the Ottoman-Russian War into the present era[37]. As a result of forging a historical connection, this sacred war was sanctified as an ancestry inheritance.

Even more, some ongoing and devastating wars were praised by racists. For instance, some racist nationalists were charmed by Germany's aggressive stand towards communist Russia and equated German advancement to Turkish advancement. In his book, *Çanakkale›ye Yürüyüş/Türkçülüğe Karşı Haçlı Seferi* (March to Çanakkale/Crusade Against Turkism), Nihal Atsız welcomed the day of 22 June 1941, when Germany declared war on Russia, as a day when Turkists' spirits found

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[33] Yaşlı 2011, pp. 153-154.

[34] Taşkın 2008, p. 628.

[35] Bora 2017, pp. 286-297.

[36] Öztan 2016, pp. 78-79.

[37] Ibid., p. 88.

rest[38]. The relief of Turkists from this offensive was also reflected in the United States' post-war donation of weaponry to Turkey. By giving military weapons, the United States, which always extended a friendly hand, helped Turkey become one of the most powerful nations in the Middle East[39].

However, it is important to stress that the economic and military effects of Marshall aid to Turkey between 1948 and 1951 should not be overestimated. In a speech to Congress in 1947, US President Harry Truman claimed that the UK could not give financial assistance to Turkey and Greece and that it was thus necessary to replace the UK. Nonetheless, the communist menace was greater in Greece than in Turkey; communist armed groups, according to Truman, were involved in terrorist activities against the Greek state, but Turkey dismissed such a threat. However, it was discovered that if an armed force captured political power in Greece, it would first advance to Turkey, then to the Middle East[40].

Thus, Turkey received 351.7 million dollars in Marshall Plan aid between 1948 and 1957, including 175 million dollars in direct aid and 176.7 million dollars in indirect aid[41]. It should be emphasized that the significance of these aid corresponded *qualitatively* more to Turkey's growing dependence on other countries than its quantity. This dependence revealed itself both economically and politically, as anti-communist vigilance was increased.

On the other hand, the specific function of organic intellectuals should be acknowledged because they have the potential to transform anti-communist rapprochement in political society into a hegemonic tool. According to Gramsci, organic intellectuals "which every new class creates alongside itself and elaborates in the course of its development, are for the most part 'specializations' of partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new social type which the mew class has brought into prominence"[42]. Organic intellectuals, who are unable to integrate old intellectuals or desire to take their place in the new phase of production, have the function of establishing hegemony between the state and civil society. This social group serves as an

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38   In ibid., p. 84.

39   In ibid., p. 92.

40   National Archives 2022.

41   Merih 2006, p. 118.

42   Gramsci 1977, p. 6.

officer or representative of the dominant class and connects two su-
perstructural levels (civil society and political society/state)[43]. Taking
Turkey into consideration, it can be argued that organic intellectuals
during the Cold War, as representatives of peripheral capitalists who
moved from the periphery to the centre, made significant contribu-
tions to the hegemony of the anti-communist project. It is also appar-
ent that religion played a role in this process[44].

For example, according to Tanıl Bora, Osman Yüksel made a spe-
cial contribution to popularising Turkism that was blended with Islam[45].
This contribution, according to Osman Yüksel, indicated that Turkism,
which had previously attracted to intellectuals, elites, teachers, and com-
missioned officers, had now expanded to "heartsick Anatolian child"[46].
As recounted in Ballad for Sakarya (*Sakarya Türküsü*)[47], this "heartsick
Anatolian child" was an "alien in his own country", and a "pariah in
his own motherland". Those who usurped power in the motherland, ac-
cording to Yüksel, were not pure and heartsick Anatolian children who
emancipated the country, but those who had arrived from the Balkans[48].
As a result, Yüksel attempted to instil a nationalist mindset in peripheral
Anatolia through new slogans and discourses, which had been unre-
sponsive to the kemalist nationalist modernization project[49].

Having said that, it is worth noting that the popularization of Turk-
ism was largely founded on an Islamist history narrative. Osman Yüksel
not only argued that the spirit of the National Pact (*Misakı Millî*)[50], its
representatives, heroes of the National Struggle in the First Grand Na-
tional Assembly, and genuine Anatolian children incurred the wrath of
the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) and
Thessalonian converts (*dönme*)[51]. Yüksel contended, similarly to what

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[43]   Ibid., pp. 5-14.

[44]   Cengiz 2018.

[45]   Bora 2017, pp. 286-290.

[46]   In ibid., 287.

[47]   Ballad for Sakarya is a well-known poem written by conservative-Islamist Necip
        Fazıl Kısakürek.

[48]   Bora, op. cit., pp. 288-289.

[49]   Aytürk 2014, p. 702.

[50]   Misakı Millî was a decision taken in the last Ottoman Parliament in 1920 that
        proclaimed the country of Turkish nation, which extends beyond the Republic of
        Turkey's actual borders.

[51]   Yüksel 1949.

was pointed out in the "Serdengeçti" periodical, that Republican revolutions did not suit the existence of people, and that as a result, unsuitable changes in national body led to moral dissatisfaction. Therefore, it is clear that Yüksel played an important role in fusing elitist Turkism with popular Islamist narratives during the early Republican period, resulting to idealism (*ülkücülük*):

> During the Republican period, which replaced the Empire, some superficial changes on the surface were made and these were dubbed revolutions; however, while these revolutions gave the impression that many things had been accomplished on the surface, in reality, this movement did not arise from the conscience of the people and did not fit the national structure; additionally, it overturned the old order, overturned faith and belief and led to depression and unrest of moral values[52].

Furthermore, the principle of secularism of Republican period, according to Yüksel, became an "unbending and unbreakable sword in the hands of enemies of religion and faith"[53]. Enemies of religion and faith made it a constitutional principle, which then turned into a taboo for idolaters[54]. For him, idolatry came into existence with the Republican revolutions; centres of faith were closed down; and Islamic communities were dispersed[55].

Similarly, inclusion of Turkism with Islamism manifests itself in conceptualization of the "West", as well. The West indicated a "non-national" geography for conservative nationalists, similar to Islamist ideology. According to Dündar Taşer, who is one of the ideologues of the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) in Turkey, communism, "had even arrived in Turkey through imitator elites under the influence of the West rather than that of Russia"[56]. Indeed, struggle between the left (communism) and the right was between those who were completely dropped out from national root and those who were completely attached to national root. Briefly,

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[52]   Yüksel 1959, p. 3.

[53]   Yüksel 1949.

[54]   Ibid.

[55]   Cited in Meşe 2016, p. 87.

[56]   Aksun 1974, p. 108.

it was argued that "the struggle is a struggle between national and non-national forces"[57].

Likewise, In *Dokuz Işık* (Nine Lights), Alparslan Türkeş depicted the history as a struggle among the nations by strictly opposing to the Marxist thought which sees history as class struggle. Non-national forces, according to Türkeş, were doomed to annihilation as a result of this reading of history[58]. The key issue here is that non-religiosity or religious deficiency was automatically portrayed as being non-national. Hence, Islam was a "blessed and powerful source for the Turkish nation"[59]. It turned out, the schism between official nationalism and idealism (*ülkücülük*) expressed itself in the institutionalization and consolidation of religiosity into nationality[60].

Aside from organic intellectuals, the actions of trade unions in the sphere of civil society were also constructive in the establishment of hegemony by integral state. The Cold War era began in 1947, when strikes and lockouts were likewise prohibited by the Law on Trade Unions of 1947. Political activity by workers' and employers' trade unions were outlawed in Turkey, and their actions were required to be aligned with national interests. In other words, trade unions were seen as "national enterprises"[61].

As a result, trade union movement in Turkey could only find a home by aligning itself with national interests, and as a result, the Turkish working class mobilised its consciousness in a nationalist direction[62]. The strategy for gaining ground was simply stated in racist-nationalist biological language. In a meeting held on 26 August 1950, Mehmed İnhanlı, the leader of the Istanbul Electric, Gasoline and Motor Vehicles Trade Union, described communism as a "germ and spectre that

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[57] Ibid., p. 106.

[58] Türkeş 2017, p. 117.

[59] Ibid., p. 160.

[60] It should be noted, however, that Türkeş avoided making an explicit allusion to Islam in his 1965 work *Dokuz Işık* (Nine Lights). Islam was viewed as a morality that was compatible with Turkish culture and spirit. It was after the Republican Villagers' Nation Party's 1969 Adana Congress that secularist discourses faded, and Islam was viewed as the essential component of Turkish nationalism. See Aytürk 2014, p. 710.

[61] Akgöz 2014, p. 66.

[62] Ibid.

insidiously grows to annihilate the nations"[63]. The meeting's goal was to curse communism, and communists' right to life was rejected[64].

Through the integral state, the Turkish bourgeoisie also attempted to turn their particular interests into the general interests of society. Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Commodity Exchange attempted to fight the communist menace from an economic standpoint by translating a pamphlet produced by the American Chamber of Commerce in 1965. This leaflet examined the economic disparity between the Soviet economy and the Free World in terms of productivity. It then proposed that the market-oriented Fordist production model in the United States triumphed over the Soviet system's state planning approach. While Fordist production helped to market growth by allowing the manufacture of many commodities for a large number of consumers at a reasonable price[65], the Soviet production model failed to advance. It could not go beyond emulating the West due to the lack of an entrepreneurial class in the Soviet Union and a state-controlled economy that hindered inventions[66].

Similarly, other anti-communist alliances were formed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and a Commission for Fighting Communism was founded in 1963 with the cooperation of all political parties[67]. Still, the acceptance of President Cemal Gürsel (1961-1966) as honorary president of the Association for the Fight of Communism exemplifies the highest level of legitimization for the integral state in Turkey[68]. His acceptance of the position broadened the organization's scope of influence, allowing some members to escalate their violent operations against leftist political parties. Nonetheless, after these aggressive activities, Gürsel resigned from his honorary status with the organization in 1965[69]. The fact that the organization was designated as a "public benefit association" until 1968 and received financial help

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[63]   In ibid., p. 76.

[64]   Ibid.

[65]   Türkiye Ticaret Odaları, Sanayi Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği 1965, p. 91.

[66]   Ibid., pp. 91-93.

[67]   Meşe 2016, p. 126.

[68]   Ibid; Koca 2017, p. 552.

[69]   Meşe 2016, pp. 142-143.

from the Treasury demonstrated an exemplary instance of state-civil society rapprochement[70].

Anti-communist front was also bolstered by the repressive apparatus of the state. As reported in *Milliyet* on 23 January 1967, Chief of General Staff Cemal Tural (1966-1969) warned of a "communist dystopia" in an ordinance named *Yıkıcı Faaliyetlerle Mücadele* (Combating Subversive Activities). It was suggested that communists will stage a coup and that measures should be taken immediately:

> The Turkish nation will be torn apart by ethnic groups, religion will be abolished, mosques will be destroyed. The Turkish male generation will be exiled to the steppes of Russia, on the other hand, a new generation will be brought up and a new generation will be brought up who have embraced communism, and Turkishness will be destroyed. The elders will be exterminated if, after a year's trial, they are not able to give their money back with their work. State administration will be handed over to the henchmen of the Moscow Communist Party, and everything will be administered according to communist standards[71].

According to the ordinance, news, student protests, theatrical performances, and even cowboy films opened the way for communist incitement and revolution. Communists thus targeted a leader (Chief of General Staff Cemal Tural) who was proud of having the capacity and discipline to wipe out all evils at once[72].

On the other hand, Mehmet Ali Aybar, the leader of the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP), submitted a resolution of censure against this ordinance on 9 February 1967. Discussions on this motion vividly demonstrate the inherent link between the state's repressive apparatuses and political parties in the war against communism. TİP contended that the ordinance's rationale opened the door to a perilous atmosphere that violated the 1961 Constitution's protection of rights and freedoms. According to TİP, it suggested a personal rule as well as tyranny with the intention of eradicating all problems at once[73]. Nonetheless, according to İsmet İnönü, who spoke for the CHP in parliament, it was extremely reasonable to stand up for those with

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[70] Koca 2017, p. 558.

[71] Cited in ibid., p. 553.

[72] TBMM 1967, p. 444.

[73] Ibid.

great responsibilities in the army because the army was the "highest educational and cultural nest of the country" to take their suggestions into consideration[74]. Regarding TİP, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated that the military had carried out a divine service against communism. He went on to say that individuals who protected communism and were very sorry for being on the lookout for communism were acting against national interests, and those who did so would be chased after by the Turkish state[75].

Those "who would be chased after by the state" had already been documented by Fethi Tevetoğlu, who was one of the founders of Association for the Fight of Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*). The book titled *Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler* (Socialist and Communist Activities in Turkey), in which Tevetoğlu analyzed socialist political parties and communist activities in Turkey since the Ottoman era until the 1960s, depicted how communism disguised itself and utilised divergent political strategies. The common feature for all these eras, for Tevetoğlu, was that communists could disguise themselves under the cover of socialism and they would like to skew 1961 Constitution's priority of social justice toward socialism. According to him, communists were afraid of violent and direct attacks and of being punished by the state so that they hided themselves under a safer title of "socialists". Furthermore, they constructed so-called socialist associations and facades, which muddled things. According to him, all of these attempts demonstrated how deadly they were[76].

Furthermore, *Su Uyur Komünist Uyumaz* (Water Sleeps and Communism is Sleepless) written by Gökhan Evliyaoğlu chased for imaginary anti-communist masses against "red communism". It was suggested that the world's continual social vigilance against communism should be maintained:

> … Since there are communists in Turkey just like everywhere else in the world, and those in Turkey, like communists all over the world, do not sit idle and work, then the problem is this: Being careful. "Water sleeps, communist is sleepless". This should not be forgotten … [77]

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[74] Ibid. For more information on İnönü's narrative against *Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği* rather than communism, see Meşe 2016., pp. 145-146.

[75] Ibid., p. 465.

[76] Tevetoğlu 1967, p. 12.

[77] In Yıldırmaz 2016, pp. 55-56.

Intellectuals' Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) established in the 1970s by a group of nationalist intellectuals was another example of this "social vigilance" and an attempt to construct anti-communist hegemony over the masses. The institution's goal was to spread nationalist-conservative views against leftist ideas in Turkey and to provide "intellectual-moral leadership" in the Gramscian sense for an anti-communist hegemonic project. However, for a hegemonic project to succeed, nationalism needed to be stripped of its romantic underpinnings and technicalized.

Language, character, morality, Islam, and consciousness for national history, according to Ibrahim Kafesoğlu, founder of the Intellectuals' Hearth, were basic characteristics of Turkish national culture. As a result, he strengthened Islam's prominence in national culture. Such, it is worth emphasising that the nexus that could not had been built between racist nationalists and the state during the early Republican period was finally established by refining Islam and revitalising national culture with it[78].

Not surprisingly, from the standpoint of party officials, being always vigilant against communism resulted in the popularization of state-political party-nation identification. According to Alparslan Türkeş, there was a common basis for the opponents of state-nation-party identification: Those who are enemies of Turkish are also enemies of the state, and those who are enemies of the state are also enemies of the MHP[79]. Hence, fighting communism meant a war against state adversaries.

Süleyman Demirel also attempted to popularise anti-communist struggle from a different perspective. Demirel urged comedian Öztürk Serengil to create an electoral record in 1997, resulting in a conflict with the anti-communist front[80]. The folk song *Zühtü* the lyrics of which were changed was a warning to wide-eyed Zühtü who could easily be duped into communism:

> You are a destitute citizen, Zühtü, your mind Zühtü, know yourself Zühtü, don't be taken in by those who try to make you forget your Turkishness, Zühtü. Your forebears would turn at their graves Zühtü. If there were no martyries, you wouldn't exist Zühtü[81].

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[78]   Ergüç 2017, p. 414.

[79]   Turhan 2016, pp. 347-348.

[80]   Öztürk 2014.

[81]   Quoted in ibid., p. 202.

Finally, the road initiated by Osman Yüksel to popularise and re-fine Turkism appears to have trickled down to the masses, fortifying the anti-communist hegemonic project of the integral state.

5.3. Conclusion

This chapter attempted to analyze the formation of Turkey's anti-communist front between 1945 and 1980 in relation to Gramsci's concept of the integral state. The relationship between the state and civil society in the integral state is not one of conflict but rather a dichotomous one. The chapter claimed that during the Cold War, the boundary between the state and civil society blurred in Turkey, and that various representative institutions of civil society (intellectuals, trade unions, chambers of commerce and industry, as well as political parties) attempted to hegemonize the state's official ideology. So, in Turkey, the Cold War refers to a period in which these institutions attempted to seek communists everywhere, communism was viewed as the deadliest enemy, and social strata were perpetually asked to be on guard against this evil.

When the state-civil society dichotomy is not crystallized and there is identification between the two, representational institutions of the latter cannot reveal themselves in a multiple form[82]. It is plausible to argue that the early republican period witnessed an amalgamation of the two dichotomous realms. Indeed, even while the nation-state attempted to infiltrate its social objective into the masses through its own organic intellectuals, it was not entirely possible to do so when the state's ideological apparatuses were immature. However, the Cold War period was left with an anti-communist allergy that showed itself in the construction of organic society. When Islam popularized nationalism, anti-communist allergy became hegemonic. As a result, the integral state could establish itself in the sphere of civil society and political society (parliament, media, journals, trade unions, employers' organizations, the military, etc.) and attempt to fight communism as a whole. As a result, the state attempted to establish its hegemony in civil society through the use of anti-communism during the Cold War. However, this sacred endeavour would only be stabilized by the anti-hegemonic battle of ascendant communist forces in the 1960s and

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[82]   For more information on state-society dichotomy, see Halifeoğlu, Yetiş 2013.

1970s. Nonetheless, when attempts to build an integral state failed or the state itself fell into a hegemonic crisis, the 1980 coup was on the horizon.

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6.   Representation of the Turkish Cold War through the political thoughts of Samiha Ayverdi

Gaia Poccetti

6.1. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to examine the literary work and ideology of Samiha Ayverdi in the context of the Cold War in Turkey[1]. Ayverdi's career as an intellectual spanned the entire twentieth century and remains a topic of academic and public interest. By adopting an analytical approach to two of Ayverdi's key works, this study examined her views on society, politics, and Islam. This analysis serves a twofold purpose: to provide a broader perspective on Turkey during the post-World War II era, and to explore Ayverdi's intellectual career. Additionally, scrutiny of her manuscripts will illuminate the role played by the political and historical context in the formation of her ideas, enabling a more effective consideration of both her academic and informal contributions.

Furthermore, ongoing research has examined this relationship over the two decades since the AKP came to power in Turkey. The vocabulary and symbols employed, alongside the renewed interest in authors and works from the past and the entirely new identity given to places, provide interesting clues to the academic debate on Turkey's past and dynamics. Samiha Ayverdi provides an interesting example to investigate because of the numerous paths that can be discerned in her writings and personal experiences. As proof of the recent resurgence of interest in her work, one of her most famous novels, *İbrahim Efendi Konağı* (The Mansion of Ibrahim Efendi), was

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[1]   About Cold War in Turkey see also Atasoy 2005; Johnston 2010; Aytürk 2014, 2017; Örnek, Üngor 2013; Kaynar 2017, 2020; Güldal 2018; Pekesen 2020; Danforth 2021.

included on the *Yüz Temel Eserler* (The Hundred Fundamental Books) list by the Minister of Education in 2004[2]. In addition, a high school in Istanbul was renamed Samiha Ayverdi Anadolu Lisesi in her honour[3].

The work will first present the state of the art and the author's biographical data. Second, three of the main topics recurring in the selected books will be analysed, relying on both literary texts and historical evidence.

6.2. Bio-bibliographical outlines: data and issues

Before examining the main themes and recurring strands within *Türk-Rus Münasebetleri ve Muharebeleri* (Turkish-Russian Relations and Battles) and *Millî Kültür Mes'eleleri ve Maârif Dâvâmız* (The National Culture Issues' and our Education Cause), it is essential to provide necessary background information on Ayverdi's biography to understand her family and cultural milieu. Additionally, it is necessary to outline the state of research on Ayverdi as both a writer and intellectual. The primary issue with the literature on Samiha Ayverdi is that it mainly comprises biographical information and overviews of her main works without giving adequate consideration to her historical background and political views. Publications related to Ayverdi can be divided into two broad categories.

In the first one, one finds both significant works[4], which provide detailed biographical accounts, specific references to the author's primary sources, historical and ideological contextualization, and critical approaches to her production. The brief section devoted to Ayverdi in Yavuz[5] is particularly significant, as it places this figure in a chapter devoted to relevant intellectuals in the context of studies of neo-Ottomanism and the resulting nostalgia for the past.

On the other hand, the second group is made up of works that do not provide an in-depth analysis of her thought and works[6], along

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[2]   Aytürk, Mignon 2013, p. 58.

[3]   https://samihaayverdi.meb.k12.tr/

[4]   See Köse 2009; Aytürk, Mignon 2013; and Mignon 2017.

[5]   Yavuz 2020.

[6]   Such as the published dissertations of Kaner 1998; Kırzıoğlu 1990, Yetiş 1993; Müderrisoğlu 2014.

with literature authored and published by individuals who had the chance to meet or collaborate with her[7].

These works provide evidence both of Ayverdi's life and of the story that is told about her in particular circles. Indeed, the early years of her life are marked by a series of events that represent a clear moment of rupture and transition from the Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey:

> Since the author lived from 1905 to 1993, she experienced the Sultan Hamid II, the Second Constitutional Monarchy, the Union and Progress, the Balkan War, the First World War, the War of Independence and the Republic. At the tender age of three, she began to witness the pain of the collapse of the Empire[8].

With this depiction, Ayverdi is immediately associated with traumatic events that deeply affected her family and herself for the rest of her life, shaping her thinking and her worldview.

Samiha Ayverdi was born to a prosperous family in 1905 in Istanbul's Şehzadebaşı district. Her father, İsmail Hakkı Bey[9], was a member of the Ottoman army, and İbrahim Efendi, her maternal uncle, served as the president of *Meclis-i Maliye*, which corresponds to today's income office, during the reign of Abdülhamid II[10].

In the early 1920s, Ayverdi began attending the circle of Ken'an Rıfai, the *shaykh* of the lodge *Altay Ümm-i Ken'an Dergahı*, opened in 1908 to spread and perpetuate the doctrine and teachings of the *Rifaiyye* order in Turkey[11]. Upon Rıfai's death in 1950, Ayverdi, although not officially appointed *mürşid*, emerged as the de facto leader of the order[12].

Among the most interesting aspects of her life, it is worth mentioning her involvement in the official reintroduction of the *Şeb-i Arûs* (The Wedding Night) in Konya, a ceremony held every year in honour of Rumi's death[13]. Meanwhile, in the early 50s, Ayverdi and her brother

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[7]   See Deliorman 2004; Yüksel, Uluant 2005; Ergiydiren 2009; and Uluant 2022.

[8]   Yüksel, Uluant 2005, p. 16

[9]   Uluant 2022, p. 533.

[10] Ibid, p. 537. It was the uncle after whom *İbrahim Efendi Konağı* was named, a memoir-style novel written in 1964 that brought her to fame. The novel contains vivid descriptions of a now-vanished Istanbul, experienced through the eyes of her wealthy Ottoman family.

[11] See Aytürk 2019.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Deliorman 2004, p. 190; Ergiydiren 2009, p. 139, p. 252; pp. 266-267.

Ekrem Hakkı were involved in the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul[14]. Also, she is recognised as one of the key founders of *Türk Ev Kadınları Derneği* (The Association of Turkish Housewives)[15], established in Ankara, and of *Kubbealtı Dil Akademisi* (The Kubbealtı Language Academy), nowadays known as *Kubbealtı Cemiyeti* (The Kubbealtı Society)[16].

The epithets used to describe her (that is "Vatan Ana" [Mother of the Homeland], "Mistik bir Kadın Yazar" [A Mystical Woman Writer], "Millî Hafıza" [National Memory], "Son Osmanlı" [The last Ottoman])[17], point out the celebratory tone, in which these works were written and highlight the fact that she is still highly regarded.

Thus, within this second group of sources, the most highlighted aspects of Ayverdi's personality include her family history as a witness to the lost Ottoman past and the significance of her being a Sufi and *mutasavvıf* (mystic), with faith as a constant factor in her worldview.

In general, scholars who wrote about Ayverdi's ideological views and works frame her as a Turkish conservative deeply influenced by Islamic mysticism. Indeed, Yavuz emphasizes that "for her, the crucial difference was *tasavvuf*, or Islamic mysticism [...]"[18], since for her Islam aligned not only with personal faith but also with her value system, in which it can be traced the reflection of restorative nostalgia, or the longing to reconstruct one's own personal past[19]. Despite acknowledging Ayverdi's involvement in various fields of society and events, Aytürk and Mignon focused on the most peculiar aspects of her thought,

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[14]   Deliorman 2004, p. 98; Yüksel, Uluant 2005, p. 27. Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi (Istanbul, 1899 – Istanbul, 1984), Samiha Ayverdi's older brother was an eminent expert on the history of Ottoman architecture. His career ranged from literary works to major restoration projects. He was also one of the founders of *İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti* (Istanbul Conquest Society) in 1950. For further information, see Binark 1999; Yüksel 1995.

[15]   Deliorman 2004, p. 202-203; Ergiydiren 2009, p. 342. Even though it does not fit this second category, see Neuebauer's PhD dissertation, since it is a proof of the interest in Ayverdi's Sufism and the intellectual legacy of her and Kenan Rifai in Cemalnur Sargut's contemporary role as *mürşid*, spiritual leader, in TÜRKKAD (namely, *Türk Ev Kadınları Derneği*, whose name changed in 1970 into *Türk Kadınları Kültür Derneği* [The Cultural Association of Turkish Women]).

[16]   A foundation in which lectures are held and literature on Sufism, the Ottoman language and re-editions of the works of Ayverdi and her disciples are published.

[17]   Yüksel, Uluant 2005, p. 32.

[18]   Yavuz 2020, p. 96.

[19]   Ibid., p. 85.

activism and literary production. Hybridity[20] is identified as the principal characteristic of her work and an explanation of its inherent contradictions. Because of her upbringing in a troubled historical context, certain elements of her personality reflect a dual trajectory: Islamism and the legacy of the kemalist era, modernity and tradition, which definitively impacted her education and thought. Instead, Köse and Azak[21] aimed to provide a general overview of the author, focusing on the themes she dealt with most in various venues and her positioning within conservatism[22].

Both scholars agree to describe her as "classical" conservative. As to Köse, she is depicted as a conservative woman, and the focus is on her views on women in society and the family: the scholar defines Ayverdi both as an intellectual and an activist because of her strong beliefs and focuses on her ideal of society and the world.

As this study aims to show, it would be more appropriate to classify her not under "classical" conservatism, but under "national conservatism", of which Taşkın's definition seems more appropriate for Ayverdi[23]. Taşkın highlights two key distinctions between the attitudes of national conservative and classical conservative intellectuals towards the role of the intellectual under kemalism[24].

First, it should be noted that national conservative intellectuals sought to acquire the "legislative" authority they would have had under kemalist rule. Second, this attitude sets them apart from traditional conservatives, in that they aspire to be dynamic agents and contributors to society.

To use the theatre metaphor, Samiha Ayverdi never played a backstage role: although she never entered politics or reached a large audience – as a pure politician would – she spent all her life fighting for her ideas and worked in all arenas that would allow her and her colleagues to speak up and be heard.

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[20]   Aytürk, Mignon 2013, p. 61.

[21]   Köse 2009; Azak 2006.

[22]   Azak 2006. It must be cited Karpat 1959, p. 291, in which Ayverdi is mentioned in a footnote, where she is categorised within the broad category of modern islamists.

[23]   Taşkın 2019.

[24]   Ibid., p. 43.

6.3. Overview of Ayverdi's works

Having identified Ayverdi as a non-traditional conservative, it is necessary to examine some of the most significant aspects of her literary works, since they testify to her social networks, the places she visited inside and outside Turkey, and the different media she used to reach different audiences. It must be emphasised that providing an exhaustive list of both the main themes and the entirety of the author's oeuvre would require a separate paper. Therefore, it will be furnished a general insight into her work.

Her literary activities can be distinguished into two main periods. The first, starting with the release of her debut novel, *Aşk Bu İmiş* (So This is Love, 1937), is characterised by a series of works with a mostly spiritual focus. In contrast, the second period features a diverse range of prose works that can be assigned to different literary genres. Among the memoirs, the most important one is the aforementioned *İbrâhim Efendi Konağı* (1964); among the biographies, there are *Ken'an Rıfai ve Yirminci Asrın Işığında Müslümanlık* (Ken'an Rifai and Islam in the Light of the Twentieth Century, 1951), written with Safiye Erol, Nezihe Araz and Sofi Huri, also three disciples of Rifai, and *Edebi ve Manevi Dünyası İçinde Fatih* (Mehmet the Conqueror in his Literary and Spiritual World, 1953).

In the late 1960s and the 1980s, she visited several European countries including France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. On those occasions, she published a collection of travel notes titled *Yeryüzünde Birkaç Adım* (Some Footsteps on Earth, 1984), which was followed by the Boğaziçi Başarı Ödülü (Bosphorus Success Award) award in 1985[25]. In 1978, she had also received the *Türkiye Millî Kültür Vakfı Armağanı* (The Turkish National Culture Association's Prize) for her efforts in promoting Turkish national culture[26]. In 1984, she was awarded Türk *Millî Kültürüne Hizmet Şeref Armağanı* (Honorary Award for Service to Turkish National Culture) by the same organization[27].

Her historical works include *Boğaz İçinde Tarih* (History in the Bosphorus, 1966), *Türk-Rus Münâsebetleri ve Muhârebeleri* (1970), *Türk Tarihinde Osmanlı Asırları* (The Ottoman Centuries in Turkish History, 1975), and *Türkiye'nin Ermeni Meselesi* (Turkey's Armenian Problem, 1976).

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[25]   Yüksel, Uluant 2005, p. 32.

[26]   Ibid.

[27]   Ibid.

The posthumous *O da bana kalsın: röportajlar, anketler* (I'll keep it for myself: reportages, surveys, 2013) is especially noteworthy as it encompasses interviews and articles from various Turkish journals of the last century, such as "Yeni İstanbul" (New Istanbul), "Türk Edebiyâtı" (Turkish Literature), "Tercüman" (The Translator) and "Yeni Asır" (The New Century).

Ayverdi's *Mektuplar* (Letters) testify to her significant contacts with some prominent personalities of her time, such as Annemarie Schimmel[28], Ahmet Kabaklı[29], Bahadır Dülger, deputy of the Democratic Party, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek[30], Nihad Sâmi Banarlı[31], and İbrâhim Kafesoğlu[32].

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[28]   Annemarie Schimmel (Erfurt, 1922 – Bonn, 2003) has been a German Orientalist Professor at Harvard University, who visited many countries, including Turkey, for her teaching and scholarly interests. Among the publications and the documents that better contribute to testify Schimmel's intense relationship with Samiha Ayverdi and her interest in Sufism it is worthy to mention: *İstanbullu bir Abide Yazar. Samiha Ayverdi*, in "Ankara Ticaret Odası", 1974, pp. 17-30 – which is the translation of the German publication *Samiha Ayverdi, eine Istanbuler Schriftstellerin*, in Hoenerbach, Wilhelm, ed. "Festschrift fur Otto Spies". Wiesbaden, 1967; *Women in mystical Islam*, in "Women's Studies International Forum", Volume 5, Issue 2, 1982, pp. 145-151; and books such as *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, The University of Carolina Press, 1975 and *My Soul is a Woman. The Feminine in Islam*, Continuum, New York, 1997.

[29]   Ahmet Kabaklı (Harput, 1924 – Istanbul, 2001) was a Turkish intellectual who wrote prolifically throughout his life: his output includes poetry, Turkish literature and novels, in addition to a column "Gün Işığında" (In Daylight) in the newspaper *Tercüman*, for which he has worked from 1956 to 1986.

[30]   Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (Istanbul, 1904 – Istanbul, 1983) was a Turkish intellectual whose career in the literary world dates back to the 1920s. His journalistic activity, although varied, was mainly marked by the editorship of the weekly magazine "Büyük Doğu" (The Great East), which was closed and reopened several times over the decades. Kısakürek, strongly influenced by Sufism, was a representative voice of nationalist and conservative thought.

[31]   Nihad Sâmi Banarlı (Istanbul, 1907 – Istanbul, 1974) was a Turkish intellectual, specialist in Turkish literature and author of *Resimli Türk Edebiyâtı Târihi* (Illustrated History of Turkish Literature), Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Istanbul, 1983; member of the *İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti* (Istanbul Conquest Society) and director of "Kubbealtı Akademi Mecmuası" (Kubbealtı Academy Journal).

[32]   İbrâhim Kafesoğlu (Telfenni, 1914 – Istanbul, 1984) was a university professor of history, a member of the advisory board at the Undersecretariat for Culture and the Ministry of Culture, and also one of the appointees of the Thousand Fundamental Works' committee. He was co-founder and president of *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Intellectuals' Hearth), as well as central in the formulation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.

6.4. Introducing *Türk-Rus Münasebetleri ve Muharebeleri* and *Millî Kültür Mes'eleleri* ve *Maârif Dâvâmız*

As previously stated, the examination of these two selected works is based on the assumption that Samiha Ayverdi is considered a nationalist conservative because of her extensive career and assertive effort to write and promote her ideas.

Türk-Rus Münasebetleri ve Muharebeleri, published in 1970, consists of two sections. The first part provides a comprehensive overview of communism from various perspectives, while the second exclusively focuses on the historical connections between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. By asserting in the preface that "The main objective of this Muscovite imperialism [...] is to eliminate the Turks and Turkishness from the world map through political and ideological means," the writer refers to a context that includes not only communism in itself, but, more widely, Russian imperialism. Ayverdi's purpose was not merely to enlist historical events, but rather to explain how Russia had tried to accomplish its goals throughout history. These events serve as examples that support this claim. To underline this position, she quotes a motto that Russian schoolchildren are said to learn: "Just as a child cannot be without its mother, so Russia cannot be without Çanakkale!"[33]

The second main source, *Millî Kültür Mes'eleleri ve Maârif Dâvâmız*, differs from previous works in one immediate respect. The book was prefaced by Rıfkı Danişman, the Minister of Culture, from 1975 to 1977 during the fifth Demirel government. In the preface, reference is made to the current *Bin Temel Eserler* (Thousand Fundamental Works) project: a collection of works aimed at restoring a true national culture in Turkey based on the nation's material and spiritual values rooted in its past. The project's goal of protecting Turkish youth from negative influences was self-evident[34]. The book's structure offers a comprehensive overview of Ayverdi's prolific writing and the intended audience. Consisting of fifty-three contributions written in different years, it is divided into five sections, featuring lectures delivered by Ayverdi at *Türk Ev Kadınları Derneği*, *İstanbul Fethi Cemiyeti*, and Darüşşafaka Highschool[35]. Due to

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[33] Ayverdi 1970, p. VII.

[34] Keyder 2020, p. 20 offers an interesting remark about the increased attention paid by all political wings to young people as listeners and key players, especially after the tensions of the 1968 student revolts.

[35] As the footnotes in Ayverdi 1976 indicate at p. 152, 175, 261, 366.

the extensive nature of both works and the wide range of content in the latter, this paper will only focus on the most coherent sections in the analysis of Ayverdi's nationalist conservative thoughts during the Cold War.

As previously mentioned, these two books revolve around anti-communism, which is used as a driving force in both works, covering diverse topics, such as family, education, historical accounts of the past and present, social structure, morality, and Islam. This extensive adoption of socialism as a leading theme across various sectors of social life may be related to widespread hysteria, a collective phobia that has affected Turkey since the beginning of the changing global order due to its precarious geopolitical position.

The shared border with communist Bulgaria and, in particular, its proximity to the Dardanelles, evoked a number of facts preceding the creation of the two world blocs, still vivid in collective memory. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 resulted in the loss of Rumelia, which was an essential region of the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, kemalist rhetoric focused on the significance of Thrace as a gateway to Anatolia, further entrenching its importance in the minds of people[36]. The defence of territory is a central concept in Turkish nationalist discourse, where the correlation between place and ethnicity is considered an inseparable bond of belonging between places and people[37]. It is not surprising that a strong and deep-rooted concept of territoriality influenced the fear of the Soviet neighbour.

6.5. Main themes

6.5.1. Education as a tool against communism

As Ayverdi states in the section on the Turkish army, present-day Turkey is afflicted by "[…]: communism, Zionism[38], lack of knowledge, and as a result, corruption of faith and a crisis of morality"[39]. The issue of education in Ayverdi is critical and closely related to communism, addressing the most troubling aspects in Turkey: specifically, the deficiency of sufficient education renders individuals vulnerable and unable to

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[36]   Çağaptay 2006, pp. 140-141.

[37]   Özkan 2012, p. 103.

[38]   See also Bora, Gültekingil 2009.

[39]   Ayverdi 1976, p. 52.

protect themselves against both internal and external enemies, such as the Soviet Union and the fringes of the state that do not effectively support Turkish national culture. Karpat noted that since the second half of the 1940s, the political debate surrounding Islam has intensified, following the reduction of religion to the private sphere and its complete regulation under the aegis of the state during the kemalist era. One of the most popular viewpoints during this period was a circle of intellectuals who regarded religion as a spiritual need for individuals and as an educational institution since they experienced nostalgia for past ethical and moral values and society[40]. In Ayverdi, the education provided to young people is intimately tied to a deficiency in faith and morality, with communism described through the recurring metaphor of disease[41]:

> Societies like people, nations like societies, and the whole world experience periods of health and illness. Communism, which can be defined as a primitive dictatorship, a contravention of natural laws, and the moral and spiritual foundation of humanity, is a mass psychosis, a disease of society. Every parent dreads their child falling ill, but unfortunately, this happens from time to time. […] (As Turks), we must ensure our children are vaccinated to immunize them against the communist disease[42]. This vaccine is possible by making (children) aware of the national structure with a real language, history, and faith, and by awakening the national and heroic enthusiasm whose roots we have planted[43].

In her view of the education issue in Turkey, Ayverdi adopts a clear standpoint: while the Soviet Union, whose methods are questionable, succeeded in inculcating its national values in young minds, the great Western powers over the centuries have never abandoned their cultural and linguistic foundations. On the contrary, Turkey has lost its connection with its founding values. It is not surprising that the author views Russia's education system positively; considering the country's proficiency in infiltrating and corrupting societies, the methods employed must have been equally efficacious. It is noteworthy to recognize the perception of Western superiority in maintaining its culture. For instance, the UK would not relinquish Shakespeare to subjugate

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[40]   Karpat 1959, p. 273.

[41]   Ayverdi 1970, p. 3.

[42]   See Öztan 2020 for a detailed description of Moscow's representation in the Turkish right-wing ideology.

[43]   Ayverdi 1976, p. 19.

India, whereas Turkey has forsaken its history and directed its focus towards dubious modern personalities, such as Atatürk[44]. The West being presented as a standard of excellence is noteworthy, as it is a common theme in Ayverdi's work and in the nationalist conservative discourse that portrays the West – to a great extent – as innately tainted and detrimental. At the same time, the inclusion of Mustafa Kemal among the figures "inexplicably" revered above others is an obvious criticism of contemporary Turkey and the era in which Ayverdi was raised.

The author's opinion of kemalism is not surprising, since the reforms of the republican era sharply and abruptly eroded the status quo, that is, the fundamental elements of Turkish society. Language reform, dress code implementation, abolishment of the sultanate and caliphate, and closure of Sufi lodges were fundamental changes in the newly established Republic of Turkey. They aimed to reduce the influence of religion and its regulation under the aegis of the state to the private sphere of each individual and to confirm that the role of Islam – the founding element of the Turkish-Ottoman national identity – was not compatible with the kemalist project[45]. The *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* (The Law on Unification of Education), which was approved in 1924 and had a lasting impact, resulted in the closure of *madrasas* and the removal of religious education from primary and secondary schools. Consequently, a crucial component of Turkish national identity was eradicated from the education system[46].

In the construction of Turkish identity, Islam was at odds with Mustafa Kemal's vision, as it was strongly influenced by the West and secularism. Despite religion representing a cultural marker of the nation, alongside language, history, and territory, the republican project did not give equal consideration to other factors that make up Turkish identity[47]. During the last years of the Ottoman Empire, Islam served as a psychological shield and a source of legitimacy, aiding in the transition of the community into a new unity of organization, the nation and state based on territory[48].

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[44]   Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[45]   Çağaptay 2006, p. 39.

[46]   Kaplan 1999, pp. 159-160.

[47]   Sakallıoğlu 1996, pp. 234-235.

[48]   Karpat 2001, p. 416.

Understanding the fundamental role of Islam in the construction of the identity system before and after single-party rule can contribute to unravelling the assumption that we tend to see a juxtaposition between religion and modernity/secularism promoted by Mustafa Kemal. Indeed, emphasizing its historical and cultural aspects allows us to understand the degree of complexity of the role of religion in Turkey. For nationalist conservatives such as Ayverdi, the removal of one of the pivotal aspects of Turkish identity necessitated the inclusion of nationalism as a central doctrine to safeguard themselves against ideological dissonance with their principles.

As we have observed, although Ayverdi's positions do not conform to the ideology promoted during the republican era, it is noteworthy that there is a certain similarity in the conception of education. The author regards schooling as the primary means to defend the Turkish nation against foreign adversaries, similar to how kemalism, albeit with different assumptions, had a militarily oriented approach to the role of schools. Mustafa Kemal had repeatedly expressed the idea that the education system should reflect Turkish values, without placing emphasis on the internationalization of school content. While integrating useful elements into the school curriculum, the main priority should always be to preserve the spirit of the nation and to make it organic.

Additionally, education was imbued with a distinctly "military" ethos, whereby schools and educators were expected to impart national values, with the ultimate aim of constructing a defensive army capable of withstanding external threats[49]. Attributing an almost militaristic significance to education is consistent with the emphasis placed on territory and territoriality in the construction of Turkish nationalism, as well as the affirmation of a solid cultural and national identity of an imperial heritage that made Turkey superior to other national entities and, therefore, subject to invasion from outside. Indeed, it is not coincidental that Ayverdi, along with the authors of her generation, who shared the same intellectual foundations, unconsciously legitimated the discourses of Turkish nationalism structured by Atatürk, since they themselves were "products" of the same rhetoric.

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[49] For a detailed account of the history of education and its utilization, see Copeaux 1997.

6.5.2. Education programme within the Turkish army

The issue of education in *Millî Kültür Mes'eleleri ve Maârif Dâvâmız* prompts the consideration of the role of schooling in the Turkish army. It is also important to highlight the criticisms and proposals for improving military education: to review and evaluate the academic writings submitted by students, ensure they align with both national and religious principles[50], and to pay greater attention to the content of the media, including theatre, television, and cinema, since they can frequently carry covert messages from foreign imperial powers[51]. In addition to focusing on educational reforms, it is worth exploring why the army, as opposed to other sectors, is the focus of attention. In Ayverdi's words,

> The military's duty is to represent the nation. Therefore, this serves as a reflection of the nation. Since external adversaries have pursued a policy of dismantling, the Turkish army should act as an antidote, using its historical prestige and bravery, against the poison of such deliberate and anarchic[52] provocations[53].

Although not featured in the analysed books, Ayverdi's letters provide additional evidence of her concern about the state of military education. In fact, the aforementioned letter provides clear evidence of Ayverdi's apprehension about the impact of foreign languages and ideology in military academies. This is due to the significant presence of English, which had replaced Turkish as the dominant language, as well as the cultural imperialism of Europe, America, and Zionism in syllabuses[54]. Some of the extracts from letters are not only intriguing because of their content but also because they demonstrate Ayverdi's network of contacts.

In addition, they reveal the extent to which the army and its condition affected her over a considerable number of years. Among the recipients of these letters are individuals with connections to the Turkish

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[50] Ayverdi 1976, p. 54.

[51] Ibid., p. 55.

[52] In this context, *anarşi* was usually used to refer to leftist ideological views. See Kenar, Gürpinar 2013, p. 27.

[53] Ibid., p. 56.

[54] Ayverdi 2012, p. 11.

military and education, including figures such as Alparslan Türkeş[55], Abdullah Nişancı[56], Orhan Kilercioğlu[57], Ali Naili Erdem[58].

The significance Ayverdi gave to the military can be explained by historical and ideological reasons that were particularly relevant during the Cold War decades. Primarily, the Turkish Army's role was to safeguard the country's status quo against communism, which inherently undermined the established rules of the economy and society. The role of the army as the "custodian" of national identity requires examination and justification, particularly from 27 May 1960, when the first military coup took place in Turkey to restore the foundations of kemalism, followed by the adoption of a more liberal constitution in 1961: within this, the very function of the army was politicised through the establishment of the *Millî Güvenlik Kurulu* (National Security Council)[59]. As noted by White, the army had acted as a "guarantor and protector" of the Turkish Republic's unity since its establishment[60]. The 1960 coup confirmed the military's organizational abilities, resulting in increased militarization in the country, as well as a period of heightened openness, liberalization, and radicalisation of political discourse. The democratisation of political debate, along with the ongoing industrial and capitalist modernisation that had been taking place since the late 1940s in Turkey, resulted in the restoration of order by the military in 1960[61]: a series of sudden changes that led nationalist conservatives to instrumentally use communism as a means to voice their fears and concerns about the dismantling of the national order[62].

During the 1950s, Turkey approached the Western bloc, participated in the Truman Doctrine, joined NATO, and received Marshall Plan funds. The introduction of the multi-party system, the expansion of the market and political debate increased the Turkish perception of belonging to the

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[55]   He had been involved as colonel in the 1960 coup. He became leader of the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party). Ayverdi 2018; Ergiydiren 2009, p. 246-259 are evidence of Ayverdi's support to the MHP.

[56]   Under Secretary of State at the Department of Education from 1979 to 1980, under Demirel's government.

[57]   Planning officer at the General Staff Operations Directorate from 1972 to 1978.

[58]   Minister of the Education from 1975 to 1977 under Demirel's government.

[59]   Zürcher 2007, pp. 293-294.

[60]   White 2020, p.312.

[61]   Eroğul 1987, pp. 101-143.

[62]   Bora 1998, p. 68.

Hür Dünya[63], the Free World, of which the great Western powers were part. At the same time, however, the affirmation of the capitalist system and rapid industrialisation had already compromised public opinion regarding the relationship with America: international events such as the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkish territory during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962-1963, and President Johnson's letter of 1964 asking Turkey not to intervene in the Cyprus issue[64], contributed to a strong anti-American sentiment within the country[65].

The recurring themes of Ayverdi's writings are the sudden changes in political, economic, and social spheres, the army's increased significance, and the prevailing anti-American – and in general, anti-imperialist – sentiment. These topics demonstrate the importance of contextualising literary works and their historical and ideological assumptions.

As noted in the previous letter to Abdullah Nişancı, in which the author observes that military academies have taken on a "college-like" character[66], the use of Turkish in military education emerges as another foundational theme, precisely because it is one of the pillars of national identity: the author openly criticise the wide use of English in military schools.

In this respect, Hasan Ali Yücel and İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, exponents of republican reforms in the field of education, are being attacked for the decadence of Turkish language. Yücel is specifically condemned for fuelling left-wing propaganda in the publishing industry and in school curricula[67]; neither of them is immune to controversy, being accused of founding the *Köy Enstitüleri* (Village Institutes) that spread left-wing ideas, according to Ayverdi[68].

6.6. Identifying through the Ottoman Empire the historical reasons of anti-communism

Among the elements that are notable and contribute to a clearer understanding of Ayverdi's anti-communist position is her methodical

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[63]   Bora, Gültekingil 2007, p. 150; p. 156.

[64]   For further historical information see Aydın, Taşkın 2014.

[65]   Keyder 2020, p. 16.

[66]   Ayverdi 2012, p. 9.

[67]   Ayverdi 1970, pp. 25-26.

[68]   Ayverdi 1976, pp. 19-20; 23.

use of historical events dating back to the Ottoman Empire era. The author cites a past animosity between the Russians and Turks to demonstrate that the strained relations with the USSR are a continuation of centuries of battles and disputed territories. It is noteworthy that the dehumanization and disgust with which first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union are described is striking. Just as the Russian influence in schools, publishing, parties, and ideas circulating in Turkey is described using the metaphor of a disease to be eradicated, the political, social, and economic reasons behind the actions of the Russian Empire are never taken into account. In the author's eyes, all the historical data recalled appear to be the result of determinism, where Russia's natural objective is seen as invading Ottoman and Turkish territories by any means possible. The reasons behind Russia's attitude towards Turkey have not been investigated by Ayverdi, disregarding the fact that it is a political entity influenced by both domestic and international dynamics. The determinism evident in Ayverdi's work stems, among other factors, from a Manichaean outlook not just on history but on life in general. Ayverdi asserts that:

> Communism and collectivism, which represent the struggle for classlessness, are the product of a utopia that does not conform to the laws of nature. In contrast, beneath the heavens, where beauty and ugliness, good and bad, intelligence and folly coexist, the natural world is founded on class divisions[69].

It can be inferred that communism and class struggle have no place or reason to exist according to the natural order of things. The existence of such rigid categories, expressed in almost dogmatic terms, results in Russia being perceived as belonging to the sphere of "evil", which is inherently cruel and hostile towards Turkey.

Although it is not directly related to anti-communism, it is still important to highlight that in the author's works, the dichotomous worldview extends to gender and family categories. This is significant for future research and to maintain consistency with the conservative nationalist project[70]. Insofar as the family constitutes the smallest unit of society, the role of women is discussed as the creator and manager of the lives of future men in service of the nation. Women are considered

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[69]   Ayverdi 1970, p. 12.

[70]   Avcil 2022, p. 109.

to contribute to the education of boys[71]. In line with Taşkın's definition, conservatism perceives society as a living organism, wherein social hierarchies and inequalities constitute the natural order of things, and where each individual, as a member of social groups, contributes in accordance with their capabilities[72].

In accordance with the belief that the world is organised into distinct categories, the factor that sets apart the Ottoman Empire from Russia is its adherence to morality and faith in Islam. Specifically, the *zakat* (donation) serves as Ayverdi's evidence of Ottoman-Turkish supremacy[73]: "But Islamic civilization did not classify people into different classes with insurmountable differences as in the West. The owner of capital, through the institution of the *zakat* obligation, helped create a middle class"[74]. In Islam, not only do classes exist, but there is room for improvement for each of them, through the sharing in the community by all individuals belonging to each social stratum. Associating one of the pillars of Islam with a means of inclusion within a community network makes it clear that religion was not regarded merely as a matter of faith, but rather as a set of universal cultural traditions, a worldview and a mentality, products of a historical process[75].

While Russians are described as colonizers who destroyed the national and cultural identities of the peoples[76], the Ottoman Turks, by virtue of the tolerance with which they treated other communities, are not to be considered as the privileged ethnic component, but rather only as the most numerous and relevant one[77]: an understanding of this is highlighted by the preferential treatment that Christians received during the Tanzimat era[78] and by the existence of nationalist movements, particularly the Slavic ones[79], which culminated in the final dismemberment of the Empire after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.

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[71] Ayverdi 1976, pp. 290-299.

[72] Taşkın 2014, pp. 114-115.

[73] The *zakat* is one of the five pillars of Islam, along with the profession of faith, the prayer, fasting, the pilgrimage.

[74] Ayverdi 1970, p. 9.

[75] Ocak 2003, p. 187.

[76] Ayverdi 1976, pp.163-169; Ayverdi 1970, p. IX.

[77] Ağaoğulları 1987, p. 1.

[78] Atasoy 2005, p. 26.

[79] Ayverdi 1970, p. 57.

As previously mentioned, Ayverdi's entire oeuvre revolves around the Ottoman past, its resurgence, and the nostalgia associated with it. One of the recurring themes in her works is the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire as a tolerant and benevolent power towards the conquered people[80]: it always respected the culture, language, and religion of the subjugated communities. In contrast, Russia is depicted as a tyrannical power[81].

Historiography typically views the establishment of multipartyism as a moment when the revival of the Ottoman past was possible, both in the media and in political debate. At the same time, it is considered that the recovery and rehabilitation of the past actually resulted from a process that had been ongoing since the early years of the Turkish Republic's birth. This process was then consolidated over time until it eventually culminated in 1953, the year in which the 500th anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul was celebrated. Danforth highlights the degree to which the kemalist aversion to the Ottoman past was actually due to the historical and political contingency of the founding of the Turkish Republic: it was necessary to purge the surviving Ottoman ruling class in order to establish the new ruling elite once as a permanent force[82]. In truth, the debate about the Ottoman world was already present and alive within both the republican and democratic elites. The resurrection of the past not only aided in shaping the identities of heroes and traitors in Turkey[83], but also provided the nation with a new identity, tolerant and with an imperial heritage, with which to fit into the "new" post-war free world[84].

6.7. Conclusions

By offering a historical contextualization of Ayverdi's writings, this essay showed how her work provides interesting insights into the debate on Turkey during the Cold War and, more generally, into the nationalist conservatism to which she referred, in order to understand its ideological assumptions and different trajectories. As previously

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[80]   Ayverdi 1970.

[81]   Ibid., p. 33.

[82]   Danforth 2021, pp. 99-101.

[83]   Bertuccelli 2021, p. 106.

[84]   Danforth 2021, pp. 118-121.

demonstrated, the author's approach is nostalgic yet vehemently combative. Her desire to reform the school system reflects an active stance that seeks to improve the present rather than restore the past. This approach is evident in her extensive and varied use of modern media to promote a more progressive vision that aligns with her ideology. Although Islam holds significant importance in Ayverdi, it is not solely a matter of faith but rather a defining aspect of both Ottoman-Turkish identity and a set of universal values associated with the Ottoman Empire and contemporary Turkey. The examination of various perspectives and schools of thought in the context of the current global order highlights how an exploration of the Cold War from diverse viewpoints can aid in comprehending contemporary Turkey, as well as contributing to the reconstruction of multifaceted identity issues.

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EDUCATION AND MEDIA

7. Living with the bomb: risk and catastrophe in Turkish Cold War culture[1]

Pınar Batur, John M. VanderLippe

When the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki they also exploded in human minds, leading to a decisive break in frames of reference. The bombs, and their destructive power, shaped the Cold War, while the explosions and the destruction of two cities altered conceptualizations of international conflict, military violence and global war. The threat of instant and total destruction by the bomb transformed understanding of "rational society," science and technology, and it affected the terms of individual and mass participation in political and economic decision making. The age of nuclear risk enabled a new perception of precaution, and contributed to the establishment of alternative hierarchies of power. We produce risk as risk produces our social and political hierarchies. And policies lead to alternative futures. In one of these alternative nuclear futures, the bomb ended the possibility for world peace and led to a new Cold War. With global militarization, an arms race, and consequent economic realignment, it started a new age of catastrophe. Due to radioactivity in the production, utilization, and even maintenance of nuclear weapons, this industry and its related risks marked a point of no return. We, and our future, were to be locked into a "nuclear cage"[2].

The central aim of our study is to step out of the confines of the classical geo-political, international relations approach to explore debates to study the impact of the creation, use and proliferation of nuclear

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[2] Kurtz 1988.

weapons and related risks on Turkey, a country that was neutral during World War II, but central to the Cold War. To explore this issue, we focus on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the "13 Days of October". We are interested in the Turkish debate regarding Turkey's place in the crisis. During that period, American Jupiter missiles which had recently been installed at a Turkish base as a NATO defense strategy, were removed after US President John Kennedy agreed secretly with Nikita Khrushchev to exchange them for the Soviet missiles in Cuba. In the Turkish media, the Cuban Missile Crisis became the focus of a debate about the loss of Turkish independence and autonomy, as related events shaped the construction of risk, its iconography, and the Cold War generated "culture of catastrophe".

We have three interrelated observations and questions:

1. Risk is not knowing the risk. How were the risk of the Cuban Missile crisis, the Jupiter missiles and the possibility of nuclear annihilation – a multiple and compounded set of risks – presented by Turkish leaders, and examined in the Turkish media?

2. Risks are judged according to another set of presumed risks. How have the media and intellectuals utilized icons and metaphors in popularizing the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Jupiter missiles and the possibility of nuclear annihilation, which affected Turkish politics and society during the Cold War?

3. Finally, knowing, not knowing and willful ignorance of a complex set of risks become a part of everyday life, the building blocks of a "culture of catastrophe." How has the construction of risk and its iconography established a "culture of catastrophe," which has an imprint on Turkish culture even today as a "calculable incalculable uncertainty"?

7.1. Risk and the construction of catastrophe

A "culture of catastrophe" reflects our understanding of world, risk, and everyday life in "rational society," which is in denial of incalculable uncertainty. Ulrich Beck explores construction of risk, especially focusing on human-made, collectively imposed, and individually unavoidable threats[3]. He describes risk as an anticipation of catastrophe. But risks are more than anticipation of catastrophe. Risks

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[3]   Beck 2009, p. 293.

embody anticipation of incalculable uncertainty, making the greatest risk to be not knowing the risk. Therefore, risk exists, but when it is acknowledged its complexity alters, adding to its uncertainty. It forces rational societies to live in a modernity shaped by the "irrational and arbitrary" in anticipation of any future possibility. Turkey exited from World War II under the real, but also unreal, treat of Soviet invasion. In 1945, a victorious Soviet Union demanded concessions from Turkey for what they construed as its failure to fully support the Allied cause in the war. The Soviets demanded that Turkey concede two provinces in northeast Anatolia, which had been occupied by Russia after the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War; and the Soviets demanded a change in the 1936 Montreux Convention, which gave Turkey unilateral control over the Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits. Turkish control of the Straits meant that Soviet military ships could not sail freely from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, and then Soviet leader Josef Stalin demanded that the Turks accept bi-lateral control of the Straits, with Soviet troops stationed at a base on the Bosporus. In Turkish perceptions of international relations, the Soviets thus represented the danger of loss of autonomy, even independence[4].

In his essay on *Living in the world risk society*[5], Beck emphasizes that risks exist in a permanent state of "virtuality," so when they become "real," they also become catastrophes. In this context, risks are cultural constructs, and they are permanent and powerful forces which influence a way of seeing, debating, and expecting the future possibilities. When they become a catastrophe, they produce a future of multiple risks. Therefore, "without techniques of visualization, without symbolic forms, without mass media, risks are nothing at all"[6]. We cannot act, we cannot mitigate risk, unless we see and anticipate it, visualize it, because its longevity relies on how the knowledge of risk has been transferred and how the knowledge has been attached to the popular models and the collective imagination. Risks exist in the future, but their acceptance and their framing are rooted in cultural patterns, emerged out of past catastrophes.

Turkish collective anxiety about the Soviets' intentions on the Bosporus, found an icon in the Jupiter missiles and the Cuban Missile Cri-

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[4]   Gönlübol, Ulman 1993, pp. 191-199.

[5]   Beck 2006, p. 329.

[6]   Beck 2009, p. 291.

sis. The Cuban Missile Crisis involved not only Soviet missiles being installed in Cuba, ninety miles away from Florida, but also American missiles that had already been installed in Turkey, which bordered the Soviet Union. American Jupiter missiles were liquid-fueled IRBMs (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles), which were already obsolete surplus that the Americans had replaced in their own arsenal. They were known to be inaccurate, and unreliable, and since they had to be fueled and targeted before launching, they were suitable only for a first-strike attack – not for a retaliatory strike in the event of a Soviet attack. Because they were offensive, not defensive, weapons, the Soviets saw them as a provocation, and one of Khrushchev's first demands during the crisis in October 1962 was their removal from a newly constructed base outside İzmir, on the Aegean Sea[7].

In an editorial in "Yön" (Direction), a leftist journal of the sixties, Doğan Avcıoğlu, a Turkish newspaperman, author and left-of-centre politician, viewed the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles as proof that they had been stationed in Turkey not for their military purpose, but for their symbolism[8]. For Turkish military planners and politicians, the missiles were icons for American support, the NATO alliance, and regional significance. The missiles, and their nuclear warheads, meant strength, modernity, and importance in the international arena. In Turkish media, at the beginning, having American missiles meant that Turkey was a powerful, modern, developing country, a close ally of the West, that deserved respect in the region, in the bi-polar world, and internationally. They also represented the possibility of striking a devastating blow against the Russians, longstanding enemies of the Turks. When the installation of nuclear missiles in Turkey became a real possibility in the late 1950s, Turkish leaders were not thinking about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the horrors of nuclear war. They saw not the specter of Ankara or Istanbul lying in ashes, but the vision of a bright, new future as a valued member of NATO, which they saw as the strongest military alliance ever in the history of the world. Turkish intellectuals did not necessarily embrace this vision, instead advocating for global disarmament and world peace. The Turkish military buildup was contrary to their vision of the future – in fact, they argued that with militarization, Turkey had no future at all. A case in

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7   Seydi 2010, p. 441.

8   Avcıoğlu 1962, pp. 1-3.

point was that the Turkish military did not actually have control of the nuclear warheads sitting on top of the Jupiters[9].

The fifteen Jupiter missiles in Turkey, which became crucial to the peaceful conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis, were part of an American plan to spread nuclear-capable missiles among all of the NATO countries, that the Eisenhower administration had proposed in 1957[10]. When Dwight Eisenhower became President of the US in 1953, he called for a "New Look" defensive strategy, that would reduce spending on conventional forces, in favour of building up the relatively cheaper strategic forces, made up of bombers, submarines and missiles carrying nuclear weapons. The thinking behind the "New Look" was that it was unnecessary to spend massive amounts of money on conventional forces – tanks, artillery, bases, personnel – to deter a Soviet attack on western Europe, when having thermonuclear warheads would be a more cost-effective deterrent. The point was to prevent a war from ever starting, not to fight and win a war[11]. When the Soviets launched Sputnik, the first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in October 1957, the apparent "missile gap" meant the Soviets were capable of striking targets anywhere on the planet, while the US could only hit short or medium-range targets. The "New Look" strategy would require putting nuclear warheads on missiles in Europe, or on planes based in Europe, or on submarines which could travel undetected into waters bordering the Soviet Union or its allies.

In this virtual world of arms buildup, risk was conceptualized as war. But nuclear warheads themselves were producing anxieties about different kinds of risk, for countries such as Turkey. These new risks included being militarily colonized, and finding themselves in the middle of a war that they had no role in starting, and nothing to gain from the conflict. Therefore, media and intellectuals were worried about the "Ottomanization" of Turkey, wherein it would once again become a pawn in the chess game between superpowers. That is why disarmament, for intellectuals, meant de-Americanization of the military, creating a fracture between Turkish policy makers and intellectuals and media in terms of the construction of alternative futures for Turkey during the Cold War.

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[9]   Ibid.

[10] Bernstein 1980, p. 99.

[11] Saunders 1985, pp. 106-107.

The incalculable uncertainty of risk undermines "singular rational truth," dividing it into "hundreds of relative truths resulting from the proximity to and dismay over risk"[12]. Risk does not destroy knowledge itself, but it merges knowledge with the iconography of imagined past and future: knowing risk is also not knowing risk. Therefore, risk lies in the domain of the "unknown," and multiple risks mean multiple possible catastrophes. But as risks and catastrophes multiply in the imagination, they also lose their already shaky, credible predictive powers. An example is how Turkish policy makers could see nuclear weapons as key to strength and defense against the Soviets, while intellectuals saw nuclear weapons as a form of colonization and loss of autonomy to the Americans.

When the US proposed a plan to NATO to have nuclear-capable missiles in every NATO country, the proposal received unanimous agreement. But when it actually came down to accepting the Jupiter missiles, Italy and Turkey were the only countries to say yes[13]. From a strategic perspective, it was not a good plan, since the Jupiter missiles were more likely to provoke a Soviet first strike before they could be launched, than they were to deter Soviet military action against either country[14]. The development of new types of missiles – more accurate, and with solid fuel, made the Jupiter missiles obsolete. But rather than just destroying them, the Eisenhower administration developed a plan to put the surplus missiles in Europe, while a new generation of missiles went into production. So why did the Turkish government agree to accept 15 Jupiter missiles, and thus, 15 nuclear warheads, knowing that their potential costs seriously outweighed their potential benefits? To answer this question, we need to explore how Turkish military planners, policymakers, intellectuals, and the public viewed risk and the possibility of catastrophe, in the context of Turkey's role in the West and NATO, and Turkey's future in a nuclear world.

Following Eisenhower's original proposal to NATO, it took another two years for the Americans and Turks to agree to the terms and conditions for the transfer, set-up, ownership, control and use of the missiles, with the result that the 15 Jupiter missiles did not arrive in

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[12]   Beck 2009, p. 291.

[13]   Bernstein 1980, p. 99.

[14]   Seydi 2010, p. 433.

Turkey until both countries had new administrations[15]. The agreement was that Turkey would own the missiles, while the US would own the warheads; any decision to launch the missiles would have to be agreed to by both countries; and the missile base would be staffed by both Turkish and American personnel. Neither side considered it worthwhile to dig deep into the details of exactly how this agreement would work in an actual emergency – for example, what if the two sides viewed risk differently, and only one side decided that catastrophe could be avoided by launching the missiles? What was to prevent either Turkish or American troops on the base from trying to seize total control of the missiles[16]? Unimaginable was meeting with unknown, and the "rational" control and management of risk was making the risks more complex and unmanageable. Now 15 Jupiter missiles, albeit militarily surplus hardware, became both risk aversion and risk production.

While safety is a frame of mind, the issue of security and the assumption of the predictability of risk will be controlled by hegemonic powers, such as the state or other global organizations. Powerful organizations and institutions, such as the state, dictate the framing of risk, therefore the visual imagery of catastrophe is imposed or restricted to the society's collective imagination. Beck describes this condition as "an inescapable structural condition of advanced industrialization" which gets to be managed by policy making: risk management becomes information management[17]. If not informed, it is assumed that the risk does not exist! And the promise of security has been fulfilled. Yet, this sense of security has never been complete. One reason why these details were glossed over was that both the Americans and the Turks tended to see the missiles not from a military-strategic perspective, but rather from a political-economic perspective.

Turkish-American relations had been limited prior to World War II, and during the war the Americans let the British take the lead in dealing with Turkey. Turkey was technically allied with Britain and France, due to a 1939 tripartite agreement that Turkey would enter the war against Germany only after the British and French had supplied sufficient weaponry to prepare the Turkish military to contribute to the war effort. İsmet İnönü, Turkey's President, had to weigh the risks of

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[15] Bernstein 1980, p. 99.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Beck 2006, p. 333.

entering the war unprepared, and facing a German attack on Istanbul against the risks of remaining out of the conflict then being diplomatically isolated in the post-war world[18]. İnönü decided that the short-term risk of a German attack was greater than the long-term risk of a Soviet attack after the war in Europe ended[19].

American interest in Turkey grew tremendously after the war, for purely strategic reasons. American planners wanted to restrict Soviet access to oil in the Middle East, and they wanted to contain the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea. When the British told the Americans in 1947 that they could no longer provide financial or military support to Turkey, Harry Truman, the US President, announced a plan to provide Turkey and Greece with $400 million in financial and military aid. The Truman Doctrine changed America's role in world affairs, and committed American money and personnel to supporting Turkey as a bulwark against the threat of Soviet expansion. In the aftermath of the war, Turkish leaders agreed Turkey's future depended upon finding a way to deter the Soviets from expanding at Turkish expense, and a close alliance with the United States was the only real option in the Cold War[20].

In 1950, a new government came to power following democratic elections in Turkey. Led by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the *Demokrat Parti* government was staunchly pro-American, and Menderes pursued every possibility to strengthen the ties between Turkey and the US. Shortly after coming to office, Menderes committed Turkish troops to fight in the Korean War, a move which helped Turkey gain membership in NATO in 1952. The 1950s were the golden age of Turkish-American relations, as American military personnel, and American experts, flooded into the country, and American money built up installations like the İncirlik air base in southeast Turkey (which the US used for U-2 spy flights over the USSR), and listening posts along the Soviet border in the northeast. Turkish leaders proudly announced that Turkey was becoming "a little America"[21]. For some intellectuals, and for school children of the period, the integration of American commodities into everyday life came to be known as the age of milk powder, fish oil, and

[18]   Demirkaya 1942, pp. 184-185.

[19]   Aydemir 1979, p. 107.

[20]   McGhee 1990, p. 43.

[21]   Simpson 1965, p. 144.

surplus cheese. Turkish students were expected to consume surplus American rations in the name of the Western alliance.

Menderes and his cabinet ministers believed that a strong relationship with the United States was essential for Turkey's future. As long as the Americans saw the Soviets as a threat in eastern Europe and the Middle East, he believed the Americans would support Turkey as their strongest ally in the region. And Turkey was the strongest ally the US had in the region. Iran was a questionable partner, as the Shah was still weak even after the US had manufactured a coup to overthrow the democratically elected Mossadegh government. Israel was still heavily dependent on aid from France and Germany. And the Arab states, especially Egypt, Syria and Iraq, tended to be hostile to US interests. This meant that Turkey, located on the border with the Soviet Union, and controlling the Straits, was essential to US containment policy in the region. Safety and security merged into one in the confusion of Cold War politics and the Turkish public began to see the impossibility of achieving both.

7.2. Framing the risks: icons and metaphors of a culture of catastrophe

Framing risk is a power game. Beck points out that powerful actors have a tendency to minimize risks for themselves while the risks might be maximized for others, making the process of risk definition "a power game." "This is especially true for the world risk society where Western governments and powerful economic actors define risks for others"[22]. In the study of international relations, theorists who concentrate on interpretation of risk have a tendency to stress global conditions. Rather, the power game of "framing the risk" has always been played at the local level, according to existing cultural patterns, and by producing and reinforcing icons and metaphors. These images, whether positive or negative, influence the boundaries of rational decision-making. The uncertainty of a situation and the complexity of information can lead to a dependence on already established images to fill gaps in knowledge of the opposition. Thus, some scholars argue that in international relations, decision-makers use stereotypes for efficiency, when there are gaps in knowledge, and when the conditions

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[22]   Beck 2006, p. 333.

are complex[23]. But these images are also produced by intellectuals and the society in an attempt to counter-frame the risk, even though powerful forces deny its existence. Such was already developing in Turkey, as policy makers saw the American alliance and NATO as essential to preventing Soviet intervention, while intellectuals and media construed the American presence as colonialism, dependence and a sign of the weakening of Turkey.

The Americans responded to what they saw as a Soviet threat to vital interests in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Containment policy was based on the assumption that the most important risk facing the Americans was that countries would fall under Soviet control, or at least Soviet influence, eventually leading to communist domination of natural resources, shipping lanes, markets and materials. Thus, the Americans strived throughout the 1950s to prevent the rise of communist, or Soviet-friendly, regimes, fearing that the fall of one country would have a domino effect of causing others to topple as well. In Turkey, among policy makers and military planners, they found enthusiastic allies, willing to go to great lengths to prove their value to the US and America's Containment effort. But the Menderes administration, and Turkish military planners knew that the main threat of Soviet aggression had subsided with the death of Josef Stalin in 1952. His successor, Nikita Khrushchev, was less afraid of the West, and consequently less desperate to increase Soviet security through expansion into neighboring countries. The opportunity that Stalin had in eastern Europe at the end of World War II was gone, and Khrushchev knew that any efforts at expansion now bore the risk of military conflict. And military conflict carried the risk of escalating into nuclear war – the ultimate catastrophe.

Turkish planners and policy makers did not see nuclear war as an immediate grave risk. What they saw as the greatest risk was missing out on all the benefits of American military and developmental aid. Over the course of the 1950s, the US followed up the initial $250 million that Turkey was allotted under the Truman Doctrine with another $2 billion in aid[24]. This aid was a combination of mostly surplus World War II or Korean War weapons and material, along with technical assistance, and developmental aid geared towards expansion of

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[23]   Vertzberger 1990, p. 26; Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff 1981, pp. 281-287.

[24]   Aydın 2000, p. 110.

agricultural exports. During the first years of the Menderes era, this aid helped spur tremendous economic growth, as Turkish agricultural exports expanded while the Korean War led to global shortages. But by the mid-fifties, Turkey's economy was beginning to decline, as growth stalled and inflation increased. By 1957, Menderes was in trouble, and he called for early elections, but the promise of turning Turkey into a "little America" was beginning to ring hollow. Criticism of the Turkish-American relationship was growing, as critical newspaper articles began to appear, and as Turkish intellectuals began ridiculing American "assistance" – aid that covered over, but did not fix basic problems in the Turkish economic and political systems, while at the same time increasing Turkey's dependence on America. For Menderes and his supporters, the growing risk they perceived was not the Cold War, but the weakening of American support and investment.

As Khrushchev moved away from Stalin's obsession with security, and as more resources were devoted to developing the Soviet domestic economy, life in a nuclear-armed world was based on deterrence. Increasing stockpiles of ever larger, more destructive types of thermonuclear devices, thousands of times more powerful than the bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, came to be seen not as preparation for World War III, but as the expected and necessary aspect of military readiness. On 4 October 1957, the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite into orbit around the planet. For three months, before its batteries ran out, Sputnik sent beeping messages to earth, reminding the Americans every few minutes of Soviet technological superiority, and American vulnerability to an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile.

7.3. The Cuban Missile Crisis in the Turkish media

The humiliation of Sputnik was followed up in 1962 with the American discovery that the Soviets were building nuclear missile silos in Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis hit the world stage on 22 October 1962, when John F. Kennedy gave a speech on American television announcing a naval blockade of Cuba, to prevent the Soviets from building the nuclear missile silos on the island. Turkish press coverage of the Cuban Missile Crisis presents an alternative vision of events, and gives insight into how different the Turkish media perceived of the balance of risk involved in Turkish relations with the Americans and with

the Soviets during the Cold War. On the 20 October, "Cumhuriyet" (The Republic), a left-leaning newspaper reported on the arrival in Ankara of Frank K. Sloan, Undersecretary of the Defense Department, and the possibility of an upcoming meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev at the United Nations. Two more news items appeared in the paper that week. One of them indicated how Turkish workers at the İncirlik airbase had voiced a complaint about American contractors because they felt abused, violated and oppressed by them[25]. "Cumhuriyet" also published an article by the winner of an editorial competition, Hikmet Gökalp, PhD, who wrote about why Turkey needed socialism to stop the oppression and violation of workers[26].

Headlines in the Turkish press first reported on the crisis on 23 October, when "Tercüman" (The Translator), a center-right paper, and "Ulus" (The Nation), at the middle of the spectrum, reported that a major conflict was brewing close to American shores, in the Atlantic Ocean. "Cumhuriyet"'s headline that day, was that there were two major obstacles to world peace. The first was the Indo-Chinese conflict in Asia. The second was that the US was preparing to respond to presumed Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba[27]. On 24 October, one item – Cuba – filled the headlines of all major Turkish newspapers. Both "Ulus" and "Cumhuriyet" wondered if a guarded, soft response by the Soviets to the American blockade would continue[28]. Meanwhile, the Turkish cabinet met with Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to discuss Turkey's response to the situation. The Turkish media also reported European responses, stressing "The Guardian"'s position that perhaps the Soviets now had the right to blockade Turkey or West Berlin. It seems that the Turkish press and policymakers were expecting a swift and more severe response from the Soviets.

On 25 October, as Soviet ships turned back from the American blockade line, "Cumhuriyet" and "Tercüman" reported that the Turkish military had confirmed its combat readiness, and had placed troops around military and industrial installations in Turkey, and were ready to defend Turkish airspace, especially around major cities. But with both sides seeming prepared for war, both "Cumhuriyet" and

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[25]   Cumhuriyet 1962a.

[26]   Gökalp 1962, p. 2.

[27]   Tercüman 1962, p. 1; Cumhuriyet 1962b, p. 1.

[28]   Ulus 1962a, p. 1.

"Tercüman" reported that Khrushchev was saying the Soviets were determined not to start a new world war. American intentions were not so clear. General R.M. Montgomery visited the İncirlik airbase near Adana during the crisis. When asked about the crisis, Montgomery had replied "I'm just a soldier. I do not understand politics"[29]. Then on the 27 October, newspapers reported that events had moved from a military crisis to political hand-wringing. The Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin, referring to the earlier Soviet request to open a military base on Turkish territory, said that this crisis could be seen as evidence of the need to consider eliminating all foreign military installations in Turkey[30].

Throughout the crisis, there was little direct discussion of the Jupiter missiles in the major Turkish newspapers[31]. But in April 1963, the Jupiter missiles made headlines, with reporting that a Polaris submarine had replaced the Jupiters as the "castle keep"[32]. The reports stressed that the Polaris submarine had longer range, and more destructive power, than the Jupiters ever had – being able to reach Moscow. "Tercüman" reported that Turkey was hung in the balance between two superpowers in the Cold War, having lost its autonomy in a possible war between them[33]. "Ulus" reported that there would be no new global war, not because Soviets feared the US, but because they were preoccupied with the growing power of China, and their main goal was now complete control of Hungary and Ukraine[34]. In November 1962 "Akis", a middle-of-the-road journal of politics and economics, had also given an alternative account of the crisis. The main editorial, written by Metin Toker, who was known for his pro-American position, argued that it was a fallacy to make a comparison between Turkey and Cuba, when the better comparison was between Cuba and Hungary, where the real danger of Soviet aggression lay. He insisted, however, that in any such conflict, Turkey would still be steadfastly on the side of NATO and the United States[35].

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[29]   Cumhuriyet 1962c, p. 1.

[30]   Erkin 1962, p. 1.

[31]   Ulus 1962b, p. 1.

[32]   Tercüman 1963, p. 1; Cumhuriyet 1963, p. 1.

[33]   Tercüman 1962, p. 1.

[34]   Göksel 1962, p. 3.

[35]   Toker 1962, p. 7.

Kennedy decided to accept the missile trade deal with Khrushchev in secret, in an effort to avoid the appearance that the US was selling out its allies for its own security. Kennedy pledged publicly that the US would not invade Cuba, although he never requested such a pledge from Khrushchev regarding Turkey. Finally, in February 1963, US ambassador Raymond Hare informed the Turkish government of the American decision to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey. He presented the decision as a matter of routine upgrading of equipment and security procedures, although the connection to the Cuban crisis was obvious. The most important part of the process to remove the missiles was not the technical details of their dismantlement and removal, but rather the finessing of the publicity. The Americans wanted to avoid looking like backstabbers, looking like they had caved into Soviet threats, while the Turks wanted to avoid looking like second-grade members of NATO and a satellite of the United States. Coverage of the removal of the Jupiters in the Turkish press tended to focus on how the new Polaris submarine-based missiles would actually increase Turkish security, by bringing in superior missiles and newer technology. Yet, in private Turkish policymakers saw the Polaris offer as a weak alternative, since the submarine would have no Turkish personnel, and could be moved away at any time by the Americans.

7.4. Icons & metaphors

Socially constructed images are products of historical processes shaping relationships[36]. Paul Ricoeur distinguishes between two levels of understanding, which are applicable to icons and their changing metaphors. For the Turks, the biggest shift came as the image of America as an ally eroded into one of America as a "conditionally committed ally", reflecting declining trust in American intentions. The language of the Cold War made all complexities laden with such double intentionalities, reflecting emergence of Turkish "double speak", representing multiple layers of interpretation that developed over time, causing alterations and adjustments in images and their meanings[37]. It is this double intentionality that requires us to look beyond the surface transparency

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[36]   Berger, Luckmann 1967, p. 173.
[37]   Ricoeur 1977.

to search for the complexity giving metaphors multiple meanings[38]. After it ended, the Cuban Missile Crisis became not only a symbol of rising risks for Turkey in global Cold War politics, but also loss of autonomy and danger to the long-cherished notion of Turkish independence. Risk was no longer being isolated in the Cold War between two superpowers, but being centre stage in a theatre of conflict, such as the one in which Cuba and Turkey found themselves.

It is at that stage that the Turkish public began to understand the multiplicity of risks in Cold War politics. The post-crisis popular iconography carried opaque metaphors in the Turkish lexicon. For example, American aid began to pour into Turkey as an extension of the American build up in Europe, and the more exposure the Turkish public had to Americans, the more their mystique deteriorated. Metaphors of strength, abundance, and competence gave way to metaphors of incompetence, greed, interference and indifference. Americans were providing Turkey only with what would benefit Americans, like the Jupiters – not what would benefit Turks. Fahri Ergenç's short story of the 1960s talks about a villager buying a US-made Caterpillar tractor, only to find out it frequently broke down, and there were no spare parts. He describes Anatolia as a graveyard for Caterpillar tractors, which could only be used after being hitched to two oxen to drag the giant machine through the fields. The story ends with the village burying the Caterpillar, just before paying the last instalment on the loan the villager had taken out for its purchase[39]. So did the Turks, with the Jupiter missiles, as they understood that international aid was not to help, but to increase complexities of multiple risks.

In the realm of depiction of risk, two levels of interpretation allow exploration of the structures and rhetoric of legitimization by authority, and the acceptance and resistance by the audience. It is this resistance which will affect the framing of risks, and also influence the formation of the "culture of catastrophe". Social production of catastrophe brings its own set of risks. As Cottle argues, media, and we would like to add, intellectuals, play a major role in revealing risks as well as alternative interpretations, challenging official approaches to risk management[40]. Yet, this task becomes more complex when compounded risks force

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[38]   Clark 1990, p. 43

[39]   Erdinç 1969, pp. 61-80.

[40]   Cottle 1998, pp. 5-32.

society to live continuously on the edge of catastrophe. At this stage, cultural imagery and symbolism take over and the more basic aspects of the risks will be identified and examined: after all, we have a limited number of minutes for the news, limited space for the press, and the limited attention of the public. The media and intellectuals count on the visual literacy of icons and their metaphors to communicate with the public, making framing and imagery key aspects of the culture of catastrophe, such as the image of the mushroom cloud. But is the mushroom cloud an image of protection or the signal of doom?

Turkish intellectuals perceived risk in multiple layers. But in the 1950s the icon of the "Ugly American" entered into the common lexicon and everyday life as a metaphor for risk perhaps more powerful than that of the nuclear bomb. The concept of "*Çirkin Amerikalı*" (Ugly American), influencing Turkish discourse regarding all Americans and American foreign policy, is pertinent even today. As a concept, it was articulated by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick, both former US naval officers, who wrote the book *The Ugly American*[41], to depict their frustration and disillusionment with American policy in Southeast Asia. Later popularized by a Marlon Brando movie, it left a deep impression in Turkish popular culture: in Turkish iconography the "Ugly American" is a swaggering, hypocritical, drunken, domineering and unprincipled bully, who is arrogant, demanding, ill-advised, ignorant and imperious. As early as the period of American expansion in the 1940s, Sabahattin Ali was among the Turkish intellectuals who challenged American "presumptuousness":

> Drunk American reporters... naive American diplomats who view our country from the smoke of cocktail parties or from the windows of luxury automobiles; swindling politicians trying to divide up world markets... Are we going to learn if there is freedom and democracy in our country from the American government?[42]

Other Turkish poets and novelists also responded to the perceived arrogance of American advisors and military personnel who had little understanding of Turkish society and little respect for the Turkish people. Nevzat Üstün, in his poem *Hey Sen Amerikalı!* (Hey You American!), wrote:

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[41]   Lederer, Burdick 1958.

[42]   Ali 1986, p. 135.

You are an unwanted guest,
That came and occupied my land.
Listen to me,
Listen to me and just leave.
We're weary from hauling your heavy weight,
We're bored with seeing you in our country.
Just leave, Leave South America, Leave Viet Nam
Leave Turkey, Just leave[43].

It is again during this period that "Yankee go home!" became a slogan wherever Americans lived, operated or otherwise had a presence in Turkey. In addition, "American-loving Turks", Turkish people who chose to work with Americans, became suspect as well. In 1967, Fakir Baykurt published his novel *Amerikan Sargısı* (American Band-Aid), a satirical account of American aid, which described a failed American attempt to transform a village in Anatolia into a model of modern agricultural technology and techniques. The attempt failed miserably, since the Americans had no idea of Turkish village culture, or the village ecosystem and no actual concern for the needs of the villagers. They ended up trying to remove a mountain to provide more exposure to wind. And after levelling the mountain, they planted pineapples, a crop Turkish farmers had never seen, and which at the time had no market in Turkey. In the novel, one of the main characters, who tries to enable the project and supports the Americans, is a retired army general, making the Turkish military out to be colonial collaborators[44].

Aziz Nesin, a well-known satirist and intellectual, wrote a short story about cumulating catastrophes following the purchase of an American Caterpillar, which was introduced to Turkish villagers by the governor and his son as a model of modern agriculture. At the end of a long series of trials and tribulations with trying to make the Caterpillar work, the owner destroys the machine with a sledgehammer, then goes to the village teahouse to celebrate his victory over the American machine. Widespread stories of similar experiences reinforced the notion that Turks could only laugh at the lamentable fact that the only thing that came from America was Americans – and they were useless.

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[43]   Üstün 1967, p. 62.

[44]   Baykurt 1967.

"American Band-Aid" became synonymous with the risks of having American experts whose expertise was limited and their concern for Turkish people next to none. They did not understand! As the common joke from that era reports, as an American expert was giving a lecture to a Turkish audience, the translator simply asked the audience to laugh: "For God sakes, he thinks he's funny. Do laugh now". When the expert asked how he could translate such a complex talk with so few words, the translator responded: "Don't worry, they understood you perfectly well". Turkish people began to expect catastrophe from the immediate, symbolized by the presence of Americans, and began to overlook the long-term catastrophes that could come from the complexities of Cold War politics.

In this sense, they were not alone. Media and intellectuals are mired in the "incalculable uncertainty of risks," and ceaseless depiction and interpretation of images. Beck points out that this confusion, stemming from incomplete images, cross-references, and fractured frames are a result of modern risk society. Uncertain, unpredictable conditions are ripe with the imminence of catastrophe, yet the society yearns for safety and security. Such were the Turks during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and after. The culture of catastrophe embraces these inconsistencies, compounds them, and fosters the gaps between the risks and icons and metaphors.

7.5. Possibilities of social catharsis or doom: complexities in the culture of catastrophe

Beck expects a metamorphosis out of the compounded global risk, a collective awakening, a transnational "social catharsis"[45]. Therefore, upending doom becomes a tool of enlightenment and liberation. Social transformation will be generated by global impending catastrophe, making risk a common emancipatory zenith with a potential to reshape global society. Yet, Beck overlooks the fractured frames, and alternative imagery of icons and their metaphors which interfere with a united global response. We argued that the fractured frames between the official and public and intellectual response is key to understanding the "culture of catastrophe" and finally, the impossibility of global "social catharsis". During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Turkish

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[45]   Beck 2015, pp. 75-88.

government maintained its distance, and made an effort to de-centre both Turkey and the Jupiter Missiles from the conflict. While maintaining focus on the Soviet response, Turkish intellectuals and the popular culture moved away from what seemed like a "crisis from distant shores" to focus on how the crisis resulted in increasing visibility of Americans in Turkey, and loss of Turkish autonomy and independence. At the end of the crisis, uncertainty became the continuity of the American presence, not the continuing Soviet intentions in the Black Sea. The unilateral decision to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey added to the Turkish fear of becoming a colonized satellite of the US. In the eye of the public, and intellectuals, Turkey had become an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the US and NATO –an image that remains today. Risk is not knowing the risks. But knowing them introduces new levels of uncertainty and risk.

Risks are judged against other presumed risks. American and Soviet were rolled into one, and having nuclear weapons on Turkish soil became a symbol of dependence rather than strength. As a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, risk also became temporally divided. The immediate risk was direct or indirect military colonization by one of the superpowers. The long-term risk was possible nuclear annihilation and global war. Most importantly, it was no longer a choice between "Little America", or "socialist Turkey", but rather an understanding that Turkey was all alone in this war. Calculable incalculable uncertainty in the popular culture of catastrophe emerged as the Ugly American. American aid was something Turks came to tolerate – it was surplus cheese that nobody wanted to eat, the tractors nobody could use, the fish oil no child wanted to take. Only the Turkish military was willing to accept surplus goods, but even they remained guarded about American involvement in planning and policy.

It is no wonder Turkey was looking at risk vs. risk in those 13 days of October. While hell was about to break loose in the Atlantic, both the Americans and Soviets continued testing nuclear warheads. On 18, 20, 26, and 27 October, the US carried out four atmospheric tests on Johnson Atoll in the Pacific totaling 2.417 megatons. The Soviets carried out atmospheric tests on the 26th and 28th, in Astrakhan Oblast, totaling 600 kilotons. The total weight of these six tests was 3,000 kilotons, 75 times the 40 kilotons combined tonnage of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. As bombs continued to explode in the midst of a nuclear weapons crisis, with every blast, they closed, locked and cemented the

nuclear cage not only for Turkey, but for the rest of the world as well. Nuclear risk is going to be with us forever as part of global politics, whether in Cuba or Turkey, making the end of the Cold War one day in the future no more than day one of a new Cold War.

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8. Islamic Studies in Turkey. A transnational history of the Cold War

Zeynep Bursa Millet

8.1. Introduction

Islam at the heart of the Cold War? Neglected for a long time, the role of religion is now considered an important aspect of the historiography of that period. The new visibility of political Islam from the end of the 1960s onwards led to a relative increase in academic production on Islam. However, experts and specialists on political Islam came out of the Cold War with very contradictory ideas.

At the end of the Cold War, Olivier Roy announced the "failure of political Islam" while towards the end of the 1980s François Burgat still believed that this political ideology was capable of competing with the great Western ideologies[1]. In the 1980s, renowned islamologists such as Maxime Rodinson declared the particularity of Islam as a monotheistic religion, linking theological and political problems[2]. In 1989, Emmanuel Sivan announced that Sayyid Qutb's ideas had acquired a significant following in "secular" Turkey, while a year after the end of the Cold War, John L. Esposito pointed out that "the strongest manifestations of Islamic resurgence occurred in secular countries, the most developed and modernized in the Muslim World"[3].

Some researchers do not hesitate to read the Islamic revivals in these regions through the prism of a "New Cold War" against the Western World[4]. Yet, the lack of research on Islam as a scientific, religious, and

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[1]   Roy 1988.

[2]   Rodinson 1982.

[3]   Sivan 1989, p. 1.

[4]   Juergensmeyer 1994; Achcar 1999; Salla 1997, pp. 729-742; Tibi 1998, pp. 214-233.

political subject in the Cold War limits our understanding of the Post-Cold War period in the Middle East, South Asia, and the former communist and socialist states of Central Asia and Eastern Europe, where practices and knowledge of Islam were revitalized. The history of Cold War and of Islam was not much analyzed. It is not a surprise that the majority of experts in Islam after the Cold War were political scientists and sociologists who primarily concentrated on the events of that period[5].

It is a complex history. To offer a history of Islam during the Cold War requires the unfolding of several intertwined histories: communism, anticommunism, Muslim Migration in this period, modernization, and secularization. Islam during the Cold War essentially appears in two fields: Islam as a subject of social sciences and Islam as a political tool (political Islam). This article examines the historical construction of Islamic studies, particularly the social sciences' perception of Islam.. I believe, as Jacques Waardenburg argues, that the Cold War was a crucial period, along with the colonial era, for studying the construction of scientific knowledge on Islam[6]. By analysing Islam in the scientific field, it will also be possible to more clearly see the intertwining of scientification of Islam and the politization of science[7]. Turkish Islam or Islamic Studies in Turkey provides a rich field to do this. During the Cold War, Turkish Islam was the object of various international strategies and scientific productions, depending on constellations of political, intellectual, and security interests. One of the major changes that occurred during the Cold War in Turkey was the institutionalization of Islamic Studies at the beginning of the 1950s. Various local and international actors and institutions mobilised to redefine this religion as a body of knowledge, practices, and institutional arrangements.

After a relatively long break with Islam under the kemalist single-party regime (1923-1946), Turkey saw the (re)emergence of intellectuals, academics, scientific institutions, journals, associations, and translators interested in Islamic Studies in the Cold War period. However, the lack of systematized knowledge of Islam and qualified academic personnel made Turkey very open to international scientific, intellectual, and political approaches. Thus, this renewed interest in

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[5]   Dakhli 2016, pp. 4-17.

[6]   Waardenburg 2007.

[7]   For an example of the politicization of science and Islam in the context of the late Cold War in Turkey see Bursa Millet 2019.

Islam in Turkey was not limited to the country's local actors, institutions, and knowledge. During the Cold War, Turkish scientific institutions and universities functioned as a melting pot of different methodological views, scientific perceptions, and political motivations on the knowledge of Islam. The history of Islamic Studies in Turkey has been profoundly marked and transformed by the cultural influence of the Western world (and the USA in particular), by migrations of intellectuals from Soviet Central Asia, and by the mobility of Muslim and non-Muslim Western-educated islamologists.

This article considers the history of Islamic Studies in Turkey as a privileged object used to better understand the transformation of relations between social sciences, religion, and politics during the Cold War. A Muslim and secular country, situated between the East, the West, and the non-aligned countries, Turkey has been a veritable bridge between different scientific and political approaches to Islamic Studies. By adopting a transnational approach, this article aims to contribute to the history of the Cold War through the construction of Islamic Studies from a "peripheral" country, yet a point of intersection of various scientific circulations.

8.2. The missing link: Turkish Islam in the Cold War

"Turkish Islam" or Turkish perception of Islam has been a concept commonly used in academic and journalistic language since the end of the Cold War. This term describes Turkish "consular Islam" in Europe (in particular in France) where immigrant populations of Turkish origin constitute one of the largest groups in the Muslim diaspora. The term "Turkish Islam" is also used to describe Turkey's soft power in Central Asia and the Balkans since the end of communism. Turkish Islam or Turkish hanafism was often proposed as a countermodel to neo-salafism.

The first question is this: Is there a "Turkish Islam" as a religious, theological, political, cultural, or scientific model? In various moments of crisis in the Muslim World, "Turkish Islam" has been presented by the Western world as an ideal model of Islam. In 1992, at the end of the Cold War, President George W. Bush described Turkey as a "model of a democratic and secular state, which could be emulated by Central Asia"[8]. During the Arab Spring in 2011, Turkish secularism and Turkish Islam

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[8]   Rasid 2011.

were presented again as a model for Arab countries[9]. Despite a certain political and intellectual interest in Turkish Islam during the Cold War and in Post-Cold War period, the literature devoted to the history of Islam and Islamic Studies in Cold War-era Turkey continues to remain relatively poor.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the kemalist elite imposed a significant distancing from Islam, attempting to remove it from intellectual and political life and confining it to a private sphere controlled by the State. As Olivier Carré puts it, "nowhere is secularism adopted as it was in kemalist Turkey. Indeed, none of the Arab countries' constitutions (with the exception of democratic Yemen) declare a nationality unrelated to Islam, nor the exercise of political power independent of Islam"[10]. It is true that no Muslim country in the Middle East has a tradition comparable to Turkey's pro-Western stance during this period. Not aiming to reform Islam in order to continue with it, kemalist elites carried out reforms *against* Islam. Under the kemalist single-party regime (1923-1946), there was little opportunity to elaborate on the question of Islam. With the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928 and the ban of learning Ottoman Turkish, it became difficult for new generations to read the old theological corpus. From the university reform of 1933 to 1949, there were no theological faculties in Turkey. The teaching of Arabic and Persian was banned in universities, except in certain specialized departments. Until the introduction of the multi-party system in 1946, it was also difficult for conservative and religious academics to obtain university posts. Academia was closely bound to the official kemalist ideology. Additionally, the historical periods and States like the Seljuk or Ottoman Empires – where Islam could be an academic subject – were also excluded from the new kemalist historiography.

Pre-World War II Turkey gives the impression of a country isolated from the Muslim World. With the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, the kemalist elite adopted a more nuanced vision of Islam. In 1950, the arrival of power for the democrats gave real hope to reinstating Islamic values in political, academic, and intellectual life. However, the institutions and academics specializing in Islam were "young" and inexperienced. This is why the transnational and international

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[9]   Taşpınar 2003.

[10] Carré 1983, p. 35. See also Carré 1979.

actors and institutions played a significant role in the construction of Islamic Studies in Turkey.

As mentioned, the history is complex, and the present literature is far from being exhaustive. There are many possible reasons. While this era had primarily been subject to study through the lenses of military, political, and economic interest, the emergence of Cultural Cold War literature in the 1990s renewed questions about this time. In this new culturally-focused literature appeared works about the role of religion during the Cold War. This literature is divided into two main themes: "communism and religion" and "Christianism, the West, and Cold War"[11]. The first theme has mainly focused on State repression, the official promotion of scientific atheism, or the relationship between Orthodox churches and the State. On the other hand, we can discover a rich literature about the instrumentalization of religion (in particular Catholicism) in the political and scientific discourse in the West. However, this literature about the Cold War and religion still pays little attention to Islam[12].

More complicated, the present literature on Turkey during the Cold War remains incomplete and is mainly concerned with international relations, geopolitical position, and security issues[13]. The impact of the Cold War on Turkish cultural, intellectual, and scientific life is largely ignored to this day. Moreover, Turkey is often excluded from the literature on the Middle East or Muslim World in the period of the Cold War[14]. A member of NATO since the beginning of the Cold War (1952), Turkey has not experienced the same social and political upheavals as other Muslim or Middle Eastern countries, and in this sense, it often

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[11] Betts, Smith 2016, p. 2.

[12] Apart from the volume edited by Dianne Kirby and published almost 20 years ago, there are few works that attempt to internationalize the question of religion during the Cold War. Kirby's volume confines itself to examining Christianity in the United States and Western Europe, with only a brief chapter on the Soviet Union. Islam is addressed only in the preface, written by Bruce Kent in the post-11 September 2001 context: "A largely secular world must now understand once again that religion still plays a major role in shaping global relations. Since 11 September 2001, the spotlight has been on Islam, often simplistically and unfairly". Kirby 2003.

[13] A handful of works focus on the cultural, intellectual and scientific aspects of the Cold War. See Örnek, Üngör 2013; Işıksel 2014; Cangül Örnek 2015. On the intellectual and academic *milieus* in the Cold War see Aytürk 2014 and Aytürk 2017.

[14] See Lüthi 2015. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim devote a chapter to Turkey but felt the need to explain the reason for this inclusion. See Hale 1997, pp. 250-279. See also the explanation of Turkey's special status during the Cold War in Barrett 2007, p. xxii.

remains off the radar of this literature[15]. In addition, the history of intellectual and scientific debates on Islam has given a limited place to Turkey since the fall of the Ottoman Empire (and the fall of caliphate) and the kemalist secular experiment. This historiography remains largely the history of the Arab world[16]. Lastly, the literature about emigration and diasporas is not enough to trace the trajectory of the émigré intellectuals and academics[17]. We know that the Soviet émigré intellectuals of Turkish-Muslim culture contributed significantly to the construction of Islamic Studies in Turkey. One of them, the historian Zeki Velidi Togan (1890, Kuzyanovo- 1970, Istanbul) is essential to this article. Among the works about these emigrations to Turkey, the work of Zaur Gasimov and Wiebke Bachmann should also be mentioned[18]. This research about the Azeri and Tatar discusses the time between the two World Wars. Although the period under examination does not fall within the Cold War era, this study distinguishes itself by concentrating on intellectuals and the transnational production of political discourse. The authors examine this discourse through several Turkish émigré trajectories and note that Islam always occupies a central place in the discussion.

The insufficiency in the existing literature and the eclecticism and the hybridity of Turkish Islamic Studies make studying this subject a challenge, but this situation offers also a rich transnational political, scientific and intellectual connections.

8.3. Turkish Islam, Sovietology, and Western Area Studies

The Second World War changed all. With the emergence of area studies in the United States and in Europe and the transformation of the social sciences and former orientalist studies, Islam has been recon-

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[15]   For Turkey's Cold War see Hasanlı 2011; Bilgin 2007; Uluinan 2010; Gökay 2006.

[16]   Mayeur Jaouen 2018.

[17]   Catherine Goussef has made a major contribution to the literature on Russian exiles. See in particular Goussef 2008. The comparative perspective may be of interest to Nicolas Lebourg (University of Montpellier), who is examining the contribution of White Russians to the construction of anti-communism in Europe. See Lebourg 2020. There is very little literature on the trajectories of Russian exiles of Turkic-Muslim origin.

[18]   Gasimov, Bachmann 2016.

structed in a number of academic fields[19]. In this context, Turkish Islam found itself at the crossroads of several of these fields, due to the presence of Turkish and Turkic populations in the Balkans and the Soviet Union, and to its historical links with the Arab and Muslim worlds.

After the World War II, the academic production on Turkish Islam was first institutionalized in the United States. America's interest in the Middle East arose partly from its abundant energy resources, but also from the need to understand the centre of the world's second-largest religion, Islam. This interest grew during the Cold War as part of an anti-communist strategy. A member of NATO, Turkey was considered the only relatively stable country in the Middle East during the Cold War and was the subject of various comparative studies in American universities. Turkey was also a beneficiary of a series of aid programs under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. This aid went hand in hand with the surveillance of political, intellectual, and economic life in Turkey. According to Natalia Tsvetkova, a specialist in education during the Cold War, Turkey was one of the countries where American influence was most visible[20]. The impact of American cultural policies on Cold War era Turkey has been studied little by historians. Of those few studies, the works of Cangül Örnek and Ali Erken are important works on the American influence on Turkish cultural, scientific, and intellectual life[21]. The influence was twofold. The first was direct, involving American scholarships, American experts and academics coming to Turkey, and economic investment in Turkish universities and research institutions. The latter was less direct and arose from the knowledge generated in the United States regarding Turkey and Turkish Islam. This academic work from the United States has influenced the global perception of Islam in Turkey.

In the context of the Cold War, a distinction was made between Turkish Islam and other streams of Islam–in particular Arab Islam–in Western academic studies. Turkish Islam appeared as a "modern" and "moderate" Islam thanks to kemalist reforms. This approach finds its clear formulation in the book of Bernard Lewis, the renowned British Arabist and Turcologist. In 1961, Lewis published *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, which became a classic in its field and a reference

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[19] See Kwashik 2016; Ioana Popa 2015.

[20] Tsvetkova 2019, p. 145.

[21] Örnek 2015; Erken 2018.

work in Turkey. In this book, Lewis proposes a reading of history which sees a large rupture in 1923, the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. According to him, in 1923 Turkey created its new nation, which offered the opportunity to remove all Ottoman and Islamic heritage. It was a great international academic contribution that attributed an image of modern Islam to Turkey[22]. Lewis was a significant intellectual and academic figure who was consulted by the leaders of American politics on several occasions during his career. He was frequently involved in projects relating to Turkey and the Middle East, often funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Turkish Islam and Turkic-Turkish Muslim populations living under socialist and communist regimes have been the subject of anti-communist policies and academic studies in the Western world. Turkish Islam has been an academic subject in several research centres in different areas of study at UCLA, Princeton, Chicago, and Harvard as well as at European universities. For example, after Fernand Braudel founded the sixth section (that became *Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales*) of the prestigious institution *Ecole pratique des hautes études*, the Center of Russian, Eastern European, and Turkish Studies was founded in 1960 by Alexandre Benningsen (1913-1988), a specialist of Islam in the Soviet Union. In Paris, Benningsen was appointed the chair of history in non-Arab Islam. Starting in 1969, Bennigsen usually taught a semester every year in the United States, first at Rochester and Columbia, then at Chicago, and subsequently in Wisconsin and Florida. It is his years in Chicago that led to the birth of the "Benningsen School"[23]. In his works focusing on Muslims in the Soviet Union, Turkish-Turkic Islam had a central place. For example, his book *Mystics and Commissars* depicts Turkish Sufism as a potential weapon, capable of undermining communist Russia. In fact, in the context of the Cold War, many Sufi groups were presented as modern and liberal by actors in the American political and intellectual world[24]. This was particularly the case with regards to the Sufi brotherhoods of Turkey, which had their religious and intellectual origins in Central Asia and transnational links with the Arab world.

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[22]   Lewis 1961.

[23]   Kalinovsky 2015, pp. 211-231. See also Rywkn 1986.

[24]   Bennigsen, Wimbush 1985.

The works of American diplomat Charles Warren Hostler also serve as a good example of the intellectual and political context and the interest in Turkish Islam. In 1957, in his book entitled *Turkism and the Soviets*, Hostler argued that,

> The general conditions of life under the Soviet regime undoubtedly have tended to undermine the religious, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic links, that have existed between the various Soviet peoples of Turkish origin. To what point have these ties actually been weakened? Islam. Soviet colonial policy makes no secret within the USSR of its long-range intention to stamp out Islam. Open atheist propaganda is sponsored and restrictions are made on the use of buildings for religious purposes (many mosques have been closed, except for propaganda showplaces).[25]

This book also features short biographies of Soviet Turkic intellectuals such as Cafer Seydahmet Kırımlı (1889, Crimea- 1960, Istanbul), Ayaz İshaki (1878, Kazan-1954, Ankara), Mehmet Emin Resulzade (1884, Azerbaijan-1955, Ankara), and Zeki Velidi Togan (1890, Kuzyanova-1970, Istanbul)[26]. These intellectuals largely settled in Istanbul and Ankara after the October Revolution and contributed to the intellectual and academic production of Turkish nationalism and Turkish Islam.

In this context, Turkic Muslim intellectuals from the Soviet Union gained international scientific renown. In 1953, the American president Eisenhower created "Captive Nations Week" to raise public awareness of the "Soviet occupation." As part of this strategy, Soviet Muslim Turkic émigré intellectuals and academics were recruited at American and European universities and invited to take part in the scientific activities of several U.S.-funded institutions such as the Institute for URSS Studies in Munich[27]. There were several commissions such as the Anti-Bolshevik National Union of the North Caucasus, the *Türkeli* (The Turkish Hand) that brought together Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, and Krygyz intellectuals, and also several committees like Tatar-Bashkir National Committee, the Azerbaijani National Council, the İstiklal

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[25] Hostler 1957.

[26] The book also featured a report entitled *Observations on the future of the Turkish World* prepared in French by Cafer Seydahmet Kırımlı at the request of this American diplomat.

[27] Connell 1990.

Committee of the North Caucasus, the Azerbaijani National Center, and the Crimean National Centre. Each committee published several journals in Turkish and English as well as in German: "Azerbaycan" (Turkish), "Milli Türkistan" (National Turkestan, Turkish), "Azat" (Liberation, Turkish), "Vatan" (Homeland, Turkish), "Türkeli" (Turkish), "Caucasian Review", and "Der Kaukasus". The Turkish journal "Dergi" (Journal) was one of the longest-lived of the Institute. It was published between 1955 and 1971. The Institute's publications were sent to around a hundred countries.

The American Strategy on Turkish Islam led to the rediscovery of the "Turks of the World" or "Outside Turks" which fuelled scientific curiosity in Turkish academia. The 1950s were marked by a relatively renewed interest in the heritage of the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires. This historiographical change also prompted sociologists, political scientists, and economists to produce more on relations with the Muslim World. As mentioned by İlker Aytürk, The Munich Institute was copied by Turkish-Turkic intellectuals in Turkey[28]. The Turkish Cultural Research Institute (*Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü*, TKAE), founded in 1961, became a scientific hearth of Turkish nationalism and Turkish Islam. This institute is a particularly interesting place to study the implications of various transnational actors, as well as the different terminologies and historiographies in the production of academic knowledge on Islam. The TKAE had produced a great deal over a period of twenty years. It has published three journals in several languages, including in Turkish, English, French, and German. In addition, it has published around a hundred books, brochures, and reports. The émigré Soviet Turkish intellectuals have contributed to this plethoric collective output. The first director of this institute between 1961 and 1962 was a Soviet Turkish intellectual from Azerbaijan, Abidin İtil (1910-1980), and the second director between 1962 and 1975 was another intellectual émigré of Kazakh origin, Ahmet Temir (1912-2003). In this context, Turkish Islamic Studies appears to be a very transnational product of the different academic and political networks that passed through the U.S., Europe, and Soviet Union.

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[28]   Aytürk 2017.

8.4. The institutionalization of Islamic Studies in Turkey and Hamidullahian école

The First Turkish Faculty of Theology was founded in 1949 at the University of Ankara and it remained the only theological faculty until 1982[29]. The faculty was set up to apply the methods of European sociological and historical studies of religion and to help produce a new form of Islamic theology that would be consistent with the values of the New Republic. Shortly after, the Institute of Islamic Studies (İslam Tetkikleri Enstitüsü) was created with the sole objective of analysing Islam through the lens of the social sciences. It was the starting point of the history of Turkish islamology. The Institute of Islamic Studies was established in 1952 at the University of Istanbul and became active in 1959. Its first director was, unsurprisingly, a former Soviet citizen of Turkish origin, the historian Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970). A member of the Basmachi movement between 1916 and 1920, Togan obtained his PhD from the University of Vienna in 1935. In Turkey, he became a leading anti-communist academic figure and gained international legitimacy by talking about the conditions of Turkish Muslims in communist regimes. Like many in his generation of Russian Muslims, he often adopted extreme political orientations, notably in Promethean networks that claimed pan-turanism as a means of halting the expansion of the Soviet Union, or in the Nazi networks to demand independence for the Turkestan and Caucasus regions. The networks of this generation in the U.S., in Europe, and in Turkey enabled Togan and his peers to familiarize the Turkish intellectual world in Istanbul with anti-communism as well as with Central Asian and Caucasian Islam. Togan and his Muslim Turkic generation, combining Russian, Middle Eastern, and European cultures are an example of "cultural hybridity"[30].

As a politically experienced and Western-educated intellectual, Togan understood the important role of Islam, particularly in the context of the Cold War. He was convinced of the need for a Western-style institute for the advancement of Islamic Studies in the Republic of Turkey[31]. Togan emphasized that the Institute of Islamic Studies was not a Faculty of Theology. His objective was not to create a dogmatic or normative

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[29]   For a theological history of Turkey, see Dorroll 2021.

[30]   Gasimov, Bachmann 2016, p. 206.

[31]   Togan 1950, pp. 212-213. See also Gökkır 2003.

understanding of Islam. In his view, the research and teaching of Islam could not be left to the theologians because they advocate a confessional approach to Islam. For Togan, Turkey needed to establish an educational and scientific knowledge base, mobilising Western methodologies[32]. Togan invited many non-Muslim and Muslim Western-educated academics to give lectures at the Institute of Islamic Studies in Istanbul. One of these was Alfred Guillaume (1888-1965), an Arabist scholar and specialist in Islam at the University of London. He was the first foreign lecturer in Turkey on Christian and Islamic theology[33]. However, Togan's most important contribution to the constitution of Islamic Studies was his invitation to Muhammad Hamidullah (1908-2002). Hamidullah created an "école" in Turkish Islamic Studies[34].

It all seems to have started in Istanbul at the 22nd International Congress of Orientalists (1951). One year later, the research on Islam was revived in Turkey with the creation of the Institute of Islamic Studies by Zeki Velidi Togan. As mentioned, Togan argued that Islamic Studies should be created at the university level and utilize Orientalist methods of the Western world. In this sense, Muhammad Hamidullah had an interesting profile: an Indian Muslim living in France, who spoke Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Urdu, as well as European languages such as French, English, and German. Hamidullah was especially known in the French intellectual circles for his translation of the Quran into French (the first translation by a Muslim Scholar) and his biography of the Prophet Muhammed, *Le Prophète de l'islam*[35]. He was at the heart of the Orientalist academic networks in France. According to Togan, Orientalist studies that dealt with Islam and Islamic civilization were followed insufficiently in Turkey. For him, this insufficiency was a real threat to Turkish Islamic culture. As such, Hamidullah's knowledge of Orientalist studies was important for Togan.

Hamidullah was at CNRS (*Centre national de recherche scientifique*) in France for 24 years between 1952 and 1976. He was also known for his lectures about the life of the Prophet Muhammad at mosques and Islamic associations, notably at the Adda'wa mosque in the 19th arrondissement of Paris. Between the early 1950s and the late 1970s,

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[32]   Togan 1953, pp. 76-85.

[33]   See Ogan 1953, p. 8.

[34]   Togan 1955, pp. 39-41.

[35]   Hamidullah 1959.

Hamidullah taught regularly in Istanbul and in Ankara, but also in other more provincial Turkish cities. He became the Institute of Islamic Studies' unofficial director. He had very large academic networks in both France and Turkey focusing on Islam. In France, Hamidullah collaborated with a number of French Orientalist scholars including Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes (1862-1957), William-Philippe Marçais (1872-1956 and 1910-1984), Louis Massignon (1883-1962), and Henri Laoust (1905-1983). In 1952, Hamidullah also cofounded the *Centre culturel islamique de Paris* with Haydar Bammate (1889-1965, North Caucasian, diplomat and scholar in Islamic Studies), Malek Bennabi (1905-1973, Algerian intellectual known for his works on Islamic civilization) and Eva de Vitray-Meyerovitch (1909-1999, French researcher at CNRS). His career brought together French and Turkish academic circles around scientific thought on Islam. Hamidullah worked together with an important number of foreign academics (islamologists and theologians) in Turkey such as M. Tayyip Okiç (1902-1977, Bosnian origin), Annemarie Schimmel (1922-2003, German origin), M. Tav'it Tanji (1918-1974, Moroccan origin), and Eva de Vitray Meyerovitch (1909-1999, French origin). All of these well-known researchers spent several years in Turkey and made major contributions to Islamic Studies in Turkey.

Muhammad Hamidullah contributed to the institutionalization of Islamic Studies in Turkey and to the formation of several generations of Turkish students. For example, Salih Tuğ (b. 1930) was Hamidullah's first assistant and his first doctoral student to defend his thesis in Turkey. Tuğ accompanied Hamidullah to his seminars and translated for him from French or Arabic into Turkish. Between 1976 and 1982, Tuğ was the director of the Institute of Islamic Studies and then dean of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Marmara. According to Salih Tuğ, there is a "before" and an "after" Hamidullah in Islamic Studies in Turkey[36]. He believes that Hamidullah's approach brought an innovative perspective to the way in which research on Islam is conducted in Turkey. According to Tuğ, Hamidullah's aim was to liberate Islamic thought from its own dogma and to re-establish a genuine insurrection against the mythical foundations of Islamic belief. In Hamidullah's words,

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[36]   Interview with Salih Tuğ, Istanbul, 9 July 2017. See also Kızılkaya 2008, pp. 19-32.

Islam is not a religion in the usual sense of the word. It is a belief in God and worship of Him, but Islam also gives organization to the community and a constitution to the State. In this sense, Islam is an economic and political system. This is natural, because in everyday life, there is no separation between the spiritual and the temporal. The spiritual governs the temporal, otherwise it becomes empty, without any activity[37].

This approach of Hamidullah, according to Tuğ, allowed him to claim a certain objectivity in understanding Quranic affirmations.

Hamidullah also worked on the structural organization of the Higher Institutes of Islamic Studies (Yüksek İslam Enstitüleri)[38]. The first Higher Institute of Islamic Studies was created by the National Education Ministry in 1959 and in Istanbul. During the 1960s and 1970s, several Higher Institute of Islamic Studies were founded in different Anatolian cities. Hamidullah took the *Institut catholique de Paris* (Paris Catholic Institute) as an example and demanded the same scientific and administrative autonomy for the Institute in Istanbul. Like at the *Institut catholique de Paris*, Hamidullah advocated for the participation of religious (Islamic) figures within the scientific structure. For him, "the participation of the muftis of Turkey's main mosques, the directors of the Imam-Hatip schools and Turkish Muslim scholars elected by the public should be compulsory."[39] By doing this, both academics and religious figures could gather around a scientific interpretation of Islam.

Hamidullah recommended the creation of three faculties in the Institute. Two faculties were based on Islamic sciences and social sciences: The Faculty of Islamic Sciences and the Faculty of Complementary Sciences (geography, archaeology, history etc.). He recommended including in the syllabus doctrines such as atheism, materialism, and communism, which he considered the greatest enemies of Islam. The third faculty proposed by Hamidullah was the faculty of foreign languages. According to him, Arabic and Persian should be taught with the European languages as well as the languages spoken in the communist countries like Russian, Bulgarian, and Romanian etc.[40].

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[37]   Moubarac 1971, p. 103.

[38]   For the history of the Higher Islamic Institutes see, İşpirli, Cebeci 2019.

[39]   Hamidullah wrote a letter to the Faculty of Literature. See Hamidullah 1962.

[40]   Hamidullah 1966, pp. 9-10.

The trajectories of Zeki Velidi Togan and Muhammad Hamidullah also created conflict between the academics in Islamic Studies and religious/intellectual circles in Turkey. These trajectories contributed to the emergence of a new ideology called "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*) and a new reformist perception of Islam. In other words, this "synthesis" appeared as a modest and limited Muslim reformism movement in Turkish Islamic Studies.

8.5. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a Muslim reformism of the Cold War?

The figure of Zeki Velidi Togan is a symbol for the creation of Islamic Studies in Turkey but also of the Turkish perception of Islam. For Togan, Islam and Turkishness were inseparable parts of Turkish culture and Turkish identity. Togan's historical studies of the early Turkish Islamic States became essential elements of a new emerging late Cold War ideology: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. This synthesis was defended by the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı, IH), founded in 1970[41]. Born mainly in the late 1920s and 1930s, the generation of the IH members benefited from political and intellectual figures like Zeki Velidi Togan or Muhammad Hamidullah. Composed in large part by academics, the members of the IH were active in the political, social, academic, cultural, and economic fields of Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s.

The members of the IH also contributed to the creation of reformist Turkish Islamic literature through their teachings, political discourses, academic productions (books and articles), and translations. For example, Ergun Göze (1931-2009) translated several books by Malek Bennabi and Salih Tuğ (b.1930) translated almost all works by Muhammad Hamidullah[42]. They attempted to create a kind of critical catalogue focusing on several questions about Islam. Nevzat Yalçıntaş (1933-2016) and Sabahattin Zaim (1926-2007), founding members of this club, became the pioneers of Islamic economy and Islamic finance. This club also included very well-known islamologists and theologians like Salih Tuğ, Hayreddin Karaman (b. 1934), Bekir Topaloğlu (1936-2016), but also the well-known historians of the Muslim World (in particular Seljuk and Ottoman Empires) like İbrahim Kafesoğlu (1912-1984), who

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[41]   Bursa Millet 2020.

[42]   Binnebi 1969; Binnebi 1973; Hamidullah 1963; Hamidullah 1962.

was also the first president of the Intellectuals' Hearth. Islamic archi-
tecture and Turkish Islamic Art were also developed in the academic
curriculum by future members of this club like Ekrem Ayverdi (1899-
1984) and Oktay Aslanapa (1914-2013)[43].

Togan, who was a Turkist but also a religious scholar, became an
important intellectual figure in the eyes of the young students at the
University of Istanbul who later went on to create the IH in 1970. The
young students knew him and his efforts for Panturkism and Islam. To-
gan was a contentious figure who repeatedly ran into trouble with the
single-party regime. In 1932, after a lecture on the history of the *Nakshi-
bendiyya* Brotherhood at the Darulfunun (an ancient Ottoman universi-
ty), Togan was immediately warned by the kemalist government[44]. His
opposition to the Official History Theses of the Republic forced him to
leave for Vienna to finish his PhD. In March 1945, at the end of the trial
"Racism and turanism," he was accused of being a turanist and was
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and 4 years internal exile. For the
IH in the 1970s and 1980s, Togan was "the unforgettable generation of
the literature on Turkishness and Islam" and "the immortal name of
the nationalist idea"[45].

As mentioned, Togan was one of the first persons who ventured
to Turkify Islam in the academic field. He believed that Turks always
considered the Quran as their national holy book[46]. Togan, and later
the members of the IH, essentially created two reforms: on the one
hand, they attempted to Turkify Islam, to de-Arabize Turkish-Muslim
culture. Unlike the kemalist elites, they tried to achieve this without
minimizing the role of Islam. From the 1950s onwards, Islam gained

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[43]   Forty-eight years separate the youngest member, Osman F. Sertkaya (assistant in the
Faculty of Arts at Istanbul University in 1970, when the Foyer was founded), born in
1946 in Adana, from the oldest, Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi (engineer and architect), born
in 1898 in Istanbul. Eight intellectuals, Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi (1898-1984), Ziyaeddin
Fahri Fındıkoğlu (1901-1974), Tahsin Banguoğlu (1904-1989), Nihat Sami Banarlı (1907-
1974), İbrahim Kafesoğlu (1911-1984), Ekrem Kadri Unat (1914-1998), Oktay Aslanapa
(1915-2013) and Mehmet Kaplan (1915-1986), were in fact invited to take part in the
founding of the IH because of their prestige, as a sign of respect and as a source of
intellectual legitimacy. These "big brothers" and "masters" from different political
and cultural currents on the Turkish right and from different fields of specialization
(architecture, medicine, history, literature, philosophy, etc.) also symbolize a political,
intellectual and professional front for the active generation of the IH.

[44]   Cumhurbaşkanlık Arşivleri 1933.

[45]   Bursa Millet 2020, p. 150.

[46]   Togan 1971, p. 32.

a high profile in cultural, political, and intellectual life. On the other hand, Togan and the members of the IH introduced an international literature of Islam that can make Turkish Islam competitive, modern, and critical on the international scale. In this context, the invitation to Muhammed Hamidullah was a big initiative to introduce an international Muslim scholar to Turkey's academic climate. But it was also radical because it drew criticism from Turkish religious circles and right-wing intellectuals. It was especially after the publication of the first volume of *Prophet of Islam* (translated by Salih Tuğ) in 1966 that the reactions against Hamidullah began to emerge in Turkey.

Several personalities accused Hamidullah of being an enemy of religion and of being under Masonic and Orientalist influences. Among others, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, one of the most well-known intellectuals of the Turkish Right, Ahmed Davudoğlu, the former director of the Higher Insitute of Islamic Studies, and Hilmi Işık, the leader of Brotherhood Işıkçılar, spoke against him[47]. In these reactions, Hamidullah was often presented as the figure of the Reformist Islamic Movement and he was compared to the important figures of Muslim Reformism in the 19th century, like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida. Davudoğlu even described Hamidullah as a more contemporary version of these figures: "Sarıksız reformcu" (a reformist without a turban)[48].

According to these critics, the life of the Prophet Muhammad was not written with all his miracles and other spiritual-metaphysical events. Even the title of Hamidullah's book was criticized because, for these Turkish religious and intellectual circles, Muhammad was not the only "Prophet of Islam" (title of the book); he was sent to everyone and to every religious community. According to Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Hamidullah contributed to the destruction of the authenticity of Islam. His attempts to personalize the Prophet, historicize Islam, and contextualize the miracles of the Prophet were all signs of a lack of respect for this religion. For his Turkish opponents, Hamidullah was an intellectual figure who was educated in the Western world and who was thinking from an Orientalist point of view.

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[47] Kısakürek 1985, pp. 131-134; Davudoğlu 1974, pp. 145-149; Işık 1975, pp. 256-266. See also Polat 1967; Çıkman 1976.

[48] Ahmed Davudoğlu 1974, pp. 115-117.

Hamidullahian école was adopted and defended by the academics and intellectuals of the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis". For the IH, their main objective was to create a Turkish perception of Islam within a more scientific framework. A good majority of the Intellectuals' Hearth made contact with Hamidullah in Paris and Istanbul and followed his seminars at the Institute of Islamic Studies at the University of Istanbul. As mentioned, Salih Tuğ was Hamidullah's first assistant and later became the president of the Intellectuals' Hearth between 1982 and 1984. His habilitation thesis entitled "Constitutional Movements in the Islamic World" was published in 1969 with a preface written by Muhammad Hamidullah[49].

Hamidullah contributed to the formation of the future intellectuals of "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis". These individuals included Hayreddin Karaman, Nevzat Yalçıntaş, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Süleyman Yalçın, Ergun Göze, and İhsan Süreyya Sırma. Moreover, Hamidullah's works on Islamic economics had already appeared in Turkish in the 1960s thanks to the efforts of these young intellectuals. From among the students of Hamidullah emerged a small group who later produced the most important works on Islamic economy, like Sabahattin Zaim. Zaim was one of the founding members of the Intellectuals' Hearth and a great defender of Hamidullahian école:

> The great Muslim World had not been able to finance the life and works of this great intellectual. The Professor (Hamidullah) was forced to go to France and live with a small salary. Neither Pakistan, nor India, nor Egypt, nor Turkey, Saudi Arabia made any effort[50].

Zaim went to see Hamidullah several times in Paris, like many others. For the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' defenders, Hamidullah appeared as an ideal figure who could play a central role in the construction of Islamic Studies. In his writings in Turkish (or translated into Turkish), Hamidullah repeatedly showed his admiration for the Turks in the history of the Muslim Worlds and for Turkish-Islamic civilization[51]. Hamidullah was not in conflict with kemalism and the modernization project of the Turkish Republic. He was a known Muslim scientific figure in the Western world as well as pragmatic and anti-communist.

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[49] Tuğ 1969.

[50] Zaim 2008, p. 566.

[51] Tuncer Baykara 1979, pp. 316-317.

For example, Hamidullah wrote to his former student: "In my opinion, a bad translation of the Koran is better than no translation at all. Especially, in the context in which Karl Marx's Das Kapital had already been translated"[52].

This Hamidullahian école is still active in the academic and political fields in Turkey. The Faculty of Theology at the University of Marmara organised a competition in 2015 on the Siyer-i Nebi (the life of the Prophet Muhammed). 15 000 participants were invited to read *The Prophet of Islam* by Muhammad Hamidullah. The winners received a prize from Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who described Hamidullah in his speech as "a unique and wonderful person" and stressed that it was remarkable that he had written his work in the West[53].

8.6. Conclusion

This article tries to show the necessity of several intertwined threads of literature when we wish to reflect on Islamic Studies in Turkey. This field is naturally heterogenic, eclectic, and transnational. In other words, it is not possible to study the construction of Islamic Studies in Turkey without analysing either transnational actors and networks or Cold War cultural and political dynamics.

This article also aims to fill a gap in the existing literature. Although Islam began to be largely discussed in the 1970s and 1980s, we do not know very much about its content, the process of producing its knowledge, its actors, networks, or circulation. This research is an invitation to think about these multiple parameters in Turkey, in the Western World, and in the Muslim World, which played a crucial role in the construction of knowledge about Turkish Islam. It shows that this academic field is partially shaped and transformed by Western Area Studies, American anti-communist policies, Indian Muslim Shafi scholars like Hamidullah, or Bashkir Turkic scholars like Zeki Velidi Togan. This field has undergone several pragmatic changes in relation to the political and cultural dynamics of the Cold War.

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[52]   Sırma 2006, p. 121.

[53]   https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/peygamberimizin-izinde-bir-nesil-istiyoruz-179605.html (last accessed 1 November 2023).

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9. "A handful of Turks facing the threat of extinction": cinematic portrayals of Turkishness in the Russian-dominated sphere

Güldeniz Kıbrıs

"We have a homeland, opened its arms to us. And the only place we can go is the homeland of our religious brothers: Turkey," says the Caucasus leader to his warriors after a brutal attack by the Russians in the 19th century in the film titled *Kaf Dağı'nı Terkedenler* (Those Who Abandoned the Mount Kaf)[1]. Similarly, the mother of Yavuz Mehmedov who decides to leave Turkestan to evade pressures exerted by the Soviet regime, says, "Run away from here, escape to our longed-for homeland, the capital of Turkishness, Istanbul," as depicted in *Güneş Ne Zaman Doğacak?* (When will the Sun Rise?)[2]. In these poignant scenes although set in different time periods, Turkey is portrayed as a homeland providing sanctuary to "Outside Turks" as the people of Caucasus and Turkestan against the encroachment of Russia in the first film, the Soviet Union in the second film. This narrative is significant because it is closely entwined with the prevailing political landscape of when the films were made – that is the 1970s, marked by the complex interaction of the burgeoning anti-communist discourse and Turkey's cautious foreign policy against the Soviet Union in the Cold War period. These dynamics resulted in nuanced cinematic portrayals of Turkish identity within the Russian-dominated sphere, carefully avoiding antagonism toward the Soviet Union. Consequently, the narrative focal point shifted from a confrontation between the Turks of Turkey and the Russians to a confrontation with Outside Turks.

Thus, this article aims to analyze the portrayal of Turkishness in the action/adventure film genre of the 1960s-1970s set against the

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[1]   Baytan, Yıldırımgeç 1971.

[2]   Kılıç 1977.

backdrop of Russian-dominated spatial context. The primary objective is to elucidate the complex relationship between the historical and political milieu and the manifestations evident within the domain of popular culture. The collection dealt with comprises of nine films divided into two groups. The first is set in the 19th century: *Hacı Murat* (Hadji Murat) [3], *Hacı Murat Geliyor* (Hadji Murat is Coming) [4], *Kafkas Kartalı* (Caucasian Eagle)[5], *Kafkas* Şeytanı *Aslan Bey* (Caucasian Evil Aslan Beg)[6], *Osmanlı Kartalı* (Ottoman Eagle)[7], *Hacı Murat'ın* İntikamı (Hadji Murat's Revenge)[8], *Kaf Dağı'nı Terkedenler*. The second group includes two films, both take place in the 20th century: *501 Numaralı Hücre* (Cell Number 501)[9], and *Güneş Ne Zaman Doğacak*. The article comprises four sections. The initial section delves into the theoretical, historical and ideological backdrop, revealing the context shaped by foreign policy considerations and domestic politics. The second section contextualizes these films within the trajectory of Turkish cinema, drawing attention to production dynamics and the overall corpus. The subsequent two sections provide analyses of the films set in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively.

9.1. The setting

Adopting a new history approach within film studies, scholars such as Barry Brummett and Lothar Mikos contend that films should not be regarded merely as audio-visual commodities but rather as intricate narratives. A comprehensive understanding of these narratives necessitates an exploration of the "conditions of (meanings') knowledgeability"[10]. Hilmi Maktav, an influential figure in film research, argues that films act as reflections of collective memories, undergoing translation onto the cinematic screen after filtering through a country's

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[3]　　Baytan 1967.

[4]　　Baytan 1968.

[5]　　Atadeniz 1968.

[6]　　Yalınkılıç 1968.

[7]　　Seden 1969.

[8]　　Figenli 1972.

[9]　　Eraslan 1967.

[10]　　Brummett 2010, p. 9; Mikos 2014, p. 411.

economic, social, and political transformations[11]. Similarly, Howard S. Becker asserts that films, as representations, articulate the prevailing conditions of society and the world.[12] Under the light of those, this article employs close reading and film analysis to uncover the inherent significance within the films, emphasising the importance of the context in which these films are created, disseminated, and consumed to grasp the underlying narrative meanings. The article posits a relationship between the examined films and the ideological climate of the Cold War era, acknowledging that this is not a direct one-to-one correlation but rather a contribution to tan ideological universe predominantly shaped by the Cold War and Turkey's foreign policy stance. It is crucial to recognise that these films, as cultural artefacts, were not insulated from the broader political and historical context.

The films in the article were all produced and released during the span of 1967 to 1977. Previously, Turkey had become an ally of the United States after its membership to the NATO (1952). Then, the first coup d'état in the history of the Turkish Republic was carried out on 27 May 1960, followed by the implementation of a new constitution in 1961. These developments sought to dampen the political rise of the conservative rural bourgeoisie, chiefly represented by the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP). The 1965 nationwide elections witnessed the rise of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP), as the successor to the DP, in opposition to the coalition formed by the military and bureaucratic elites who orchestrated the 1960 coup. Political tensions found an echo in the streets through the mobilization of emergent social movements, with university students constituting one of the most dynamic groups, alongside the burgeoning business sector and trade unions. The escalating tension was disrupted by a memorandum issued by the Turkish military on 12 March 1971, which forced the resignation of the government. The repercussions of the oppressive measures implemented by the memorandum regime predominantly targeted leftist youth, resulting in severe ideological suppression. The result of this oppression was the domination of Islamist and nationalist elements in everyday political discourse, something reflected in the formation of the so-called "Nationalist Front" governments by the rightist political

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[11] Maktav 2013, pp. 3-31.

[12] Becker 2007.

parties. Islamic influence rose in political culture, with Ottoman and Islamic values touted as bulwarks the spread of leftist ideology[13].

Despite rising anti-communism, Turkey never adopted an entirely anti-Soviet foreign policy; rather it pursued a prudent approach to avoid provoking the Soviet Union[14]. In this regard, the prevailing pan-turkism and its irredentist aspirations were curtailed following the Second World War through trials that targeted ideological leaders[15]. On the other hand, in the late 1960s, pan-turkism took a publicly visible role, becoming an integral component of mainstream ideology as it aligned itself with the newly established Nationalist Movement Party (*Millyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) led by a former colonel, Alparslan Türkeş[16]. However, it still had limited presence in official foreign policy of the state. And its persistence, to some extent, was contextual as it served as a barrier against communism[17]. At this point, the situation of Turks outside Turkey since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the way they formulate their national identities in relation to Turkey has become a major theme debated by the pan-turkist and other nationalist circles under the influence of both domestic politics and foreign policy concerns[18]. These communities are called "Outside Turks" and this category included those living in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Cyprus, who are the Muslim ethnic Turks[19]. Therefore, on the one hand, irredentist visions were not considered legitimate by the official ideology. On the other hand, the "Outside Turks" were seen as the "cultural-political extension of the mainland"[20]. In this vein, developing relations with those peoples and regions has and even culturally engineering them in accordance with

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[13]   Zürcher 2017.

[14]   Hale 2019.

[15]   Poulton 1997.

[16]   For pan-turkism before and during the Second World War, see Özdoğan 2001; Atabay 2005.

[17]   Landau 1995.

[18]   Poulton 1997, pp. 285-314.

[19]   For the evolution of the term "Outside Turks" during the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) rule, see Tabak 2017.

[20]   In fact, the Ottomans were already protectors of the Muslim communities of the Russian Empire. See Uzer 2010, p. 111.

the Turkish nation-building project became a significant foreign policy goal for the Turkey's political elite[21].

There already existed an imaginary bond with the Central Asia as it was considered as the ancient land of Turks. The founding elite reinforced this bond when the state employed several instruments to promote kemalist visions of history, language and culture. These included diplomatic missions, financial aid and equipment, or teachers as the pursuers of identity. Textbooks and other relevant education materials were supplied; students were sponsored, and newspapers were funded in line with the principles of the founding elite[22]. It is important to highlight that Turkish governments also denounced the rhetoric surrounding "captive Turks" (*esir Türkler*) advocated by pan-turkists. This term suggested that Turkic communities under the communist regimes are in dire need for Turkey's help for their liberation[23]. Nevertheless, these arguments contributed significantly to the anti-communist narrative, underscoring the Soviet suppression of Turkic communities throughout the Cold War era. They could also highlight the significance of spiritual and cultural values in countering the growing threat of communism within the context of Stalin's expansionist heritage. Consequently, it could be argued that during the Cold War period, followed a cautious foreign policy that also served to undermine potential irredentist claims of Pan-Turkism.

9.2. Cinema in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s

During this period, Turkish cinema experienced its zenith in terms of both production and consumption. Özgüç reported an average annual production of over 200 films[24], resulting in a total of more than 4,000 films between 1965 and the 1970s[25]. Despite issues such as dubbing problems, lack of special effects, and numerous continuity mistakes, certain films enjoyed prolonged screenings nationwide, facilitated by the abundance of cinema halls. In 1970, there were 2,424 cinema houses with 1,164,769 seats across Turkey, with İstanbul alone boasting

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[21]   Karadeniz 2011, p. 345.

[22]   Hablemitoğlu 1999, pp. 24-29; Anzerlioğlu 2006, pp. 31-51.

[23]   Landau 1975, p. 148.

[24]   Özgüç 1993.

[25]   Arslan 2011, pp. 103-8.

274 cinema halls in 1977 [26]. The figures likely underestimated the actual count, considering unregistered open-air cinemas operated during the summer. This proliferation reflected in ticket sales, with an average annual sale of eight tickets per person for domestic films [27]. Notably, the average number of films viewed per individual increased from 11.8 in 1950 to 22.3 in 1970. Istanbul's ticket sales exceeded 50 million in 1977 [28], a remarkable figure given that the country's population was around 41 million, indicating a substantial rise in cinema consumers proportionate to the overall population increase.

Turkish cinema in the 1950s-70s emerged as a distinctive sector primarily driven by crowds within a consumption-based economy. Its foundation lay in the basic supply and demand relationship. Producers engaged with first-run cinema hall owners in Istanbul, partly controlled by major film-importing companies, for distribution. Collaborating with distributors in six regions including Istanbul, Adana, Ankara, Samsun, İzmir and Zonguldak, producers gleaned audience demands, shaping their film production decisions for the upcoming season. Bonds provided by cinema hall owners or regional operators were used to guarantee labour payments to actors and film crews[29]. Distributors ensured the production of highly demanded films, either renting films or securing four-walled cinema houses for short periods. Owners of cinema houses collected 35 to 45 percent of net profits from ticket revenues, with the remainder going to producers[30]. This economy, rooted in consumer demand, compelled directors to align with commercial sensibilities, leading to a proliferation of formulaic films inspired by Hollywood and Egyptian predecessors. The surge in demand transformed the landscape, with production companies growing from 12 in the 1950s to over 370 in the 1960s and early 1970s[31]. This expansion welcomed newcomers making cinema a lucrative business for those seeking quick financial gains.

Amidst the cinematic productions of this remarkable period, a significant portion consists of action/adventure genre films featuring

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[26]   Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü 1973.

[27]   Özön 1995, p. 50.

[28]   Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü 1973, p. 7.

[29]   Tunç 2012, pp. 92-93.

[30]   For details about regional distributors and four-walling, see Arslan 2011, pp. 105-109.

[31]   Scognamillo 2001, pp. 94-105.

iconic protagonists engaged in horseback combat against non-Turk-ish and non-Muslim adversaries, portraying them as brave, nationalist and intelligent heroes excelled in swordsmanship and combat tech-niques[32]. Within this cinematic landscape, a subset of films emerges, highlighting the heroism of Turks in regions under the dominance of Russia or the Soviet Union. Notably, few filmmakers or actors were distinct to this genre as both leftist and rightist ones participated in the production of such films, irrespective of ideological inclinations. In this regard, the consumer-driven production conditions make it challenging to analyze agency-pertaining to the roles of individual directors, actors, or production companies. Therefore, the article un-dertakes an examination of Turkishness without delving into potential agency roles, focusing instead on its representation within a specific context. Lastly, the film selection is based on availability in archives.

9.3. Turks against the Tsarist army

The narrative in the seven films of the first group unfolds within the backdrop of the second half of the 19th century, specifically in the aftermath of the Crimean War in 1859. This period was not selected arbitrarily by the filmmakers; rather it was a tumultuous era character-ized by the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Russian forces in the Caucasus region. Here, the Crimean War holds a unique status that officially integrated the Ottoman Empire into the European state sys-tem known as the Concert of Europe after its collaboration with Brit-ain and France against Russia. However, despite being on the winning side, the Ottoman Empire faced economic and moral exhaustion as the Black Sea was neutralized for Russia and Britain obtained Cyprus as a reward for its support[33]. This left an imprint on Turkish cultural mem-ory as quoted by Candan Badem from a research published by the General Staff of the Army in 1981:

> During the time of the Crimean War Turkey had almost no real friends in the outside world. Those who seemed friendly were not real friends either… Turkey in this war lost its treasury. For the first time it became indebted to Europe. What is worse, by participating in this war with

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[32]   For an analysis of action/adventure films with historical setting in relation to the Cold War context, see Kıbrıs 2022.

[33]   Badem 2010, p. 2.

allies, thousands of foreign soldiers and civilians were allowed to see closely the most secret places and shortcomings of Turkey… Even some friendly opponents [*sic*, "*dost muhalifler*"] characterized as perfidy the indifferent attitude and foot-dragging of the allies for a long time in the participation in the war… While Turkish soldiers showed every sign of selflessness and shed their blood on the fronts, the Allies took all the honours of the war to themselves. Likewise, some historians came under the influence of this propaganda and neglected the role of the Turks in this war, despite the fact that Turkish casualties in this war amounted to 120,000[34].

According to this quote, during the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire found itself lacking allies and even those appearing as friendly were not truly supportive although many Ottoman soldiers died on the frontline. Therefore, it seems that the Crimean War has been associated with the isolation and feelings of resentment on the Ottoman side.

Given the above mentioned historical setting, the films centralize on the isolation and loneliness of "Turks" under the Russian oppression. In that context, they epitomize Hadji Murad (1818-1852), an actual historical figure who was a Chechen leader fighting against Russia in the 19th century. According to the films, on occasion, he becomes a loyal confidant of Sheikh Shamil (1797-1871), another actual historical figure who was the Muslim leader of North Caucasus, engaging warfare against the Russians in Chechnya and Dagestan since 1834. The films portray both characters as Turkish heroes although Circassians and Chechenians are not Turks and do not even have Central Asian origins.[35] Besides, in the Crimean War, Sheikh Shamil effectively diverted a significant number of Russian troops away from the Russo-Ottoman front, keeping them occupied in the Caucasus[36]. This made Sheikh Shamil the voice of the oppressed people against Russia and so a familiar figure for the Turkish political culture.

In *Kafkas Kartalı*, the voiceover explains the narrative as follows:

After the Crimean War, the Caucasian Turks found themselves compelled to wage a relentless struggle against the Tsarist armies, defending their homeland and honour. At the helm of this valiant resistance

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[34]   Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı 1981, pp. 64–66; Ibid., p. 21.

[35]   Badem 2010, pp. 10, 21.

[36]   Ibid., pp. 211-212.

stood Sheikh Shamil, the champion of Dagestan freedom, who, for thirty years, staunchly resisted the formidable Russian imperial forces. In the year 1859, a mere handful of Turks stood at the precipice of extinction, facing an ominous threat[37].

In this context, the overarching objective of the Russian forces, as portrayed in these narratives, centres on the eradication of all Turkish presence in these lands. Therefore, the films analysed in the article invariably commences with a harrowing depiction of a village raid, wherein innocent lives are brutally extinguished by the evil irrational enemy: Russians. Individuals with scythes and axes embedded in their backs are portrayed, and even animals flee in fear in the film *Hacı Murat'ın* İntikamı. In *Hacı Murat Geliyor*, the protagonist encounters labour camps established by the Russians, where Turks are subjected to harsh treatment such as carrying stones all day long. The same film depicts the kicking of Hacı Murat's mother by the Russians. In *Hacı Murat*, Murat even asserts that the Russians are so evil and therefore take pleasure in causing chaos, burning and destroying without reason.

All these set the stage for the protagonist's entrance. The central character, be it Hadji Murat or Aslan Beg in some cases, embodies a heroic archetype characterized by formidable martial skills, adept use of firearms, proficiency in the archery, and equestrian expertise. The physical attributes of the protagonist are portrayed with noble attractiveness, devoid of any exaggerated traits. In fact, he is represented as the warrior son of another heroic warrior as in the case of Hamza Bey, who is the father of Aslan Bey in *Kafkas* Şeytanı *Aslan Bey*. This depiction reinforces the political myth that Turks are born with inherent military prowess. Consequently, the protagonists in all films are driven by a fervent determination to safeguard Turks from the clutches of the Russian forces and protect their ancestral village and homeland. These villages vividly reflect traditional, rural landscape, characterized by wooden dwellings, women adorned with headscarves and traditional attire. All these do not necessarily evoke a Turkish identity given the fact that men bear Russian influences in their clothing such as their headgears. But they are all out of the centre and therefore strengthens the isolated situation of those people. The serene ambiance mainly quiet atmosphere of these villages is palpably disrupted by the brutal raids of the Tsarist army.

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[37]   Atadeniz 1968.

After the Russian army leaves, the protagonist traverses the boundless, often snow-covered, steppe lands and approaches the village. The protracted scenes unfold over last, desolate expanses, with his solitary and tranquil entry into the village in a manner devoid of accompanying music, or grand entrances. Here, the ambiance evokes a sense of isolation and perhaps serves to accentuate the theme of solitude. Importantly, a pervasive hush pervades these films, notably devoid of any presence of the Ottoman Empire. In the films, Turks are always in a defensive position. They are all alone and persistently make their voices heard by the other Turks. Besides, the absence Russian civilians in the films strengthens the notion that these territories are inherently Turkish. Despite that the civilian Turks and the protagonist try to take revenge and at the same time protect the land piece that they call as the homeland. In *Kafkas* Şeytanı, the protagonist Aslan Beg tells the woman he has captured, the daughter of the Russian commander:

> These lands are our lands mademoiselle. Every person willingly sheds blood for their homeland. We are doing the same, whether you label us as outlaws or heroes; what matters is not the form but the belief[38].

As opposed to mostly civilian Turks on the one side, the adversaries, though characterized as malevolent, adhere to a structured hierarchy and always put on military uniforms. Interestingly, the narratives gradually unravel their identities and respective ranks, firmly establishing them as the formidable army of the Tsar, rather than an undisciplined force. For example, in *Kafkas* Şeytanı *Aslan Bey*, there is a Russian general with too many medals as the enemy. These representations strengthen the idea of how desperate the Turks are against a very powerful and organized enemy. The predominant method of punishment, too, confirms the militaristic side of the enemy. In all films, the Tsarist army involves execution through firing squad without discriminating between men, women or children. The most indelible scenes etched in memory involve a group of prisoners trudging through the snow, and, subsequently, being lined up for execution. This visual depiction of execution by firing squad by uniformed soldiers serves to underscore not only the profound isolation experienced by the Turkic communities, but also their misery and distance.

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[38]   Yalınkılıç 1968.

The protagonist's exceptional courage and intellect earn him admiration, even from the highest-ranking Russian officials. The Tsar himself praises Hadji Murat acknowledging him as more valiant and more astute than his officers. In a striking scene from the film, *Hacı Murat*, the commander remarks to his subordinates: "You are meant to drink vodka and dance at the balls"[39]. In *Osmanlı Kartalı*, he is praised by a major. The protagonist's ingenuity, accompanied by an ability to turn disadvantage into advantage through the clever use of disguises and other and other strategic manoeuvres is also emphasized. Besides, children always admire him and view him in the highest regard. A notable scene unfolds when a seven- or eight-year-old Turkish boy named Ali gazes with awe at the knife in Murat's hand in *Hacı Murat* during a combat with the enemy. The boy admires Murat's fighting skills and then Murat says: "War is like that. And people may not come back [from war]. Those who wait should get used to it. [This is what war is] especially for men"[40]. Here, Ali represents a man-to-be and Murat implies traditional gender roles regarding the role of men through a militarist message.

Furthermore, the portrayal of women is not overtly pronounced or dominant. 'Our' women predominantly assume the role of maids, with only Sheikh Shamil's daughter serving as an exception. In the case of *Hacı Murat Geliyor*, there is also Murat's mother depicted as an innocent and humble Turkish woman with traditional clothes such as headscarf and lose pants. As for the women of the other, two characters are worth mentioning. The first is Boronzon's wife, Princess Maria in *Hacı Murat*, who converts to Islam, transitioning to Ayşe. *Kafkas Kartalı* has Bianca, another Russian princess, falling in love with Murat. Both women are the representatives of the 'good others' who finally discovers the true path in their lives. Here, the absence of morally compromised female characters from the other side can potentially be attributed to the filmmakers' deliberate avoidance of any portrayals that might incite tension with the Soviet Union during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The films in this part do incorporate certain Islamic elements, albeit in a progressively unfolding manner. This might be an indication of the burgeoning influence of political Islam. In this regard, the only

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[39]   Batyan 1967.

[40]   Ibid.

depiction related to Islam in the late 1960s is in *Kafkas Kartalı*. Before surrendering Sheikh Shamil prays on the snowy ground. He implores "Do not forget your Turkish identity" and he further emphasizes: "Our homeland is entrusted to you. Do not reside elsewhere but in the Turkish homeland"[41]. Then, amidst the resounding calls of "Allahu Akbar" he departs. Yet it is pivotal to recognize that, in essence, the cause championed by Murat has become a unifying force for all Turks. Indeed, in the 1970s, this cause had predominantly Islamic elements. In *Hacı Murat'ın İntikamı*, Murat's father was murdered while reciting the Koran in a mosque.

9.4. Turkishness in the Soviet Union

The narratives of *501 Numaralı Hücre* and *Güneş Ne Zaman Doğacak?* are characterized by complexity, featuring numerous parallel characters with interconnected stories. In contrast to the films discussed in the preceding section, these works depict a rich atmosphere marked by the presence of spies, soldiers, conspiracies, secret police service as well as prolonged scenes of torture and imprisonment. This heightened complexity may be attributed to the audience's familiarity with the Soviet Union and the diverse political myths and narratives associated with it. These elements collectively illustrate the profound desperation experienced by the characters and the nature of the repressive conditions they faced.

501 Numaralı Hücre unfolds in the 1930s, is set in the period between 1920s-30s whereas *Güneş Ne Zaman Doğacak* takes place in an indistinct temporal setting but definitely situated during the Cold War era. Their storylines bear notable similarities, featuring Turks or Turkic characters residing under Soviet oppression. The protagonists Mehmet Altunbay in the first film and Yavuz Mehmedov in the second one, both occupy prominent roles, serving as the air force commander and a bureaucrat, respectively. Among the two characters, Mehmet Altunbay (1911-1987) is an actual historical figure, a Soviet pilot of Azerbaijani origin. According to very limited historical sources about him, in 1939, he and his two other friends hijacked a plane to Turkey but are shot by the border security. Then they had forced landing in Iran, detained in Tabriz. After nine months they escaped from the prison with the help of the Turkish

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41   Atadeniz 1968.

embassy in Tehran. When they migrated to Turkey, Altunbay continued to work as a pilot[42]. The film was definitely inspired by his life story although searching for one-to-one connection is not feasible. Besides, he was probably an unfamiliar character to the Turkish audience. However, the film still served to nurture the anti-Russian discourse of the Cold War.

Despite their high-ranking positions, both Mehmet and Yavuz harbour a national consciousness, fuelling their shared aspiration to reach Turkey and spearhead organized resistance against the Soviet regime. For them, Turkey is the motherland (*anavatan*) and this reinforces idea that the Turks under the Soviet regime are all living "outside". In that context, the link between Turkey and the Turkic communities is emphasized in several scenes. For instance, on his way to Turkey, an elderly man presents Yavuz with a *kaval* with the following words:

> Take this instrument with you, play our song there…This song has been sung for five millennia. Let everybody know it. Teach each one of them this sacred piece. Suleiman the Magnificent had once played the *kaval* across three continents. Imam Bukhari had played it. Tell them not to turn against each other. Tell them the painful, unhappy end of our discord[43].

Here, the evocation of the *kaval*, a venerable musical instrument traditionally played across the Balkans and Anatolia, often associated with mountain shepherds, serves to underscore the shared cultural bonds between the people of Turkey and Turkestan. Moreover, it highlights a historical continuity spanning five millennia and three continents- Asia, Europe and Africa, all of which had once been under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. This extensive temporal journey commences pre-Islamic eras, traverses the 9th century marked by the scholarly achievements of Imam Bukhari, a renowned scholar of Islamic history, who meticulously compiled the Prophet's hadiths. It ultimately culminates in the 16th century, characterized by the reign of Sultan Suleiman, presiding over the zenith of the Ottoman Empire's history. As a result, the histories of both geographies unite with this narrative.

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[42] Özkan 2018, pp. 331-340.

[43] Kılıç 1977.

The protagonists of from these geographies exhibit intelligence and charisma; although their combat skills are not prominently showcased, the audience perceives them as capable and composed individuals, embodying trustworthiness and charisma with an underlying understanding of their potential for combat when necessary. This portrayal strengthens their depiction as the civilized "us" in contrast to the perceived barbarity of the Russians. The enemy's cruelty and aggressiveness are depicted through various raids wherein the Russians assault innocent civilians, subjecting them to imprisonment or death. For example, *Güneş Ne Zaman Doğacak?*'s opening sequence[44] illustrates the aftermath of the Red Army's destruction of Yavuz's village, presenting a scene of desolation with a deteriorated mosque and Turkic inhabitants, including Yavuz's mother, taking refuge in their partially demolished homes. In the background, the call to prayer (*ezan*) can be heard, although the identity of the individual reciting it remains ambiguous. Yavuz is apprehended by members of the Red Army by participating in the recitation of azan, leading to his imprisonment. Then, in a particularly discerning scene, Yavuz finds himself subjected to torture at the hand of the Red Army operatives, their stated rationale being his alleged endeavour to sway individuals through *ezan*. The visual depiction of this torment is characterized by close-up shots, meticulously framing Yavuz's ensure physique, coupled with the administration of a certain narcotic agent. Concurrently, Yavuz is compelled to listen to propagandistic speeches, coercing acquiescence to the prevailing regime's authority. Here, the audience witnesses not only the cruelty but also the oppressive nature of the Soviet regime. In both films, Soviet oppression encompasses political suppression, restrictions on individual freedoms, extensive police surveillance, imprisonment, killings, and the imposition of communism. In this context the films primarily convey the notion that Turks under the Soviet rule experienced hardships and constraints on their national and religious identity, prompting a

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[44] This scene is accompanied by the folk song *Güzel Türkistan* (Beautiful Turkestan), a deliberate choice with a profound historical resonance. The lyrics of the song were composed by Abdullah Süleyman Çolpan, an Uzbek poet who met his demise during Stalin's Great Purge in 1938. The song's fundamental message calls upon the people of Turkistan to awaken and unite against oppression and cruelty, aligning harmoniously with the overarching narrative of the film and the call a national reawakening. Another folk song in the film is *Çırpınırdı Karadeniz* (Fluttering Black Sea), which is about the Russian oppression on the Azeris in the First World War. This is again a popular idealist song based on a poem by Azeri poet Ahmet Cevat.

desire for resistance and liberation. Consequently, the depicted war is portrayed legitimate. This legitimacy is underscored in the latter half of *501 Numaralı Hücre* with the involvement of even some scientists and the daughter of the chief of secret police service.

In *Güneş Ne Zaman Doğacak?*, a striking component that arrests the discerning the viewer's attention is the presence of a charcoal rendering of Lenin adorning the wall within the chamber of torment. This identical depiction of Lenin's image is also observable within the confines of a school affiliated with the communist party, designed to indoctrinate young students, typically aged eleven or twelve in alignment with the party's principles. This institution swiftly expels those who dare to question the ruling regime. The fundamental objective of the school resides in the systematic erosion of moral values, traditional martial norms and religious beliefs, thus warranting the establishment of a dedicated department referred to as "spreading godlessness"[45]. In a similar manner, *501 Numaralı Hücre* includes multiple references to the Russians as "*Allahsız*" implying godlessness, particularly when inflicting torture on the Turkic people calling themselves as *mucahits*, individuals engaged in holy war against infidels. These allusions all serve to offer insights into the perspective held by anti-communism of the Cold War era in which communism is perceived as a force that actively undermines moral foundations restrict freedoms and threatens religious convictions[46].

On the other hand, when Yavuz of *Güneş Ne Zaman Doğacak?* comes to Istanbul, he undergoes a disheartening disillusionment. His awakening dawns as he confronts the pervasive infiltration of "foreign ideologies," most notably communism and capitalism, within the Turkish landscape. This disillusionment is further compounded when he stumbles upon bookstores peddling the writings of Mao, Jack London, Gorki and Yılmaz Güney juxtaposed with a publication bearing the title *Gençliğin Cinsel Mücadelesi* (The Sexual Struggle of the Youth). Street vendors eagerly proffer tickets to erotic films. Yavuz's gaze also alights upon newspapers chronicling the fervent protests of students and workers. His friend, Alp Giray Nuriyev also mentions the notion that minorities should play a catalytic role in fomenting anarchy within the nation. From Yavuz's vantage point, the prevailing milieu in Turkey

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[45] Kılıç 1977.

[46] Eraslan 1977.

encapsulates a moral decay stemming from the imposition of foreign ideologies. He attributes much of this to a profound spiritual emptiness brought about by the tenets of communism and capitalism[47].

In this broader context, the female character of Cemile crystallizes this perceived spiritual void. Notably, Cemile aligns with leftist ideological tenets, personifying the traits often attributed to leftists by the Idealists. She enjoys dancing to Western music, has jeans and listens to Western music in her room. Her behaviour is often deemed irresponsible as she returns home after her father, displaying a lack of respect and hospitality, to the extent of not even greeting her father's guests. Moreover, her room features posters of figures like Che Guevera and slogans such as "freedom to Angola" and "Chile ship Esmeralda, go home". In Yavuz's eyes, she personifies an elitist, pampered individual who has superficially embraced Western values[48].

One evening, Yavuz undertakes to play his *kaval*, plays it at Cemile's house while he is a guest of her father. This disturbs Cemile's sleep, prompting her to express her frustration by belittling Yavuz, remarking: "You may be a shepherd, but this is not a mountain". This scene illustrates the biased perception held by the Idealists who view leftists as elitist. Yavuz reacts by escorting her back to her room with a firm grip on her arm, adopting a macho demeanour. He asserts that she cannot grasp the essence of the *kaval* because she has detached himself from her Turkish heritage. Furthermore, he delivers a speech emphasizing that nationalism stands in opposition to both communism and capitalism. In this exchange, Cemile experiences a moment of enlightenment confirming the conventional depiction of the gender roles which portray men as the active agents whereas women are only passive receivers. As she falls in love with Yavuz, she is rescued and ultimately adopts a nationalist stance. Upon completing her transformation, she alters the slogans adorning her room's walls. The new slogans include "don't forget enslaved Turks" and "nationalist independent Turkey" accompanied by images of Alparslan, the Seljuk Sultan who triumphed over the Byzantines in Anatolia, as well as several Ottoman Sultans bearing a traditional Ottoman flag featuring three crescents. Through these new slogans, the Ottomans, Seljuks and contemporary Turkey are depicted as part of a continuous national and Islamic heritage. Furthermore, Cemile starts

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47   Kılıç 1977.

48   Ibid.

dressing modestly, opting for a demure skirt, and styling her hair in a bun. In one of the final scenes, she is seen wearing a cooking apron and states that she has found her identity thanks to Yavuz. Consequently, Cemile is portrayed as a passive and vulnerable character who undergoes a transformation catalysed by the assertive male character. This transformation of Cemile aligns with the type of metamorphosis Yavuz envisions for the Turkish people influenced by external forces. Thus, even though the film lacks violent scenes, it conveys powerful messages. These messages cast Yavuz as a valiant and resolute national warrior who champions the cause of Turkishness and Islam against perceived godlessness and communism.

Similarly, in *501 Numaralı Hücre*, Mehmet Altunbay's affirmation of his Turkishness becomes evident with the revelation of his possession of a Turkish passport, a noteworthy and unexpected detail considering his Azerbaijani origin and residence in the Soviet Union. This peculiarity may be interpreted as a means to unveil his suppressed inner identity under the influence of Soviet pressure, marking a process of Turkification. He also underscores his Islamic identity. A notable instance is observed when he and his associate receive support from an Iraqi soldier during their imprisonment in British-occupied Iraq. Altunbay recognizes this soldier as their Muslim brother, emphasizing "the belief and feeling of being connected that Stalin seeks to obliterate"[49]. These references contribute to the reinforcement of an anti-Russian political discourse and underscore the bond between Turkey and outside Turks.

9.5. Conclusion

Amid the plethora of action and adventure films produced during the pinnacle of Turkish cinema, it is noteworthy that there is a conspicuous dearth of examples that prominently feature Russia or the Soviet Union as subject matters. This apparent absence may be linked to the limited familiarity of the Turkish audience with Russians, in stark contrast to the Greek adversaries, who served as the central theme of numerous cinematic productions. The scarcity of such film productions might also signify a deliberate departure in search of alternative thematic material.

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[49]   Eraslan 1977.

In those rare instances where films do delve into the portrayal of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, the narratives gradually acquire multifaceted layers through their engagement with the Soviet Union. Throughout all the films, a recurring theme is the aggression of both the Tsar's army, and later Stalin's army against innocent civilians, who are subsequently enslaved. A comparative analysis also reveals that the depiction of the Russian Empire, replete with its formidable army and opulent palaces, could potentially be attributed to the Ottoman Empire's imperial heritage as well. This portrayal might be an attempt to establish a semblance of imperial affinity. In contrast, the Soviets are portrayed as immediate adversaries, and the Turkish or Turkic characters eventually sever their ties with these regions.

One might speculate that this approach was consciously adopted to distance the films from irredentist tendencies given the foreign policy concerns of the 1960s and 1970s. However, it is worth noting that the underlying desire to foster a sense of affinity with the people residing in the Russian dominated space persists throughout. The marked absence of any Turkish characters hailing from the Ottoman Empire or modern-day Turkey might be seen as a measure to negate any irredentist or expansionist implications. Nevertheless, the enduring appeal of this underlying concepts remains discernible.

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Afterword

Fabio L. Grassi

As the supervisor of the project that resulted in this publication, I offer my sincere congratulations to the contributors of this book, which provides valuable insights into the political and cultural struggles that shaped Turkey during the Cold War era. It is noteworthy that during the Cold War era, Turkey was regarded as the "twin country" of Greece, a parallel that can be drawn with the perception of Italy as the "twin country" of France. The initial group of North Atlantic Treaty members included a de facto dictatorship, namely Portugal, as well as two countries (France and Italy) where strong and legal Communist Parties were present. Portugal maintained its authoritarian rule until the mid-1970s, then experienced a troubled but successful transition to a stable pluralist liberal democracy. Italy and France were pluralist countries from the beginning, but at the same time were countries where the communist factor (and, in France, the problems of decolonization) often created an atmosphere of potential civil war and a physiological political alternation could not take place[1].

As for Greece and Turkey, during the Cold War these two countries not only followed until 1981 parallel routes in the integration with the West but shared the condition of experiencing a limited (for some aspects very limited), endangered, troubled and sometimes comple-

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[1]   François Mitterand's victory in 1981 coincided with a serious decrease of the allied French Communist Party. His victory did not demonstrate that the Communist factor was over, rather demonstrated that in the West a physiological change of government between the left and the wing of the various national political "markets" could occur only with the weakening of this factor. In that same 1981 Greece became member of the European Economic Community, separating its own destiny from that of Turkey.

tely suspended regime of pluralist liberal democracy, where not only their communist parties were for long time openly banned (the Communist Party of Greece until 1974) but the leftist parties were permanently accused to be crypto-communist organization. In sum, both in Greece and Turkey the whole of the leftist side of the political arena was permanently subject to delegitimization, stigma and threat[2].

Another shared feature of Greece and Turkey in the post-WWII period was that they did not experience a significant economic takeoff. Both countries remained relatively poor, with a fragile economy and a limited middle class. Periodically, there were severe declines in the welfare and spending power of the lower classes, which followed brief periods of improvement. There are numerous potential explanations for this persistent underdevelopment and inability to join the "society of the two-thirds" that other countries in the Western bloc achieved in the "glorious thirties" (with the exception of Portugal). This complex issue requires a multidisciplinary approach, as it involves a range of historical, anthropological, sociological, and religious factors. However, we argue that the general delegitimization of the left was a relevant factor. This allowed the local ruling classes to criminalize social struggles and to spare them from being "annoyed" by strong, combative trade unions.

The anti-communist elites of Greece and Turkey followed parallel routes in the integration with the West and became formally allied in 1952 but their relations quickly deteriorated especially due to the question of Cyprus. This is another anomaly they share, being permanently in uneasy terms with another member of the Western alliance. The last contribution of this book recalls a special aspect of Turkey that no other country of the "Atlantic Pact" shared: having millions of kin communities inside a Soviet Union, where 5 out of 15 republics bore the names of Turkic peoples. Many of the national leaders of these peoples lived in exile in Turkey. Ankara may have had another weapon aimed at Moscow. This weapon was the large Caucasian diaspora. But to bring the Caucasian diaspora into the public space, into the official discourse, was too dangerous for the myth of the Turkish nation established by the kemalist regime in the 1920s and 1930s. Occasionally, citizens of Caucasian origin were referred to as "Caucasian Turks" (in

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[2]   In formally banning its own Communist Party, from 1956 to 1968 West Germany joined Portugal, Greece and Turkey. However in West Germany the Socialist Party had so rooted and clear an anti-Communist stance that the delegitimization of the entire left could not be seriously conceived and pursued.

fact, only a very little share of the Caucasian diaspora has Turkic roots), but in the end, the Turkish state preferred to keep this weapon in its pocket.

Finally, it can be observed that the Cold War facilitated the entrenchment of the Turkish nomenklatura, which effectively froze all structural issues within the country and its own power. During the final decade of the 20th century, this nomenklatura demonstrated a striking inability, or perhaps even unwillingness, to develop new policies and discourses, to reform itself, or to engage in constructive dialogue with civil society. In the preceding decades, the rhetoric of a persistent, prevailing threat and the rhetoric of *önce vatan, gerisi teferruat* (prior is the fatherland, the rest is inconsequential) provided a rationale for numerous injustices and authoritarian actions. However, these justifications remained grounded in the reality of a bipolar competition in which the country was a first-line player. The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity for Turkey to address its internal challenges and build a new relationship with civil society. However, as long as the pluralism was perceived as a national security challenge, for Turkey the 1990s were a lost decade.

Abstracts

1) Tutelary but not unitary. The role of ideology and political culture in Turkey's civil-military relations during the Cold War

Samuele C.A. Abrami

Abstract

For long time during the Republican era, the Turkish paradigm of civil-military relations (CMR) became increasingly based on a convergence of the army filling the basic security needs of the society as well as a central role of guardianship and national continuity. While traditional scholarships tend to analyze this phenomenon under either institutionalist or international relations approaches, this chapter aims at grasping its overlooked cultural dimension. Refuting the idea of the Turkish military as a unitary actor, this chapter aims not only to explain how military's tutelary function varied over time, but also to disentangle the nuances characterizing the different political and ideological stances within the Turkish army itself. In this sense, the global ideological-power confrontation of the Cold War era is here considered as a major determinant in altering Turkey's socio-political environment around two main issues: the communist threat and the rise of leftist political groups; the emergence of a debate on whether an "Islamic-Democratic Synthesis" would be a barrier or an additional threat to the former. Through a multidimensional approach combining historical, culturalist, and comparative cross-time analyses, the objective is also to confute earlier claims that Turkish military's tutelage was limited to restore public order and preserve the secular regime.

2) Between the two poles: the anti-communist centre-left discourse in the Republican People's Party in the Cold War period (1950s-1970s)

Ali Açıkgöz, Carlo Sanna

Abstract

Most of the existing literature dealing with the left in Turkish political history and party politics during the Cold War period focused mainly on the cultural and political movements located at the far or extreme ends of the spectrum. Even when dealing with the Republican People's Party (CHP), which after the turn to multi-party politics embarked in a slow but steady path towards the "left of centre" and social democracy, important research has been carried on about its relations with the movements of the far-left. In that light, a discussion on the developments in the centre-left during the 1960's and 1970's is needed to further place the left in Turkey in a global context. The centre-left organized out of a synthesis of early-republican kemalist and European democratic socialist traditions. This chapter aims to explore the evolution of the discourse within the CHP during the Cold War, answering the questions: What are the main ideological demarcation lines of the CHP's left of centre from other political movements on the Turkish political spectrum at that time? How were these discussions reflected in the overall political strategy of the CHP in the 1960's and 1970's? Who were the intra- and extra-party allies and opponents for the centre-left movement in this era? The main sources will be: memoirs and public writings of relevant political actors of the CHP, journals/newspapers close to the CHP such as "Ulus", "Barış", "Kim", "Akis".

3) "The people's power will be established with its own strong arms": creating a revolutionary culture in the 1970s Turkey through the case of Revolutionary Path *(Devrimci Yol)*

Halit Serkan Simen

Abstract

The period between 1960 to 1980 witnessed a race for political, ideological, and cultural supremacy in Turkey, similar to other parts of the globe, driven by Cold War's struggle for cultural and political hegemony. The '78 Movement, a constructive and destructive repositioning of the '68 movement in a radical sense, aimed to advance the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist struggle in all domains. While various associations

and political groups rallied behind these aims, one of the most notable movements was undoubtedly the Revolutionary Path Movement (*Devrimci Yol Hareketi*). Focusing on primary sources including articles and brochures, as well as memoirs, biographies, and analyses, this study will analyze how the Movement created a discourse and practice of "Revolutionary Culture" tailored for its advanced cadres and masses/people. Amid the political and ideological climate of Cold War Turkey, efforts were made to create a comprehensive common culture for the public by cultivating a series of revolutionary attitudes and values. Due to its numerical and influential capacity, surpassing that of other political movements and parties, Revolutionary Path acquired a distinct discourse, expertise, and influence following its emergence as it was exemplified in the Resistance Committees and Fatsa municipality experiences. Therefore, this study aims to highlight the creation of an alternative revolutionary culture prior to the 1980s, which has received little attention, and to provide a contribution to the political and cultural history of Turkey during Cold War.

4) Borders and boundaries: the impact of Soviet-Turkish relations on Armenians during the early Cold War years

Hilal Yavuz

Abstract
This chapter explores Turkey's interactions with the Soviet Union during the early Cold War, using the Soviet-Turkish border as a case study within the framework of borderland studies. It examines how border-related issues extend beyond physical boundaries, engaging with broader temporal and spatial contexts. The shifting dynamics of this border are analysed to highlight their effects on Armenians living in Turkey, with particular attention to the experiences of Zaven Biberyan (1921-1984), a prominent author, journalist, and political activist.

5) Integral State against communism in the Cold War (1945-1980)

Fatih Cağatay Cengiz

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the formation of an anti-communist front in Turkey between 1945 and 1980 in terms of the "integral state" a concept examined by Antonio Gramsci Even though a plethora

of literature examines the anti-communist battle from the standpoint of the state or civil society separately, this chapter argues for the dichotomic unity of state and civil society against communism in Turkey during the Cold War. According to the chapter, the anti-communist front in Turkey established a strong partnership and alliance between the state and civil society, allowing the state to organize and construct anti-communist consent inside the sphere of civil society. In other words, the chapter claims that throughout the Cold War between 1945 and 1980, the Turkish political regime attempted to construct "anti-communist hegemony armoured with force" in political society and civil society in order to achieve intellectual and moral leadership over the masses.

6) A representation of the Turkish Cold War through the political thoughts of Samiha Ayverdi

Gaia Poccetti

Abstract
This contribution aims at analyzing Samiha Ayverdi's profile as intellectual towards the most common right-wing ideologies in Turkey in the '60s and '70s of the past century. This study, which is part of an on-going research, focuses on two Ayverdi's works *Türk-Rus Münasebetleri ve Muharebeleri and Millî Kültür Mes'eleleri ve Maârif Dâvâmız*, published respectively in 1970 and 1976.
The main research lines about Ayverdi's works have neglected an in-depth analysis of her political ideas, even if she often manifested her thoughts in any kind of literary production. Not even the socio-historical environment, that contributed to shape her intellectual profile, has been adequately investigated, particularly in the framework of the Cold War. Essentially, the paper aims not only to enlarge the sources of the crucial period of the Cold War in Turkey, but also to focus on the perspective of an *insider*, such as Samiha Ayverdi, and repercussions of both political and cultural life in Turkey on her production.

7) Living under the bomb: risk and catastrophe in Turkish Cold War culture

Pınar Batur, John M. VanderLippe

Ulrich Beck asks about the "culture of catastrophe" and how it transforms our understanding of world, risk, and everyday life in rational

society, in denial of incalculable uncertainty. When the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki they also exploded in human minds, leading to a decisive break in frames of reference. The bombs, and their destructive power, started and shaped the Cold War, while the explosion and the destruction of two cities altered our conceptualization of conflict, violence and war.

The central aim of our paper is to step out of the confines of the classical geo-political, international relations approach to explore debates to study the impact of the creation, use and proliferation of nuclear weapons on Turkey, a country that was neutral during World War II, but central to the Cold War. We are interested in how the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were represented in Turkish media at the time and since, how the existence of nuclear weapons influenced Turkey's participation in the Korean War, and how the U.S.-Soviet arms race forced Turkey onto centre stage during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Our paper will reveal the cultural and political impact of collective memory on understanding of risk and peace. How did this construction of historical memory become the core of a "culture of catastrophe"? How did, and do, Turkish people reconcile the "incalculable uncertainty" of nuclear risk? How has the "incalculable uncertainty" become an integral and invisible aspect of Cold War politics and culture in Turkey? We will illustrate our argument by media, Turkish intellectuals and interviews.

8) Islamic Studies in Turkey. A transnational history of the Cold War

Zeynep Bursa Millet

Abstract
The academic institutionalization of Islam in Turkey began at the outset of the Cold War and was deeply marked by the international dynamics of this period. Thus, the scientific works about Islam constitutes a privileged object of study of the transformation of the relationship between science, religion and politics during the Cold War.
After kemalism's long break with Islam, Turkey became the crucible of a scientification of Islam during this period, hosting different transnational actors and networks. They contributed to the institutionalization of knowledge on Islam by developing new scientific and political approaches. The scientific production on Turkish Islam has been deeply marked and transformed by cultural transfers from the Western world

and, in particular, from the United States. This occurred through the circulation of ideas and actors between Turkey, the Muslim world, and Europe, and finally via intellectual migrations from Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus, from Titist Yugoslavia, and from Communist Bulgaria. Turkish Islam is thus the bearer of different scientific, intellectual, and political approaches but also of different spaces and temporalities.

9) "A handful of Turks facing the threat of extinction": cinematic portrayals of Turkishness in the Russian-dominated sphere

Güldeniz Kıbrıs

Abstract

In the action/adventure films of the 1960s-1970s, Turkish identity is depicted amidst Russian-dominated contexts, reflecting the prevailing political landscape of the Cold War era. Through close analysis of nine films, this article explores the complex relationship between historical and political milieu and their manifestations in popular culture. Divided into two sections, the films set in the 19th and 20th centuries reveal a nuanced portrayal of Turkishness. The first group of films set in the 19th century portrays Turkish heroes combating Russian oppression in the Caucasus region. Through the central figures of Hadji Murat and Aslan Beg, these narratives highlight the isolation and courage of Turks facing a formidable enemy. Despite the absence of Ottoman support, the protagonists embody martial prowess and intellect, earning admiration even from high-ranking Russian officials. The films depict the brutal reality of village raids and execution by firing squad, underscoring the desperation and distance experienced by Turkic communities.

In contrast, the narratives of the two films set in the 20th century, against the backdrop of Soviet oppression, are characterized by complexity. Mehmet Altunbay and Yavuz Mehmedov, the protagonists of these films, navigate the treacherous terrain of Soviet rule with a shared aspiration to reach Turkey and resist the regime. The films depict the harsh realities of political suppression, imprisonment, and torture under Soviet rule, highlighting the desire for resistance and liberation. Through these narratives, the films reflect the prevailing anti-communist discourse and Turkey's cautious foreign policy stance during the Cold War era. They depict Turkey as a sanctuary for "Outside Turks," providing refuge against encroaching powers. By contextualizing these

films within the trajectory of Turkish cinema and the broader political and historical context, this article elucidates the intricate interplay between ideology, culture, and geopolitics in shaping representations of Turkish identity on screen.

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Historica

Turkey's position as the only Muslim-majority member of NATO, coupled with its pivotal role in pursuing Western interests in the Middle East and Western Europe, has attracted significant scholarly attention, particularly in the fields of diplomatic and international relations history. In contrast, the cultural and ideological dimensions of the Cold War have begun to be studied systematically only in recent years. In this light, the book is an attempt to present to an international audience some tassels of the complex mosaic of Turkey's Cold War by focusing on its cultural and ideological dimensions. Adopting a variety of disciplinary approaches, the essays in this collection examine the interconnections between politics and culture, the anti-communist intellectual landscape, and the role of cultural production and the media, questioning how the global dynamics of the Cold War affected political, cultural, and social change in Turkey.

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